Editing Iris recognition (section)

==Security considerations==
As with most other biometric identification technology, an important consideration is live-tissue verification. The reliability of any biometric identification depends on ensuring that the signal acquired and compared has actually been recorded from a live body part of the person to be identified and is not a manufactured template. A person's physical characteristics, which includes one's eyes, [[speaker recognition|voice]], and [[handwriting recognition|handwriting]], are not protected by the [[Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fourth Amendment]] even though they are all constantly exposed.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Hashemi|first1=Soheil|last2=Tann|first2=Hokchhay|last3=Buttafuoco|first3=Francesco|last4=Reda|first4=Sherief|title=2018 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE) |chapter=Approximate Computing for Biometric Security Systems: A Case Study on Iris Scanning |date=March 2018|pages=319–324 |language=en-US|publisher=IEEE|doi=10.23919/date.2018.8342029|isbn=9783981926309|s2cid=5061011}}</ref> Many commercially available iris-recognition systems are easily fooled by presenting a high-quality photograph of a face instead of a real face,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brewster |first=Thomas |title=Hacking Putin's Eyes: How To Bypass Biometrics The Cheap And Dirty Way With Google Images |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/03/05/clone-putins-eyes-using-google-images/ |access-date=2023-06-28 |website=Forbes |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Goodin |first=Dan |date=2017-05-23 |title=Breaking the iris scanner locking Samsung's Galaxy S8 is laughably easy |url=https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/breaking-the-iris-scanner-locking-samsungs-galaxy-s8-is-laughably-easy/ |access-date=2023-06-28 |website=Ars Technica |language=en-us}}</ref> which makes such devices unsuitable for unsupervised applications, such as door access-control systems. However, this is not the case with all iris recognition algorithms. The problem of live-tissue verification is less of a concern in supervised applications (e.g., [[immigration control]]), where a human operator supervises the process of taking the picture.

Methods that have been suggested{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} to provide some defence against the use of fake eyes and irises include changing ambient lighting during the identification (switching on a bright lamp), such that the [[pupillary reflex]] can be verified and the iris image be recorded at several different [[pupil]] diameters; analysing the 2D spatial frequency spectrum of the iris image for the peaks caused by the printer [[dither]] patterns found on commercially available fake-iris contact lenses; analysing the temporal frequency spectrum of the image for the peaks caused by computer displays.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}}

Other methods include using [[spectrometer|spectral analysis]] instead of merely monochromatic cameras to distinguish iris tissue from other material; observing the characteristic natural movement of an eyeball (measuring nystagmus, tracking eye while text is read, etc.); testing for retinal [[retroreflection]] ([[red-eye effect]]) or for reflections from the eye's four optical surfaces (front and back of both cornea and lens) to verify their presence, position and shape.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hsieh |first1=Sheng-Hsun |last2=Li |first2=Yung-Hui |last3=Wang |first3=Wei |last4=Tien |first4=Chung-Hao |date=March 2018 |title=A Novel Anti-Spoofing Solution for Iris Recognition Toward Cosmetic Contact Lens Attack Using Spectral ICA Analysis |journal=Sensors |language=en |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=795 |doi=10.3390/s18030795 |pmid=29509692 |pmc=5876747 |bibcode=2018Senso..18..795H |issn=1424-8220 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Another proposed{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} method is to use 3D imaging (e.g., [[stereo camera]]s) to verify the position and shape of the iris relative to other eye features.

A 2004 report{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} by the German [[Federal Office for Information Security]] noted that none of the iris-recognition systems commercially available at the time implemented any live-tissue verification technology. Like any pattern-recognition technology, live-tissue verifiers will have their own false-reject probability and will therefore further reduce the overall probability that a legitimate user is accepted by the sensor.
{{Original research|section|date=April 2014}}