Editing Dual-use technology (section)

== Biological ==
{{see also|Gain-of-function research}}
The July 2007 [[terrorist]] attacks [[2007 London car bombs|in central London]] and [[2007 Glasgow International Airport attack|at Glasgow airport]] was a recent biosecurity wake-up call when it was discovered that doctors which could have access to [[pathogen]]s were among the suspects. The challenge remains to maintain security without impairing the contributions to progress afforded by research.<ref>
{{cite journal
|author=Daniel Cressey
|date=17 August 2007
|title=Not so secure after all
|journal=[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]
|volume=448
|issue=7155
|pages=732–733
|doi=10.1038/448732a
|pmid=17700663
|bibcode=2007Natur.448..732C
|pmc=7095479
}}</ref>

Reports from the project on building a sustainable culture in dual-use [[bioethics]] suggest that, as a result of perceived changes in both science and security over the past decade, several states and multilateral bodies have underlined the importance of making life scientists aware of concerns over dual-use and the legal obligations underpinning the prevention of biological weapons. One of the key mechanisms that have been identified to achieve this is through the education of life science students, with the objective of building what has been termed a “culture of responsibility”.

At the 2008 Meeting of States Parties to the [[Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention]] (BTWC), it was agreed by consensus that: States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines...States Parties noted that formal requirements for seminars, modules or courses, including possible mandatory components, in relevant scientific and engineering training programmes and continuing professional education could assist in raising awareness and in implementing the convention.<ref>UN (2008) "Report of the Meeting of States Parties", BWC/MSP/2008/5, 12 December 2008.</ref>

The [[World Health Organization]] in 2010 developed a "guidance document" for what it called "Dual Use Research of Concern" (DURC) in the life sciences, regarding “research that is intended [to] benefit, but which might easily be misapplied to do harm".<ref name="whodurc">{{cite news |title=Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) |url=https://www.who.int/csr/durc/en/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029002508/http://www.who.int/csr/durc/en/ |url-status=dead |archive-date=October 29, 2013 |access-date=4 February 2021 |publisher=World Health Organization}}</ref>

Along with several similar stipulations from other states and regional organisations,  [[biosecurity]] education has become more important. Unfortunately, both the policy and academic literature show that life scientists across the globe are frequently uninformed or underinformed about biosecurity, dual-use, the BTWC and national legislation outlawing biological weapons.<ref>Mancini. G & Revill. J (2008) Fostering the Biosecurity Norm: Biosecurity Education for the Next Generation of Life Scientists, November 2008. {{cite web|url=http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/content/binary/Fostering%20the%20Biosecurity%20NormFinal.pdf |title=Centrovolta.it - Informazioni Turistiche |access-date=2010-08-20 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721161219/http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/content/binary/Fostering%20the%20Biosecurity%20NormFinal.pdf |archive-date=2011-07-21 }}</ref><ref>Minehata. M and D. Friedman (2009) Biosecurity Education in Israeli Research Universities. Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project on Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual Use Bioethics. http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/dube/publications/Israel_BioSecReport_Final.pdf</ref> Moreover, despite numerous declarations by states and multilateral organisations, the extent to which statements at the international level have trickled down to multifaceted activity at the level of scientists remains limited.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Revill |first=James |last2=Mancini |first2=G. |last3=Minehata |first3=Masamichi |last4=Shinomiya |first4=N. |date=2009-11-18 |title=Biosecurity education: surveys from Europe and Japan |url=https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Biosecurity-education:-surveys-from-Europe-and-Revill-Mancini/141b1ff94d89ec1af2a97bba03e4d66d1c32bf75 |journal=Conference: Inter Academy Panel Workshop on Promoting Education on Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Revill |first=James |date=January 2009 |title=Biosecurity and Bioethics Education: A Case Study of the UK Context. |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/202170909_Biosecurity_and_Bioethics_Education_A_Case_Study_of_the_UK_Context |journal=Conference: Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project on Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual Use Bioethics}}</ref>

The US federal government (USG) developed several policy documents on DURC. In May 2024, the White House published the "United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential",<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/news-updates/2024/05/06/united-states-government-policy-for-oversight-of-dual-use-research-of-concern-and-pathogens-with-enhanced-pandemic-potential/ |title=United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential |date=May 6, 2024 |publisher=White House Office of Science and Technology Policy }}</ref> "a unified federal oversight framework for conducting and managing certain types of federally funded life sciences research on biological agents and toxins." The policy superseded several prior documents, published in 2012,<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf |title=United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern |year=2012}}</ref> 2014,<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/durc-policy.pdf |title=United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern |year=2014}}</ref> and 2017,<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/P3CO-FinalGuidanceStatement.pdf |title=Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight |year=2017}}</ref> and it follows the directives established by the 2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-Final.pdf |title=National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan |publisher=White House |year=2022}}</ref>