Editing Ontological commitment (section)

== References ==
{{Reflist |refs=
<ref name=Azzouni>
{{cite book|last=Azzouni|first=Jody|title=Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism|year=2004|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford}}
</ref>

<ref name=Baker>
This section is a slightly modified version of the discussion by {{cite encyclopedia |author=Baker, Alan |title=Simplicity |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/simplicity/#OntPar |date=Feb 25, 2010}}
</ref>

<ref name=definition>
{{cite book |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgediction00audi |url-access=limited |edition=Paperback 2nd |page= [https://archive.org/details/cambridgediction00audi/page/n663 631] |chapter=Ontological commitment |isbn=0521637228 |editor=Robert Audi  |year=1999}} A shortened version of that definition is as follows:
:The '''ontological commitments''' of a theory are those things which occur in all the ''ontologies'' of that theory. To explain further, the [[ontology]] of a theory consists of the objects the theory makes use of. A dependence of a theory upon an object is indicated if the theory fails when the object is omitted. However, the ontology of a theory is not necessarily unique. A theory is '''ontologically committed''' to an object only if that object occurs in ''all'' the ontologies of that theory. A theory also can be ''ontologically committed'' to a class of objects if that class is populated (not necessarily by the same objects) in all its ontologies.
</ref>

<ref name=Dejnozka>
Of course, this description is not understandable unless one knows what ''first-order existential quantifiers'' are and what is meant by saying they are ''bound''. An approachable discussion of these matters is found in {{cite book |author=Jan Dejnožka |chapter=Chapter 1: Introduction   |title=The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and Its Origins: Realism, Possibility, and Identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cI0d7Cgj0BAC&pg=PA1 |pages=1 ''ff'' |isbn=0822630532 |year=1996 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield }}
</ref>

<ref name=Fogelin>
{{cite book |title=The Cambridge Companion to Quine |author=Robert J Fogelin |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Kvw-n1JIXHkC&pg=PA36 |page=36 |isbn=	0521639492 |year=2004 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}}
</ref>

<ref name=French>
{{cite book |chapter=Quine's Ladder: Two and a half pages from the ''Philosophy of Logic'' |author= Marion David |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xZO_BJuSzq0C&pg=PA274 |pages=274 ''ff'' |isbn=978-1405191456 |year=2008 |title=Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Truth and its Deformities (Volume XXXII) |editor1=Peter A. French |editor2=Howard Wettstein |publisher= Wiley-Blackwell}}
</ref>

<ref name=Colyvan>
{{cite book |title=The Indispensability of Mathematics |author=Mark Colyvan |chapter=§4.2 What is it to be indispensable? |pages=76 ''ff'' |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OBs-TSFopLkC&pg=PA76 |isbn=0198031440 |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2001}}
</ref>

<ref name=Gibson>
{{cite book |title=Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson |chapter=Quine vs. Quine: Canonical notation, paraphrase, and regimentation |page=171 |author=Alex Ornstein |editor=Chase B Wrenn |isbn=978-1433102295 |year=2008 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7hv-twrMHUgC&pg=PA171 |publisher=Peter Lang Publishing, Inc}}
</ref>

<ref name=Glock>
{{cite book |title=Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Reality |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6gUY1YNf_qEC&pg=PA41 |pages=41–47 |chapter=§1: Ontological commitment and ontological parsimony |author=Hans-Johann Glock |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2004 |isbn=1139436732 }}
</ref>

<ref name=Guarino>
{{cite book |chapter=Formal ontology and information systems |author=Nicola Guarino |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Wf5p3_fUxacC&pg=PA3 |pages=3 ''ff'' |title=Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the First International Conference (FIOS'98), June 6–8, Trento, Italy |year=1998 |isbn=	9051993994 |publisher=IOS Press}}
</ref>

<ref name=Heil>
{{cite book|last=Heil|first=J.|title=From an ontological point of view|year=2003|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford}}
</ref>

<ref name=Henke>
{{cite book |title=Handbook of Paleoanthropology: Primate evolution and human origins: Volume 2 |author=Kaila E Folinsbee|editor=Winfried Henke |chapter=Quantitative approaches to phylogenetics; §5.2: Fount of stability and confusion: A synopsis of parsimony in systematics |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vhoRdbTrjc8C&pg=PA168 |page=168 |isbn=978-3540324744 |year=2007 |publisher=Springer |display-authors=etal}}
</ref>

<ref name=Inwagen>
{{cite journal |title=Meta-ontology |author=Peter Van Inwagen |url=http://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Meta-ontology.pdf |journal=Erkenntnis |volume=48 |pages=233–250 |year=1998 |issue=2/3 |doi=10.1023/a:1005323618026}}
</ref>

<ref name=Inwagen2>
{{cite book |title=Oxford Studies in Metaphysics : Volume 4 |chapter=Chapter 6: Quine's 1946 lecture on nominalism |pages=125 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0191562310 |author=Peter van Inwagen |publisher=Oxford University Press |year= 2008 |editor=Dean Zimmerman |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kivYOG_0vmwC&pg=PA125 |quote=Quine has endorsed several closely related theses that I have referred to, collectively, as his "meta-ontology". These are...those of his theses that pertain to the topic "ontological commitment" or "ontic commitment".}}
</ref>

<ref name=Loux>
{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics |author1=Michael J. Loux |author2=Dean W. Zimmerman |editor1=Michael J. Loux |editor2=Dean W. Zimmerman |chapter=Introduction |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cgVVvyQ4lIMC&pg=PR4 |isbn=0199284229 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2005}}
</ref>

<ref name=Peacock>
{{cite journal|last=Peacock|first=Howard|title=Two Kinds of Ontological Commitment|journal=The Philosophical Quarterly|year=2011|volume=61|issue=242|pages=79–104|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.665.x}}
</ref>

<ref name=Putnam>
See for example, {{cite book |title=Philosophy of Quine: General, reviews, and analytic/synthetic, Volume 1 |pages=252 ''ff'' |author=Hilary Putnam |chapter=The analytic and the synthetic  |orig-year=1962 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=efvWNDajvs4C&pg=PA252 |editor=Dagfinn Fllesdal |isbn=0815337388 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2001}}
</ref>

<ref name=Quine0>
 {{cite book |author=Willard Van Orman Quine |year=1983 |title=Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist: And Other Essays |chapter=Chapter 22: Ontology and ideology revisited  |pages=315 ''ff'' |isbn=0674030842 |publisher=Harvard University Press |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8cnG59X1ntQC&pg=PA315}}
</ref>

<ref name=Quine1>
{{cite book |title=From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-philosophical Essays |author=Willard Van Orman Quine |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OalXwuw3MvMC&pg=PA20 |pages=20 ''ff'' |chapter=Chapter 2: Two dogmas of empiricism |isbn=	0674323513 |year=1980 |publisher=Harvard University Press |edition =2nd}} See [http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html this]
</ref>

<ref name=Quine2>
{{cite journal |author=Quine, W. V. |year=1948 |title=On What There Is |journal= Review of Metaphysics |volume=2 |pages=21–38}} Reprinted in {{cite book |title=From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-philosophical Essays |publisher= Harvard University Press |year= 1980 |pages=1–19 |isbn=0674323513 |edition=2nd |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OalXwuw3MvMC&pg=PA1}} Online on [[s:On What There Is|Wikisource]].
</ref>

<ref name=Quine3>
{{cite journal |author=Quine, W. V.|year=1951 |title=On Carnap's views on ontology |journal= Philosophical Studies |volume=2 |issue=5 |pages=65–72 |doi=10.1007/bf02199422|s2cid=170241527 }} Reprinted in {{cite book |title=The Ways of Paradox |pages=[https://archive.org/details/waysofparadox00quin/page/203 203]–211 |author=Willard Van Orman Quine |url=https://archive.org/details/waysofparadox00quin |url-access=registration |isbn=0674948378 |chapter=Chapter 9: On Carnap's views on ontology |year=1976 |publisher=Harvard University Press |edition=2nd}}
</ref>

<ref name=QuineW>
{{cite book |title=Theories and Things |author= Willard Van Quine |isbn=0674879260 |year=1981 |publisher=Harvard University Press |edition=3rd  |pages=[https://archive.org/details/theoriesthings00quin/page/144 144]''ff'' |url=https://archive.org/details/theoriesthings00quin|url-access=registration }} Cited by Alan Baker.
</ref>

<ref name=Routledge>
{{cite book |author=Alex Orenstein |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |pages=8 ''ff'' |chapter=Quine, Willard Van Orman |editor=Edward Craig |isbn= 0415073103 |year=1998 |volume=8}} See also [[Models of scientific inquiry#Choice of a theory|Choice of a theory]].
</ref>

<ref name=Ryan>
{{cite book |title=American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia |chapter=Analytic: Analytic/Synthetic |author=Frank X Ryan |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KmUTkreTEQsC&pg=PA36 |pages=36–39 |editor1=John Lachs |editor2=Robert B. Talisse |isbn=020349279X |publisher=Psychology Press |year=2004}}
</ref>

<ref name=Schafer>
{{cite book |chapter=Invariance principles and the community of heirs |author=Burkhard Schäfer |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Wf5p3_fUxacC&pg=PA108 |pages=108 ''ff'' |isbn=9051993994 |year=1998 |editor=N Guarino |title=Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the 1st International Conference June 6-8, 1998, Trento, Italy|publisher=IOS Press }}
</ref>

<ref name=Schaffer>
{{cite book |author=Jonathan Schaffer |author-link=Jonathan Schaffer |chapter=On What Grounds What Metametaphysics |title=Metametaphysics |url=http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/grounds.pdf |editor=Chalmers |editor2=Manley |editor3=Wasserman |isbn=978-0199546046 |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2009 |pages=347–83 }} Reprinted by Philosopher’s Annual 29, eds. Grim, Charlow, Gallow, and Herold; also reprinted in Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Kim, Korman, and Sosa (2011), 73-96: Blackwell.) Contains an analysis of Quine and proposes that questions of ''existence'' are not fundamental.
</ref>

<ref name=Schaffer1>
{{cite web|last=Shaffer|first=Jonathan|title=Truthmaker Commitments|url=http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/commitment.pdf}}
</ref>
}}