Editing Pascal's wager (section)

== Criticism ==

Criticism of Pascal's wager began soon after it was published. Non-believers questioned the "benefits" of a [[deity]] whose "realm" is beyond reason and the religiously orthodox, who primarily took issue with the wager's [[deism|deistic]] and [[Agnosticism|agnostic]] language. Believers criticized it for not proving God's existence, the encouragement of false belief, and the problem of which religion and which God should be worshipped.<ref name="chance and infinity">{{Cite web|url=http://thegemsbok.com/art-reviews-and-articles/friday-phil-pascals-wager/|title=A Logical Infinite: The Constrained Probabilistic Definitions of Chance and Infinity in Blaise Pascal's Famous Wager|last=Podgorski|first=Daniel|date=December 18, 2015|website=The Gemsbok|access-date=April 21, 2016}}</ref><ref name="The God Delusion">{{cite book|last=Dawkins|first=Richard|author-link=Richard Dawkins|publisher=Black Swan|date=May 21, 2007|title=[[The God Delusion]]|pages=130–132|chapter=Chapter 3: Arguments for God's existence|isbn=9780552773317 }}</ref> <!-- Should probably source criticisms to J. H. Sobel, Logic and Theism, Chapter XIII -->

=== Laplace ===

The probabilist mathematician [[Pierre Simon de Laplace]] ridiculed the use of probability in theology, believing that even following Pascal's reasoning, it is not worth making a bet, for the hope of profit – equal to the product of the value of the testimonies (infinitely small) and the value of the happiness they promise (which is significant but finite) – must necessarily be infinitely small.<ref> {{citation | author=[[Jacques Attali]] | title = Pascal | date = 2004 | place = Warszawa | page= 368}} </ref>

=== Failure to prove the existence of God ===

[[Voltaire]] (another prominent French writer of the [[age of Enlightenment]]), a generation after Pascal, regarded the idea of the wager as a "proof of God" as "indecent and childish", adding, "the interest I have to believe a thing is no proof that such a thing exists".<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.voltaire-integral.com/Html/22/07_Pascal.html|title=Remarques (Premiéres) sur les Pensées de Pascal|last=Voltaire|author-link=Voltaire|year=1728|website=Oeuvres Complétes de Voltaire|series=Mélanges I|language=fr|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120418162422/http://www.voltaire-integral.com/Html/22/07_Pascal.html|archive-date=April 18, 2012|url-status=dead|access-date=April 24, 2016}}</ref> Pascal, however, did not advance the wager as a proof of God's existence but rather as a necessary pragmatic decision which is "impossible to avoid" for any living person.<ref name="Durant-Voltaire">{{cite book
  | last = Durant
  | first = Will and Ariel
  | author-link= Will Durant
  | title = The Age of Voltaire
  | url = https://archive.org/details/ageofvoltairevol00dura
  | url-access = registration
  | year = 1965
  | pages = [https://archive.org/details/ageofvoltairevol00dura/page/370 370]
| publisher = Tapei
 }}</ref> He argued that abstaining from making a wager is not an option and that "reason is incapable of divining the truth"; thus, a decision of whether to believe in the existence of God must be made by "considering the consequences of each possibility".

Voltaire's critique concerns not the nature of the Pascalian wager as proof of God's existence, but the contention that the very belief Pascal tried to promote is not convincing. Voltaire hints at the fact that Pascal, as a [[Jansenist]], believed that only a small, and already predestined, portion of humanity would eventually be saved by God.

Voltaire explained that no matter how far someone is tempted with rewards to believe in [[Christian salvation]], the result will be at best a faint belief.{{efn|Vous me promettez l’empire du monde si je crois que vous avez raison: je souhaite alors, de tout mon coeur, que vous ayez raison; mais jusqu’à ce que vous me l’ayez prouvé, je ne puis vous croire. […] J’ai intérêt, sans doute, qu’il y ait un Dieu; mais si dans votre système Dieu n’est venu que pour si peu de personnes; si le petit nombre des élus est si effrayant; si je ne puis rien du tout par moi-même, dites-moi, je vous prie, quel intérêt j’ai à vous croire? N’ai-je pas un intérêt visible à être persuadé du contraire? De quel front osez-vous me montrer un bonheur infini, auquel d’un million d’hommes un seul à peine a droit d’aspirer?{{cq|date=July 2024}} [You promise me the empire of the world if I believe you are right: I then hope, with all my heart, that you are right; but until you prove it to me, I cannot believe you. […] It is in my interest, no doubt, that there is a God; but if in your system God only came for so few people; if the number of the elect is so frighteningly small; if I can do nothing at all for myself, please tell me, what interest do I have in believing you? Don’t I have a visible interest in being convinced otherwise? How dare you show me an infinite happiness, to which barely one in a million men can aspire?]}}  Pascal, in his ''Pensées'', agrees with this, not stating that people can choose to believe (and therefore make a safe wager), but rather that some cannot believe.

As [[Étienne Souriau]] explained, in order to accept Pascal's argument, the bettor needs to be certain that God seriously intends to honour the bet; he says that the wager assumes that God also accepts the bet, which is not proved; Pascal's bettor is here like the fool who seeing a leaf floating on a river's waters and quivering at some point, for a few seconds, between the two sides of a stone, says: "I bet a million with Rothschild that it takes finally the left path." And, effectively, the leaf passed on the left side of the stone, but unfortunately for the fool Rothschild never said "I [will take that] bet".<ref>À vrai dire le célèbre pari de Pascal, ou plutôt le pari que Pascal propose au libertin n'est pas une option désintéressée mais un pari de joueur. Si le libertin joue «croix», parie que Dieu existe, il gagne (si Dieu existe) la vie éternelle et la béatitude infinie, et risque seulement de perdre les misérables plaisirs de sa vie actuelle. Cette mise ne compte pas au regard du gain possible qui est infini. Seulement, l'argument suppose que Dieu accepte le pari, que Dieu dit «je tiens». Sans quoi, nous dit Souriau, le libertin « est comme ce fou : il voit une feuille au fil de l'eau, hésiter entre deux côtés d'un caillou. Il dit : «je parie un million avec Rothschild qu'elle passera à droite». La feuille passe à droite et le fou dit : «j'ai gagné un million». Où est sa folie? Ce n'est pas que le million n'existe pas, c'est que Rothschild n'a pas dit : «je tiens». ». (Cf. l'admirable analyse du pari de Pascal in Souriau, L'ombre de Dieu, p. 47 sq.) – La Philosophie, Tome 2 (La Connaissance), [[Denis Huisman]], André Vergez, Marabout 1994, pp. 462–63</ref>

=== Argument from inconsistent revelations ===
{{main|Argument from inconsistent revelations}}

Since there have been many religions throughout history, and therefore many conceptions of God (or gods), some assert that all of them need to be factored into the wager, in an argumentation known as the argument from inconsistent revelations. This, its proponents argue, would lead to a high probability of believing in "the wrong god" and would eliminate the mathematical advantage Pascal claimed with his wager. [[Denis Diderot]], a contemporary of Voltaire, expressed this opinion when asked about the wager, saying "an [[Imam]] could reason the same way".<ref name="Diderot">{{cite book
  | last = Diderot
  | first = Denis
  | author-link = Denis Diderot
  | editor = J. Assézar
  | title = Pensées philosophiques, LIX, Volume 1
  | orig-year = 1746
  | year = 1875–77
  | language = fr
  | pages = 167
}}</ref> [[J. L. Mackie]] writes that "the church within which alone salvation is to be found is not necessarily the Church of Rome, but perhaps that of the [[Anabaptists]] or the [[the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints|Mormons]] or the [[Sunni Muslims|Muslim Sunnis]] or the worshipers of [[Kali]] or of [[Odin]]."<ref>[[J.L. Mackie|Mackie, J. L.]] (1982). ''The Miracle of Theism'', Oxford, pg. 203</ref>

Pascal considers this type of objection briefly in the notes compiled into the ''Pensées'', and dismisses it:<ref>Wetsel, David (1994). ''Pascal and Disbelief: Catechesis and Conversion in the Pensées''. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, p. 117. {{ISBN|0-8132-1328-2}}</ref>

{{quote box|quote=What say [the unbelievers] then? "Do we not see," say they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like Christians? They have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors, their saints, their monks, like us," etc. If you care but little to know the truth, that is enough to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. That would be sufficient for a question in philosophy; but not here, where everything is at stake. And yet, after a superficial reflection of this kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same religion whether it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps it will teach it to us.<ref name="Pensée #72"/>}}

Pascal says that the skepticism of unbelievers who rest content with the many-religions objection has seduced them into a fatal "repose". If they were really bent on knowing the truth, they would be persuaded to examine "in detail" whether Christianity is like any other religion, but they just cannot be bothered.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 370.</ref> Their objection might be sufficient were the subject concerned merely some "question in philosophy", but not "here, where everything is at stake". In "a matter where they themselves, their eternity, their all are concerned",<ref name="Pensée #72"/> they can manage no better than "a superficial reflection" ("une reflexion légère") and, thinking they have scored a point by asking a [[leading question]], they go off to amuse themselves.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 238.</ref>

As Pascal scholars observe, Pascal regarded the many-religions objection as a rhetorical ploy, a "trap" that he had no intention of falling into.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', pp. 118 (quotation from Jean Mesnard), 236.</ref>

David Wetsel notes that Pascal's treatment of the pagan religions is brisk: "As far as Pascal is concerned, the demise of the pagan religions of antiquity speaks for itself. Those pagan religions which still exist in the New World, in India, and in Africa are not even worth a second glance. They are obviously the work of superstition and ignorance and have nothing in them which might interest 'les gens habiles' ('clever men')<ref name="Pensée #251">[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18269/18269-h/18269-h.htm#p_251 ''Pensée'' #251]".</ref><ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 181.</ref> Islam warrants more attention, being distinguished from paganism (which for Pascal presumably includes all the other non-Christian religions) by its claim to be a revealed religion. Nevertheless, Pascal concludes that the religion founded by Mohammed can on several counts be shown to be devoid of divine authority, and that therefore, as a path to the knowledge of God, it is as much a dead end as paganism."<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 182.</ref> Judaism, in view of its close links to Christianity, he deals with elsewhere.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 180.</ref>

The many-religions objection is taken more seriously by some later [[apologist]]s of the wager, who argue that of the rival options only those awarding infinite happiness affect the wager's [[dominance (game theory)|dominance]]. In the opinion of these apologists "finite, semi-blissful promises such as Kali's or Odin's" therefore drop out of consideration.<ref name="SEP entry" />  Also, the infinite bliss that the rival conception of God offers has to be mutually exclusive. If Christ's promise of bliss can be attained concurrently with [[Jehovah]]'s and [[Allah]]'s (all three being identified as the [[God in Abrahamic religions|God of Abraham]]), there is no conflict in the decision matrix in the case where the cost of believing in the wrong conception of God is neutral (limbo/purgatory/spiritual death), although this would be countered with an infinite cost in the case where not believing in the correct conception of God results in punishment (hell).<ref name="IEP entry">{{Cite web|url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/pasc-wag/|title=Pascal's Wager about God|last=Saka|first=Paul|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=April 21, 2016}}</ref>

[[Ecumenical]] interpretations of the wager<ref>For example: Jeff Jordan, ''Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal's Wager'', 1994, Rowman & Littlefield.</ref> argues that it could even be suggested that believing in a generic God, or a god by the wrong name, is acceptable so long as that conception of God has similar essential characteristics of the conception of God considered in Pascal's wager (perhaps the [[Aristotelian view of God|God of Aristotle]]).  Proponents of this line of reasoning suggest that either all of the conceptions of God or gods throughout history truly boil down to just a small set of "genuine options", or that if Pascal's wager can simply bring a person to believe in "generic theism", it has done its job.<ref name="IEP entry" />

Pascal argues implicitly for the uniqueness of Christianity in the wager itself, writing: "If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible...Who then can blame the Christians for not being able to give reasons for their beliefs, professing as they do a religion which they cannot explain by reason?"<ref>{{cite web |first=Blaise |last=Pascal |work=Pensées |translator-first=John |translator-last=Warrington |date=1932 |title=Pascal's Wager: 343 [6-233] |url=http://www.stat.ucla.edu/history/pascal_wager.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190213131607/http://www.stat.ucla.edu/history/pascal_wager.pdf |archive-date=February 13, 2019 |publisher=Everyman's Library No. 874 |via=ucla.edu}}</ref>

=== Argument from inauthentic belief ===

Some critics argue that Pascal's wager, for those who cannot believe, suggests feigning belief to gain eternal reward. [[Richard Dawkins]] argues that this would be dishonest and immoral and that, in addition to this, it is absurd to think that God, being just and omniscient, would not see through this deceptive strategy on the part of the "believer", thus nullifying the benefits of the wager.<ref name="The God Delusion" /> [[William James]] in his '[[Will to Believe]]' states that "We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted wilfully after such a mechanical calculation would lack the inner soul of faith's reality; and if we were ourselves in the place of the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern from their infinite reward. It is evident that unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option".<ref>{{cite book |editor1-last=Baily |editor1-first=Andrew |title=The Broadview Introduction to Philosophy: Concise Edition |date=2024 |publisher=Broadview Press |page=68}}</ref>

Since these criticisms are concerned not with the validity of the wager itself, but with its possible aftermath—namely that a person who has been convinced of the overwhelming odds in favor of belief might still find themself unable to sincerely believe—they are tangential to the thrust of the wager. What such critics are objecting to is Pascal's subsequent advice to an unbeliever who, having concluded that the only rational way to wager is in favor of God's existence, points out, reasonably enough, that this by no means makes them a believer. This hypothetical unbeliever complains, "I am so made that I cannot believe. What would you have me do?"<ref name="Pensée #72"/> Pascal, far from suggesting that God can be deceived by outward show, says that God does not regard it at all: "God looks only at what is inward."<ref name="Pensée #72"/> For a person who is already convinced of the odds of the wager but cannot seem to put their heart into the belief, he offers practical advice.

Explicitly addressing the question of inability to believe, Pascal argues that if the wager is valid, the inability to believe is irrational, and therefore must be caused by feelings: "your inability to believe, because reason compels you to [believe] and yet you cannot, [comes] from your passions." This inability, therefore, can be overcome by diminishing these irrational sentiments: "Learn from those who were bound like you. . . . Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.—'But this is what I am afraid of.'—And why? What have you to lose?"<ref>''Pensée'' #233. Gérard Ferreyrolles, ed. Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2000.</ref>

An uncontroversial doctrine in both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology is that mere belief in God is insufficient to attain salvation, the standard cite being [https://biblehub.com/kjv/james/2.htm James 2:19] ([[King James Version|KJV]]): "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble." Salvation requires "faith" not just in the sense of belief, but of trust and obedience. Pascal and [https://iep.utm.edu/pascal-j/ his sister], a nun, were among the leaders of Roman Catholicism's [[Jansenism|Jansenist school of thought]] whose doctrine of salvation was close to Protestantism in emphasizing faith over works. Both Jansenists and Protestants followed [[Augustine of Hippo|St. Augustine]] in this emphasis (Martin Luther belonged to the [[Order of Saint Augustine|Augustinian Order]] of monks). Augustine wrote

{{Quotation| So our faith has to be distinguished from the faith of the demons. Our faith, you see, purifies the heart, their faith makes them guilty. They act wickedly, and so they say to the Lord, "What have you to do with us?" When you hear the demons saying this, do you imagine they don't recognize him? "We know who you are," they say. "You are the Son of God" (Lk 4:34). Peter says this and he is praised for it; 14 the demon says it, and is condemned. Why's that, if not because the words may be the same, but the heart is very different? So let us distinguish our faith, and see that believing is not enough. That's not the sort of faith that purifies the heart.<ref>DTK, "A Person is Justified by Works - (James 2:14-26)", ''Puritanboard.com'',  https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/a-person-is-justified-by-works-james-2-14-26.13531/,  (May 2, 2006) viewed January 21, 2021, citing John E. Rotelle, O.S.A., ed.,''WSA, Sermons, Part 3, Vol. 3,'' trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., "Sermon 53.11" (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991), p. 71. DTK collects several other Augustine quotes on the topic, with similarly precise citations.</ref>}}

Since Pascal's position was that "saving" belief in God required more than [[Logical assertion|logical assent]], accepting the wager could only be a first step. Hence his advice on what steps one could take to arrive at belief.{{cn|date=December 2024}}

Some other critics{{who|date=October 2019}} have objected to Pascal's wager on the grounds that he wrongly assumes what type of epistemic character God would likely value in his rational creatures if he existed.{{cn|date=December 2024}}
<!-- === Argument from ??? ===
Richard Dawkins asks whether the so-called "God" would prefer honest people who did good to society without believing in it or hedge-betters like Pascal. -->

{{Clear}}