Editing M1 Abrams (section)

=== Chrysler is chosen ===
Having narrowly averted losing the contract, Chrysler set about improving the design. Expensive components were replaced with less expensive ones. Chrysler's team also negotiated lower costs from their subcontractors. The price of the redesigned tank's turret especially was decreased, but other improvements came from unexpected places, such as a $600 hydraulic oil reservoir replaced with a $25 one.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=157-158}} Chrysler also submitted a version with a Teledyne AVCR-1360 diesel engine.{{sfn|Hunnicutt|2015|p=190}} Chrysler's new bid came to $196 million, down from $221 million in the original proposal.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=157-158}}

[[File:XM1 during trial 1979.png|thumb|right|An XM1 pilot during trials in 1979]]
GM's proposal replaced the diesel engine with an AGT1500 turbine and integrated a turret capable of mounting either the 105&nbsp;mm or 120&nbsp;mm gun.{{sfn|Hunnicutt|2015|p=190}} Cost growth pushed the tank bid to $232 million from $208 million.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=157-158}}

Although the GM team had successfully integrated the turbine, Baer was more impressed by the cost savings introduced by the Chrysler team's redesign.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=157-158}} On 12 November 1976, the Defense Department awarded the $4.9 billion development contract to Chrysler.<ref name="Chrysler selected">{{cite news |last1= Finney |first1=John |title= Army Picks Chrysler to Develop New Tank at $4.9 Billion Cost |url= https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/13/archives/new-jersey-pages-army-picks-chrysler-to-develop-new-tank-at-49.html |access-date=6 August 2018 |work=The New York Times |date=13 November 1976}}</ref>

The turbine engine and cost do not appear to be the only reason for the selection of Chrysler. Chrysler was the only company that appeared to be seriously interested in tank development; the M60 had been lucrative for the company. In contrast, GM made only about 1% of its income from military sales, compared to 5% for Chrysler, and only submitted their bid after a "special plea" from the Pentagon.<ref name=bail/>

Eleven XM1 preproduction models were manufactured between February and July 1978 at [[Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant]].{{sfn|Hunnicutt|2015|p=197}} Quality problems with the engine quickly became apparent in testing. The first preproduction units that arrived at [[Aberdeen Proving Ground]] in March 1978 had serious problems. The tank accumulated mud and dirt under the hull which led to thrown tracks. Chrysler installed a scraper to prevent the build-up of dirt. This did not solve the issue entirely. It was determined months later that a gauge used to tension tracks was miscalibrated. This caused the tracks to be fitted too loosely.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=161-167}} Another problem was the ingestion of debris by the engine. The problem was determined to be caused by poorly fitting air filters.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=161-167}} At [[Fort Bliss]], several tanks experienced transmission issues. It was determined that the tankers at Fort Bliss had discovered that they could throw the vehicle directly from acceleration into reverse, a tactically advantageous maneuver called the "bow tie". Chrysler resolved this by installing a device that prevented this.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=161-167}} The problems found during testing were easily surmounted. Critics of the M1 program emerged in the early 1980s, particularly the newly formed Project on Military Procurement (PMP) (later renamed the [[Project on Government Oversight]]). PMP took issue with the tank's vulnerability, high price, reliance on flammable hydraulics, and high fuel consumption.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=242-250}} American tank historian [[Steven J. Zaloga]] characterized American press criticism of the M1 during this time as "ill-founded". Zaloga wrote the issues uncovered by the tank trials were "not particularly serious".{{sfn|Zaloga|1985|p=20-21}} PMP's criticism failed to generate any serious opposition to the program, which maintained strong support from Congress and the Pentagon.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=249}} Responding to some of the alleged issues with the tank in ''King of the Killing Zone'' (1989), journalist Orr Kelly wrote that "The truth is close to the opposite." Kelly said the program "ranks as one of the Army's best managed", producing a tank in "a remarkably short time" while avoiding "[[gold plating (project management)|gold-plating]]" and utilizing effective competition.{{sfn|Kelly|1989|p=249-250}}