Editing First day on the Somme (section)

====British====
[[File:Lewis Gun (derivated).jpg|left|thumb|{{centre|An example of a [[Lewis gun]]}}]]
In 1915, British tactical thinking had been based on the experience of its [[Western Front (World War I)|Western Front]] battles, particularly the [[Battle of Loos]] in September and the study of French and German experience in translated manuals and pamphlets. British planners knew the importance of organised artillery firepower and the integration of types of weapons and equipment. [[Barrage (artillery)|Creeping barrages]], [[smoke screen]]s and [[Chemical warfare|cloud gas discharges]] were to be used along with aircraft, [[Stokes mortar]]s (a light trench mortar), [[Lewis gun]]s (a light machine-gun) and elaborate signals systems to counter the chronic lack of communication, once infantry advanced beyond their telephone system when they attacked. Troops were to advance in a succession of lines grouped into waves, followed by parties to consolidate captured ground or pass through the leading troops and continue the advance.{{sfn|Griffith|1996|pp=53–54}}

The [[9th (Scottish) Division]] had attacked at Loos with four battalions on a front {{cvt|1600|yd}} wide, each battalion in three waves. A second battalion followed each of the leading battalions in the same formation, ready to [[Leapfrogging (infantry)|leapfrog]] beyond and a second brigade followed the first as a reserve. Six lines of infantry, with the soldiers {{cvt|2|yd}} apart had confronted the German defence. Lines and waves had been made thinner and shallower since then. On 14 July 1916, in the attack on Longueval, the 9th (Scottish) Division advanced with four battalions. Companies were arranged in columns of platoons, creating four platoon waves {{cvt|70|yd}} apart. One of the attacking brigades advanced with each battalion on a two-company front with two companies behind and a second battalion following on. Each section of the front was attacked by sixteen platoon waves. Six platoons had attacked on a front of about {{cvt|1000|yd}}, roughly one soldier every {{cvt|5.5|yd}}.{{sfn|Griffith|1996|pp=53–54}}