Editing Fundamental attribution error (section)

==Versus correspondence bias==

The fundamental attribution error is commonly used interchangeably with "correspondence bias" (sometimes called "correspondence inference"), although this phrase refers to a judgment which does not necessarily constitute a bias, which arises when the inference drawn is incorrect, e.g., dispositional inference when the actual cause is situational. However, there has been debate about whether the two terms should be distinguished from each other. Three main differences between these two judgmental processes have been argued:
# They seem to be elicited under different circumstances, as both correspondent dispositional inferences and situational inferences can be elicited spontaneously.<ref>Hamilton, D. L. (1988). Causal attributions viewed from an information-processing perspective. In D. Bar-Tal & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.) ''The social psychology of knowledge''. (Pp. 369-385.) Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press.</ref> Attributional processing, however, seems to only occur when the event is unexpected or conflicting with prior expectations. This notion is supported by a 1994 study, which found that different types of verbs invited different inferences and attributions.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Semin | first1 = G. R. | last2 = Marsman | first2 = J. G. | year = 1994 | title = Multiple inference-inviting properties" of interpersonal verbs: Event instigation, dispositional inference and implicit causality | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 67 | issue = 5| pages = 836–849 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.67.5.836}}</ref> Correspondence inferences were invited to a greater degree by interpretative action verbs (such as "to help") than state action or state verbs, thus suggesting that the two are produced under different circumstances.
# Correspondence inferences and causal attributions also differ in automaticity. Inferences can occur spontaneously if the behavior implies a situational or dispositional inference, while causal attributions occur much more slowly.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Smith | first1 = E. R. | last2 = Miller | first2 = F. D. | year = 1983 | title = Mediation among attributional inferences and comprehension processes: Initial findings and a general method | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 44 | issue = 3| pages = 492–505 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.44.3.492}}</ref>
# It has also been suggested that correspondence inferences and causal attributions are elicited by different mechanisms. It is generally agreed that correspondence inferences are formed by going through several stages. Firstly, the person must interpret the behavior, and then, if there is enough information to do so, add situational information and revise their inference. They may then further adjust their inferences by taking into account dispositional information as well.<ref name="Gilbert1989"/><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Krull | first1 = D. S. | last2 = Dill | first2 = J. C. | year = 1996 | title = Thinking first and responding fast: Flexibility in social inference processes | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 22 | issue = 9| pages = 949–959 | doi=10.1177/0146167296229008| s2cid = 144727564 }}</ref> Causal attributions however seem to be formed either by processing visual information using perceptual mechanisms, or by activating knowledge structures (e.g. schemas) or by systematic data analysis and processing.<ref>Anderson, C. A., Krull, D. S., & Weiner, B. (1996). Explanations: Processes and consequences. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), ''Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles'' (pp. 221–296). New York, Guilford.</ref> Hence, due to the difference in theoretical structures, correspondence inferences are more strongly related to behavioral interpretation than causal attributions.

Based on the preceding differences between causal attribution and correspondence inference, some researchers argue that the fundamental attribution error should be considered as the tendency to make dispositional rather than situational explanations for behavior, whereas the correspondence bias should be considered as the tendency to draw correspondent dispositional inferences from behavior.<ref>Hamilton, D. L. (1998). Dispositional and attributional inferences in person perception. In J. M. Darley & J. Cooper (Eds.), ''Attribution and social interaction'' (pp. 99-114). Washington, DC, American Psychological Association.</ref><ref name="Krull2001">{{cite book|last1=Krull|first1=Douglas S.|editor1-last=Moskowitz|editor1-first=Gordon B.|title=Cognitive Social Psychology: The Princeton Symposium on the Legacy and Future of Social Cognition|date=2001|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-1135664251|pages=211–227|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DE-cJ8F4rSMC&pg=PA211|language=en|chapter=On partitioning the fundamental attribution error: Dispositionalism and the correspondence bias|location=Mahwah, New Jersey, USA}}</ref> With such distinct definitions between the two, some cross-cultural studies also found that cultural differences of correspondence bias are not equivalent to those of fundamental attribution error. While the latter has been found to be more prevalent in individualistic cultures than collectivistic cultures, correspondence bias occurs across cultures,<ref>Masuda, T., & Kitayama, S. (1996). ''Culture-specificity of correspondence bias: Dispositional inference in Japan.'' Paper presented at the 13th Congress of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Choi | first1 = I. | last2 = Nisbett | first2 = R. E. | year = 1998 | title = Situational salience and cultural differences in the correspondence bias and actor-observer bias | url =https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68364/2/10.1177_0146167298249003.pdf | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 24 | issue = 9| pages = 949–960 | doi=10.1177/0146167298249003| hdl = 2027.42/68364 | s2cid = 145811653 | hdl-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Krull | first1 = D. S. | last2 = Loy | first2 = M. H. | last3 = Lin | first3 = J. | last4 = Wang | first4 = C. F. | last5 = Chen | first5 = S. | last6 = Zhao | first6 = X. | year = 1999 | title = The fundamental attribution error: Correspondence bias in individualist and collectivist cultures | journal = Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin | volume = 25 | issue = 10| pages = 1208–1219 | doi=10.1177/0146167299258003| s2cid = 143073366 }}</ref> suggesting differences between the two phrases. Further, disposition correspondent inferences made to explain the behavior of nonhuman actors (e.g., robots) do not necessarily constitute an attributional error because there is little meaningful distinction between the interior dispositions and observable actions of machine agents.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Edwards |first1=Autumn |last2=Edwards |first2=Chad |title=Does the Correspondence Bias Apply to Social Robots?: Dispositional and Situational Attributions of Human Versus Robot Behavior |journal=Frontiers in Robotics and AI |date=January 4, 2022 |volume=8 |pages=404 |doi=10.3389/frobt.2021.788242 |pmid=35059443 |pmc=8764179 |doi-access=free }}</ref>