Editing Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor (section)

===Production termination===
Throughout the 2000s when the U.S. was primarily fighting counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USAF's requirement for 381 F-22s was questioned over rising costs, initial reliability and availability problems, limited multirole versatility, and a lack of relevant adversaries for air combat missions.<ref name="WP"/><ref name="hatch.senate.gov">{{cite web |url=http://hatch.senate.gov/public/_files/F22AssertionsAndFacts.pdf |title=Assertion and Facts |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120703230138/http://hatch.senate.gov/public/_files/F22AssertionsAndFacts.pdf |archive-date=3 July 2012 |work=Office of Senator Orrin Hatch |access-date=17 January 2012}}</ref> In 2006, [[Comptroller General of the United States]] [[David M. Walker (U.S. Comptroller General)|David Walker]] found that "the DoD has not demonstrated the need" for more investment in the F-22,<ref>{{cite report |url=http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-455R |title=Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business Case before Making Further Investments |date=20 June 2006 |publisher=Government Accountability Office |access-date=9 May 2010 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120730201052/http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-455R |archive-date=30 July 2012}}</ref> and further opposition was expressed by [[Presidency of George W. Bush|Bush Administration]] Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his successor [[Robert Gates]], Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Gordon R. England]], and Chairman of [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) Senators [[John Warner]] and [[John McCain]].<ref>{{cite news |last=Wayne |first=Leslie |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/business/28plane.html?pagewanted=print |title=Air Force Jet Wins Battle in Congress |work=The New York Times |date=28 September 2006 |access-date=29 June 2014 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240527015930/https://www.webcitation.org/6Qi8IrzKV?url=http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/business/28plane.html%3Fpagewanted=print&_r=0 |archive-date=27 May 2024}} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190404101657/https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/business/28plane.html?pagewanted=print |date=4 April 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Carroll |first=Ward |url=http://defensetech.org/2008/11/19/dogfight-over-f-22-reveals-dod-schisms/ |title=Dogfight Over F-22 Reveals DoD Schisms |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170703193904/https://www.defensetech.org/2008/11/19/dogfight-over-f-22-reveals-dod-schisms/ |archive-date=3 July 2017 |work=Defense Tech |date=19 November 2008 |url-status=usurped |access-date=29 June 2014}}</ref> Under Rumsfeld, procurement was severely cut to 183 aircraft. The F-22 lost influential supporters in 2008 after the forced resignations of Secretary of the Air Force [[Michael Wynne]] and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force General [[T. Michael Moseley]].<ref name="topgeneralwarns">{{Cite news |last=Wolf |first=Jim |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/lockheed-f-idUSN1827570420090618 |title=Top general warns against ending F-22 fighter |work=Reuters |date=18 June 2009 |access-date=1 November 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103150912/http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/18/lockheed-f-idUSN1827570420090618 |archive-date=3 November 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> In November 2008, Gates stated that the F-22 lacked relevance in [[Asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] post-Cold War conflicts,<ref>{{cite news |last=Cole |first=August |archive-url=https://archive.today/20140702135310/http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122584363466799201 |archive-date=2 July 2014 |title=Lawmakers Pressure Pentagon to Release Funds for Controversial F-22 Fighter Jet |work=The Wall Street Journal |date=5 November 2008 |url=https://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122584363466799201 |access-date=29 June 2014}}</ref> and in April 2009, under the [[Presidency of Barack Obama|Obama Administration]], he called for production to end in FY 2011 after completing 187 F-22s.<ref name=cut>{{cite news |last1=Levine |first1=Adam |last2=Mount |first2=Mike Mount |last3=Silverleib |first3=Alan |url=https://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/gates.budget.cuts/index.html |title=Gates Announces Major Pentagon Priority Shifts |work=CNN |date=9 April 2009 |access-date=31 August 2011}}</ref>

[[File:Two F-22A Raptor in column flight - (Noise reduced).jpg|thumb|Two F-22As in close trail formation]]
The loss of staunch F-22 advocates in the upper DoD echelons resulted in the erosion of its political support. In July 2008, General [[James Cartwright]], Vice Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], stated to the SASC his reasons for supporting the termination of F-22 production, including shifting resources to the multi-service F-35 and the electric warfare [[Boeing EA-18G Growler|EA-18G Growler]].<ref>{{cite report |url=http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/07%20July/09-58%20-%207-9-09.pdf |title=SASC Transcripts |publisher=U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services |date=9 July 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130517005020/http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/07%20July/09-58%20-%207-9-09.pdf |archive-date=17 May 2013}}</ref> Although Russian and Chinese fighter developments fueled concern for the USAF, Gates dismissed this and in 2010, he set the F-22 requirement to 187 aircraft by lowering the number of major regional conflict preparations from two to one, despite an effort by Wynne's and Moseley's successors [[Michael B. Donley|Michael Donley]] and General [[Norton Schwartz]] to raise the number to 243; according to Schwartz, he and Donley finally relented in order to convince Gates to preserve the [[Long Range Strike Bomber]] program.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Schwartz |first1=Norton |last2=Levinson |first2=Ron |last3=Schwartz |first3=Suzie |date=2 January 2018 |title=Journey: Memoirs of an Air Force Chief of Staff |url= |location= |publisher=Skyhorse |page= |isbn=9781510710344}}</ref><ref>[http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL31673_20090716.pdf "CRS RL31673 Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress"], p. 15. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090804003819/http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL31673_20090716.pdf |date=4 August 2009}}. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 26 September 2010.</ref> After President [[Barack Obama]] threatened to [[presidential veto|veto]] further production at Gates' urging, both the Senate and House agreed to abide by the 187 cap in July 2009.<ref>{{|=Matthews |=William |=31 July 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131004233951/http://www.defencetalk.com/house-reverses-itself-votes-to-kill-f-22-buy-20860/ |archive-date=2013-10-04 |title=House Reverses Itself, Votes To Kill F-22 Buy |title=Defense News |url=http://www.defencetalk.com/house-reverses-itself-votes-to-kill-f-22-buy-20860/}}</ref><ref>[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SP01469: "S.AMDT.1469 to cut F-22 funding"]. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121215111917/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111%3ASP01469%3A |date=15 December 2012}} Library of Congress. Retrieved 13 June 2010.</ref> Gates highlighted the F-35's role in the decision,<ref name="gates_speech">{{Cite speech|last=Gates |first=Robert |url=http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1369 |title=Economic Club of Chicago |publisher=US Department of Defense |event=Economic Club of Chicago |location=Chicago, Illinois |date=16 July 2009 |access-date=1 November 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100228043004/http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1369 |archive-date=28 February 2010}}</ref> and believed that the U.S. would maintain its stealth fighter numbers advantage by 2025 even with F-35 delays.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20150905164707/http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4748 "Media Availability with Secretary Gates en route to Beijing, China from Andrews Air Force Base"].  U.S. Department of Defense, 11 January 2011.</ref> In December 2011, the 195th and final F-22 was completed out of 8 test and 187 production aircraft built; the jet was delivered on 2 May 2012.<ref name=AW_last_Raptor>{{Cite news |last=Butler |first=Amy |url=https://aviationweek.com/awin/last-raptor-rolls-lockheed-martin-line-0 |title=Last Raptor Rolls Off Lockheed Martin Line |work=Aviation Week |publisher=McGraw Hill |date=27 December 2011 |access-date=10 April 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150324042842/http://aviationweek.com/awin/last-raptor-rolls-lockheed-martin-line-0 |archive-date=24 March 2015 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="FG_last_f-22">{{Cite news |last=Majumdar |first=Dave |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-usaf-receives-last-f-22-raptor-371401/ |title=USAF receives last F-22 Raptor |work=FlightGlobal |date=3 May 2012 |access-date=9 June 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140528155848/http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-usaf-receives-last-f-22-raptor-371401/ |archive-date=28 May 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref>

After production ended, F-22 tooling and associated documentation were retained and mothballed at the [[Sierra Army Depot]] to support repairs and maintenance throughout the fleet life cycle, as well as the possibility of a production restart or a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP).<ref>{{cite web |last=Trimble |first=Stephen |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-considers-options-to-preserve-f-22-production-tooling-339070/ |title=USAF considers options to preserve F-22 production tooling |work=FlightGlobal |date=5 March 2010 |access-date=30 October 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131031212110/http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-considers-options-to-preserve-f-22-production-tooling-339070/ |archive-date=31 October 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG797.pdf "Ending F-22A Production: Costs and Industrial Base Implications of Alternative Options"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121007214536/http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG797.pdf |date=7 October 2012}}. Rand Corporation. Retrieved 26 September 2010.</ref><ref name=Mothball>{{Cite news |last=Wolf |first=Jim |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fighter-usa-lockheed-idUSTRE7BC09T20111213 |title=U.S. to mothball gear to build top F-22 fighter |work=Reuters |date=12 December 2011 |access-date=30 October 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131022043329/http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/us-fighter-usa-lockheed-idUSTRE7BC09T20111213 |archive-date=22 October 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> The Marietta plant space was repurposed to support the [[Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules|C-130J]] and F-35, while engineering work for sustainment and upgrades continued at Fort Worth, Texas and Palmdale, California.<ref>Wolf, Jim (12 December 2011). [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fighter-usa-lockheed-idUSTRE7BC09T20111213 "U.S. to mothball gear to build top F-22 fighter"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190330193221/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fighter-usa-lockheed-idUSTRE7BC09T20111213 |date=30 March 2019}}. Reuters.</ref><ref name="restart">{{cite report |url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4452474-F-22A-Production-Restart-Assessment.html |title=Report to Congress: F-22A Production Restart Assessment |publisher=U.S. Air Force |via=[[DocumentCloud]] |date=February 2017 |access-date=13 March 2023 |archive-date=9 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221209010940/https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4452474-F-22A-Production-Restart-Assessment.html |url-status=live}}</ref> The curtailed production forced the USAF to extend the service of 179 F-15C/Ds until 2026—well beyond its planned retirement—and replace those with new-build [[Boeing F-15EX Eagle II|F-15EX]], which had an active export production line that minimized non-recurring start-up costs, to maintain adequate air superiority fighter numbers.<ref>{{cite news |last=Trimble |first=Steve |url=https://aviationweek.com/aerospace-defense-2021/defense-space/three-generations-fighters-compete-limited-resources |title=Three Generations Of Fighters Compete For Limited Resources |work=Aviation Week |publisher=Informa |date=10 December 2020 |access-date=13 March 2023 |archive-date=9 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230209044920/https://aviationweek.com/aerospace-defense-2021/defense-space/three-generations-fighters-compete-limited-resources |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="f15ex">{{cite web |last=Pawlyk |first=Oriana |date=22 March 2019 |title=Pentagon Buying F-15EX Alongside F-35s to Preserve Diversity, Official Says |url=https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/03/22/pentagon-buying-f-15ex-alongside-f-35s-preserve-diversity-official-says.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231225222305/https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/03/22/pentagon-buying-f-15ex-alongside-f-35s-preserve-diversity-official-says.html |archive-date=25 December 2023 |work=[[Military.com]]}}</ref>

In April 2016, Congress directed the USAF to conduct a cost study and assessment associated with resuming production of the F-22, citing advancing threats from Russia and China.<ref>[http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/04/19/house-lawmakers-air-force-study-restarting-f22-production.html "House Lawmakers Want Air Force to Study Restarting F-22 Production"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331115552/https://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/04/19/house-lawmakers-air-force-study-restarting-f22-production.html |date=31 March 2019}}. ''Military.com''. 19 April 2016.</ref> On 9 June 2017, the USAF submitted their report stating they had no plans to restart the F-22 production line due to cost-prohibitive economic and logistical challenges; it estimated it would cost approximately $50&nbsp;billion to procure 194 additional F-22s at a cost of $206–216&nbsp;million per aircraft, including approximately $9.9&nbsp;billion for non-recurring start-up costs and $40.4&nbsp;billion for acquisition with the first delivery in the mid-to-late 2020s. The long gap since the end of production meant hiring new workers, sourcing replacement vendors, and finding new plant space, contributing to the high start-up costs and lead times. The USAF believed that the funding would be better invested in its next-generation Air Superiority 2030 effort, which evolved into the [[Next Generation Air Dominance]] (NGAD).<ref>[http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/06/21/the-f22-fighter-jet-restart-dead-study.html?ESRC=todayinmil.sm "The F-22 Fighter Jet Restart Is Dead: Study"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306234757/https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/06/21/the-f22-fighter-jet-restart-dead-study.html?ESRC=todayinmil.sm |date=6 March 2019}}. ''Military.com''. 21 June 2017.</ref><ref name="restart"/>