Editing Phoenix Program (section)

=== Targeted killings ===
Phoenix operations often aimed to assassinate targets or kill them through other means. PRU units often anticipated resistance in disputed areas, and often operated on a shoot-first basis.<ref>Neil Sheehan (1988). ''A Bright Shining Lie'', p. 732.</ref> [[Lieutenant]] [[Vincent Okamoto]], an intelligence-liaison officer for the Phoenix Program for two months in 1968 and a recipient of the [[Distinguished Service Cross (United States)|Distinguished Service Cross]] said the following:<ref>''Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides'' by [[Christian G. Appy]], [[Penguin Books]], 2003, p. 361. [https://www.amazon.com/dp/0142004499]</ref>

{{blockquote|The problem was, how do you find the people on the [[blacklist]]? It's not like you had their address and telephone number. The normal procedure would be to go into a village and just grab someone and say, "Where's Nguyen so-and-so?" Half the time the people were so afraid they would not say anything. Then a Phoenix team would take the [[informant]], put a sandbag over his head, poke out two holes so he could see, put [[commo wire]] around his neck like a long leash, and walk him through the village and say, "When we go by Nguyen's house scratch your head." Then that night Phoenix would come back, knock on the door, and say, "[[April Fools' Day|April Fool]], [[motherfucker]]." Whoever answered the door would get wasted. As far as they were concerned whoever answered was a Communist, including family members. Sometimes they'd come back to camp with ears to prove that they killed people.}}

[[William Colby]] denied that the program was an assassination program stating: "To call it a program of murder is nonsense ... They were of more value to us alive than dead, and therefore, the object was to get them alive." His instructions to field officers stated "Our training emphasizes the desirability of obtaining these target individuals alive and of using intelligent and lawful methods of interrogation to obtain the truth of what they know about other aspects of the VCI ... [U.S. personnel] are specifically not authorized to engage in assassinations or other violations of the rules of land warfare."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Lipsman|first1=Samuel|last2=Doyle|first2=Edward|title=Fighting for Time (The Vietnam Experience)|publisher=Boston Publishing Company|year=1984|isbn=978-0-939526-07-9|page=80}}</ref><ref name=ksil241 /><ref>''Phoenix Program 1969 End of Year Report''. A-8.</ref>{{sfn|Andradé|1990|p=53}}