Editing Intentionality (section)

== Dennett's taxonomy of current theories about intentionality ==
[[Daniel Dennett]] offers a taxonomy of the current theories about intentionality in Chapter 10 of his book ''[[Intentional stance|The Intentional Stance]]''. Most, if not all, current theories on intentionality accept Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idiom. From this thesis the following positions emerge:
* intentional idiom is problematic for [[natural science|science]];
* intentional idiom is not problematic for science, which is divided into:
** [[Eliminative materialism]];
** [[Epistemological realism]];
** Quinean double standard (see below) which is divided into:
*** adherence to Normative Principle (epistemology), which is divided into:
**** who makes an Assumption of Rationality;
**** who follows the [[Principle of charity|Principle of Charity]];
*** adherence to Projective Principle.

[[Roderick Chisholm]] (1956), [[G.E.M. Anscombe]] (1957), [[Peter Geach]] (1957), and [[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]] (1964) all adhere to the former position, namely that intentional idiom is problematic and cannot be integrated with the natural sciences. Members of this category also maintain realism in regard to intentional objects, which may imply some kind of dualism (though this is debatable).

The latter position, which maintains the unity of intentionality with the natural sciences, is further divided into three standpoints:
* ''Eliminative materialism'', supported by [[W.V. Quine]] (1960) and Churchland (1981)
* ''Realism'', advocated by [[Jerry Fodor]] (1975), as well as Burge, Dretske, Kripke, and the early [[Hilary Putnam]]
* those who adhere to the ''Quinean double standard''.

Proponents of the ''eliminative materialism'', understand intentional idiom, such as "belief", "desire", and the like, to be replaceable either with behavioristic language (e.g. Quine) or with the language of neuroscience (e.g. Churchland).

Holders of ''realism'' argue that there is a deeper fact of the matter to both translation and belief attribution. In other words, manuals for translating one language into another cannot be set up in different yet behaviorally identical ways and ontologically there are intentional objects. Famously, Fodor has attempted to ground such realist claims about intentionality in a language of thought. Dennett comments on this issue, Fodor "attempt[s] to make these irreducible realities acceptable to the physical sciences by grounding them (somehow) in the 'syntax' of a system of physically realized mental representations" (Dennett 1987, 345).

Those who adhere to the so-called ''Quinean double standard'' (namely that ''ontologically there is nothing intentional, but that the language of intentionality is indispensable''), accept Quine's thesis of the [[indeterminacy of translation|indeterminacy of radical translation]] and its implications, while the other positions so far mentioned do not. As Quine puts it, indeterminacy of radical translation is the thesis that "manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another" (Quine 1960, 27). Quine (1960) and [[Wilfrid Sellars]] (1958) both comment on this intermediary position. One such implication would be that there is, in principle, no deeper fact of the matter that could settle two interpretative strategies on what belief to attribute to a physical system. In other words, the behavior (including speech dispositions) of any physical system, in theory, could be interpreted by two different predictive strategies and both would be equally warranted in their belief attribution. This category can be seen to be a medial position between the realists and the eliminativists since it attempts to blend attributes of both into a theory of intentionality. Dennett, for example, argues in ''True Believers'' (1981) that intentional idiom (or "[[folk psychology]]") is a predictive strategy and if such a strategy successfully and voluminously predicts the actions of a physical system, then that physical system can be said to have those beliefs attributed to it. Dennett calls this predictive strategy the [[intentional stance]].

They are further divided into two theses:
* adherence to the ''Normative Principle''
* adherence to the ''Projective Principle''

Advocates of the former, the Normative Principle, argue that attributions of intentional idioms to physical systems should be the propositional attitudes that the physical system ought to have in those circumstances (Dennett 1987, 342). However, exponents of this view are still further divided into those who make an ''Assumption of Rationality'' and those who adhere to the ''Principle of Charity''. Dennett (1969, 1971, 1975), Cherniak (1981, 1986), and the more recent work of Putnam (1983) recommend the Assumption of Rationality, which unsurprisingly assumes that the physical system in question is rational. [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] (1967, 1973, 1974, 1985) and Lewis (1974) defend the Principle of Charity.

The latter is advocated by Grandy (1973) and Stich (1980, 1981, 1983, 1984), who maintain that attributions of intentional idioms to any physical system (e.g. humans, artifacts, non-human animals, etc.) should be the propositional attitude (e.g. "belief", "desire", etc.) that one would suppose one would have in the same circumstances (Dennett 1987, 343).