Editing Philipp Scheidemann (section)

=== Reich minister president ===
{{Main|Scheidemann cabinet}}

During the fighting in Berlin in late December 1918 known as the [[1918 Christmas crisis|Christmas crisis]], Scheidemann backed Ebert's decision to use military force against the occupation of the Palace by the leftist [[Volksmarinedivision|People's Marine Division]]. That drew the fury of left-wing radicals. Signs carried at the funeral of those killed read "Of the murder of the sailors we accuse Ebert, Landsberg and Scheidemann".{{Sfn|Winkler|1998|p=55}}
[[File:Wappen Deutsches Reich (Weimarer Republik).svg|thumb|left|222x222px|Arms of Germany at the beginning of the Weimar Republic]]
Scheidemann was elected a member of the [[Weimar National Assembly]] in the [[1919 German federal election|January 1919 federal election]]. He wanted to persuade Ebert, who was seeking the office of Reich president, to take over the office of Reich chancellor, as he was convinced that Ebert's strengths lay in practical rather than representative activity.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Noske |first=Gustav |title=Erlebtes aus Aufstieg und Niedergang einer Demokratie |publisher=Bollwerk Verlag |year=1947 |pages=90 |language=de |trans-title=Experiences from the Rise and Fall of a Democracy}}</ref> He therefore ran against Ebert in the [[1919 German presidential election|presidential election in February 1919]] but received only one of 379 valid votes cast by members of the National Assembly. Ebert, who received 73 percent of the votes, then entrusted Scheidemann with the formation of the government, which took place on 13 February 1919. Scheidemann held office from then until 20 June 1919 as Reich minister president, the designation for the head of government until the adoption of the [[Weimar Constitution]] and equivalent to Reich chancellor.

Scheidemann headed a cabinet consisting of the MSPD, the [[Christian democracy|Christian democratic]] [[Centre Party (Germany)|Centre Party]] and the center-left [[German Democratic Party]] (DDP) – a combination that came to be known as the [[Weimar Coalition]]. Historians attribute the relatively conflict-free work of the coalition government to Scheidemann's role as a moderator rather than as a true leader in the administration of his office.{{Sfn|Winkler|1998|p=72}} Such assessments are sometimes interpreted as signs of weak leadership and a lack of assertiveness. [[Gustav Noske]], who participated in the government as minister of military affairs, described the government's actions as an expression of the democratic sentiments of the Social Democrats' leaders, to whom "the idea of forcing those who think differently seemed criminal". Out of respect for the election results (the MSPD had 38% of the vote, the Centre 20%, the DDP 19%), the MSPD "never acted in a forcible manner" toward their bourgeois colleagues in the coalition government.{{Sfn|Noske|1947|p=90}}

The most difficult domestic challenge for the cabinet were the strikes in the first months of 1919, which were primarily concerned with raising real wages that had fallen as a result of inflation. In the [[Ruhr]] region in particular, the strikes were combined with demands for the nationalization of mines. Since coal mining was a key factor in the economy as a whole, Scheidemann's government responded in part by deploying [[Freikorps]] units but also by negotiating. In response to a general strike in central Germany in February 1919 involving three-quarters of all workers, Scheidemann had the [[Reichswehr]] (German army) occupy the city of [[Halle (Saale)|Halle]], but at the same time he announced steps to democratize the economy.

The unrest that Scheidemann's government faced in Berlin was quite different. There the movement, which in the end came to be communist-led, was not concerned with economic goals but political ones. They included recognition of the workers' and soldiers' councils, implementation of the resolutions of the [[German workers' and soldiers' councils 1918–1919#Reich Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils|Reich Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils]] ({{Lang|de|Reichsrätekongress}}) on military policy, and resumption of political and economic relations with the Soviet Union. The government used military force against the movement in the [[Berlin March Battles|Berlin March battles]]. Mass strikes also occurred in [[Upper Silesia]], [[Württemberg]], and [[Magdeburg]].{{Sfn|Winkler|1998|pp=72 ff}}

Scheidemann's government adopted a law in the National Assembly on 6 March 1919 that, in the words of one historian, "greatly modified and liberalized the code of military justice", bringing it into the realm of social policy.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Watt |first=R.M. |title=The Kings Depart: The Tragedy of Germany: Versailles and the German Revolution |publisher=Dorset Press |year=2001}}</ref> In February 1919, as a concession to the mass movement in the Ruhr, labor minister [[Gustav Bauer]] decreed setting up workers' councils for the mining industry, thus beginning a political struggle for representation of workers' councils on boards of directors. On 18 March 1919 a regulation issued by the Demobilization Office introduced the eight-hour working day for office employees, while a government declaration from the same month accepted workers' committees "as official representatives of the economy".
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1989-072-16, Matthias Erzberger.jpg|thumb|199x199px|Matthias Erzberger]]
In foreign policy, the decision on whether to accept or reject the [[Treaty of Versailles]] fell during Scheidemann's term of office. He had spoken out clearly against signing it. When the Weimar National Assembly met in Berlin for the first time on 12 May 1919, he said, "What hand should not wither that puts this fetter on itself and on us?"{{Sfn|Winkler|1998|p=91}} At first the majority not only of the population but also in political circles seemed to be behind the rejection, and Scheidemann's remark became a popular saying.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Büchmann |first=Georg |title=Geflügelte Worte |publisher=Praktisches Wissen |year=1952 |location=Berlin |pages=308 |language=de |trans-title=Popular Sayings}}</ref> Political realists such as [[Matthias Erzberger]] of the Centre Party, Gustav Noske, and Eduard David drew attention to the fact that a rejection would threaten the occupation of all of Germany by the Allies. The still existing Supreme Army Command also urged acceptance of the treaty, as did Reich President Ebert. In addition, the majority of his own parliamentary group was in favor of acceptance. Since no agreement could be reached between the governmental parties and no unified position in the cabinet could be reached – several ministers were clearly against the acceptance of the treaty – Scheidemann saw no possibility except resigning.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Osterroth |first=Franz |title=Chronik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie |publisher=Schuster |year=1963 |location=Berlin |pages=227 |language=de |trans-title=Chronicle of German Social Democracy}}</ref>