Editing Is–ought problem (section)

===Moral oughts===
As MacIntyre explained, someone may be called a good person if people have an inherent purpose. Many ethical systems appeal to such a purpose. This is true of some forms of [[moral realism]], which states that something can be wrong, even if every thinking person ''believes'' otherwise (the idea of [[brute fact]] about morality). The ethical realist might suggest that humans were created for a purpose (e.g. to serve God), especially if they are an [[ethical non-naturalist]]. If the ethical realist is instead an [[ethical naturalist]], they may start with the fact that humans have [[evolved]] and pursue some sort of [[evolutionary ethics]] (which risks “committing” the [[moralistic fallacy]]).
Not all moral systems appeal to a human telos or purpose. This is because it is not obvious that people even ''have'' any sort of natural purpose, or what [[Teleology|that purpose]] would be. Although many scientists do recognize [[teleonomy]] (a tendency in nature), few philosophers appeal to it (this time, to avoid the naturalistic fallacy).

Goal-dependent oughts run into problems even without an appeal to an innate human purpose. Consider cases where one has no desire to be good—whatever it is. If, for instance, a person wants to be good, and good means washing one's hands, then it seems one morally ought to wash their hands. The bigger problem in moral philosophy is what happens if someone does ''not'' want to be good, whatever its origins? Put simply, in what sense ''ought'' we to hold the goal of being good? It seems one can ask "how am I rationally required to hold 'good' as a value, or to pursue it?"<ref>These ideas are discussed extensively in {{cite book |first=Richard |last=Joyce |authorlink=Richard Joyce (philosopher) |title=The Myth of Morality |year=2001 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=9780521808064}}</ref>

The issue above mentioned is a result of an important [[ethical relativist]] critique. Even if "oughts" depend on goals, the ought seems to vary with the person's goal. This is the conclusion of the [[ethical subjectivist]], who says a person can only be called good according to whether they fulfill their own, ''self-assigned'' goal. Alasdair MacIntyre himself suggests that a person's purpose comes from their culture, making him a sort of ethical relativist.<ref>Discussed in {{Cite book |last=Mackie |first=J. L. |title=Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong |title-link=Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong |publisher=[[Penguin Books]] |year=1997 |isbn=978-0-14-021957-9 |author-link=J. L. Mackie}}</ref> Ethical relativists acknowledge local, institutional facts about what is right, but these are facts that can still vary by society. Thus, without an objective "moral goal", a moral ought is difficult to establish. [[G. E. M. Anscombe]] was particularly critical of the word "ought" for this reason; understood as "We need such-and-such, and will only get it this way"{{mdash}}for somebody may need something immoral, or else find that their noble need requires immoral action.<ref name=":0">{{cite journal |first=Elizabeth |last=Anscombe |authorlink=G. E. M. Anscombe |year=1958 |title=Modern Moral Philosophy |journal=[[Philosophy (journal)|Philosophy]] |volume=33 |issue=124 |pages=1–19 |jstor=3749051 |doi=10.1017/s0031819100037943|s2cid=197875941 |doi-access=free }}</ref>{{rp|19}} Anscombe would even go as far to suggest that "the concepts of obligation, and duty{{mdash}}''moral'' obligation and ''moral'' duty, that is to say{{mdash}}and of what is ''morally'' right and wrong, and of the ''moral'' sense of 'ought,' ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible".<ref name=":0"/>{{rp|1}}

If moral goals depend on private assumptions or public agreement, so may morality as a whole. For example, Canada might call it good to maximize global welfare, where a citizen, Alice, calls it good to focus on herself, and then her family, and finally her friends (with little empathy for strangers). It does not seem that Alice can be objectively or rationally bound—without regard to her personal values ''nor'' those of groups of other people—to act a certain way. In other words, we may not be able to say "You just ''should'' do this". Moreover, persuading her to help strangers would necessarily mean appealing to values she already possesses (or else we would never even have a hope of persuading her).<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Blackford |first=Russell |author-link=Russell Blackford |date=December 2010 |title=Book review: Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape |url=https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=ec180a6b07efa681a28b62d468ddea5dfef7583f |journal=[[Journal of Evolution and Technology]] |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=53–62}}</ref> This is another interest of [[normative ethics]]—questions of [[Normative ethics#Binding force|binding forces]].

There may be responses to the above relativistic critiques. As mentioned above, ethical realists that are non-natural can appeal to God's purpose for humankind. On the other hand, naturalistic thinkers may posit that valuing people's well-being is somehow "obviously" the purpose of ethics, or else the only relevant purpose worth talking about. This is the move made by [[natural law]], [[scientific moralist]]s and some [[utilitarians]].