Editing Political polarization (section)

===Party polarization===
Some scholars argue that diverging parties has been one of the major driving forces of polarization as policy platforms have become more distant. This theory is based on recent trends in the [[United States Congress]], where the [[majority party]] prioritizes the positions that are most aligned with its [[party platform]] and political ideology.<ref name="ura-12">{{cite journal|last=Ura|first=Joseph Daniel|author2=Ellis, Christopher R.|title=Partisan Moods: Polarization and the Dynamics of Mass Party Preferences|journal=The Journal of Politics|date=10 February 2012|volume=74|issue=1|pages=277–291|doi=10.1017/S0022381611001587|hdl=1969.1/178724|s2cid=55325200|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The adoption of more ideologically distinct positions by political parties can cause polarization among both elites and the electorate. For example, after the passage of the [[Voting Rights Act]], the number of conservative Democrats in Congress decreased, while the number of conservative Republicans increased. Within the electorate during the 1970s, [[Southern Democrats]] shifted toward the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]], showing polarization among both the elites and the electorate of both main parties.<ref name="mann-12" /><ref name="abramowitz-98">{{cite journal|last=Abramowitz|first=Alan I.|author2=Saunders, Kyle L.|title=Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate|journal=The Journal of Politics|date=August 1998|volume=60|issue=3|page=634|doi=10.2307/2647642|jstor=2647642|s2cid=154980825}}</ref><ref name="galston-09">{{cite journal|last=Galston|first=William A.|title=Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary|journal=UKMC Law Review|year=2009|volume=77|issue=207|url=http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/umkc77&div=15&g_sent=1&collection=journals}}</ref> In this sense, political polarization could be a top-down process, in which elite polarization leads to—or at least precedes—popular polarization.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Benkler|first1=Yochai|url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190923624.001.0001/oso-9780190923624-chapter-10|title=Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics|publisher=Oxford Scholarship Online|year=2018|publication-date=2018-10-01|doi=10.1093/oso/9780190923624.003.0010|isbn=978-0-19-092366-2}}</ref> However, polarization among elites does not necessarily produce polarization within the electorate, and polarized electoral choices can often reflect elite polarization rather than voters' preferences.<ref name="fiorina-08" /><ref name="mccarty-06" /><ref name="hetherington-09" /><ref name="carmines-12" /><ref name="claassen-08" />

Political scientists have shown politicians have an incentive to advance and support polarized positions.<ref name="beniers-07">{{cite journal|last=Beniers|first=Klaas J.|author2=Dur, Robert|title=Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition|journal=International Tax and Public Finance|date=1 February 2007|volume=14|issue=1|pages=29–54|doi=10.1007/s10797-006-8878-y|hdl=1765/6632 |s2cid=39796862|url=https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04065.pdf}}</ref> These argue that during the early 1990s, the Republican Party used polarizing tactics to become the majority party in the [[United States House of Representatives]]—which political scientists [[Thomas E. Mann]] and [[Norman Ornstein]] refer to as [[Newt Gingrich]]'s "guerrilla war."<ref name="mann-12" /> What political scientists have found is that moderates are less likely to run than are candidates who are in line with party doctrine, otherwise known as "party fit."<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Thomsen|first1=Danielle M.|title=Ideological Moderates Won't Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress|journal=The Journal of Politics|date=2014|volume=76|issue=3|pages=786–797|doi=10.1017/s0022381614000243|jstor=0022381614000243|hdl=10161/8931|s2cid=154980416|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Other theories state politicians who cater to more extreme groups within their party tend to be more successful, helping them stay in office while simultaneously pulling their constituency toward a polar extreme.<ref name="hirano-09">{{cite journal|last=Hirano|first=Shigeo Jr. |author2=James M. Snyder|author3=Michael M. Ting|title=Distributive Politics with Primaries|journal=Journal of Politics|year=2009|volume=71|issue=4|pages=1467–1480|url=http://www.yale.org/leitner/resources/docs/snyder.pdf|doi=10.1017/s0022381609990247|s2cid=11453544|access-date=2013-04-22|archive-date=2014-05-31|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140531104933/http://www.yale.org/leitner/resources/docs/snyder.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> A study by Nicholson (2012) found voters are more polarized by contentious statements from leaders of the opposing party than from the leaders of their own party. As a result, political leaders may be more likely to take polarized stances.<ref name="nicholson-12">{{cite journal|last=Nicholson|first=Stephen P.|title=Polarizing Cues|journal=American Journal of Political Science|date=1 January 2012|volume=56|issue=1|pages=52–66|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00541.x|pmid=22400143|s2cid=147497906 }}</ref>

With regards to [[multiparty systems]], [[Giovanni Sartori]] (1966, 1976) claims the splitting of ideologies in the public constituency causes further divides within the political parties of the countries. He theorizes that the extremism of public ideological movement is the basis for the creation of highly polarized multiparty systems. Sartori named this polarizing phenomenon [[polarized pluralism]] and claimed it would lead to further polarization in many opposing directions (as opposed to in simply two directions, as in a polarized two-party system) over policy issues.<ref name="sartori-66">{{cite journal|last=Sartori|first=Giovanni|title=European political parties: the case of polarized pluralism|journal=Political Parties and Political Development|pages=137–176|year=1966|doi=10.1515/9781400875337-006|isbn=978-1400875337}}</ref><ref name="sartori-76">{{cite book|last=Sartori|first=Giovanni|title=Parties and party systems : a framework for analysis|year=1976|publisher=ECPR|location=Colchester|isbn=978-0954796617|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ywr0CcGDNHwC|edition=[Nouvelle édition]}}</ref><ref name="johnston-08">{{cite journal|last=Johnston|first=Richard|title=Polarized Pluralism in the Canadian Party System: Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, June 5, 2008|journal=Canadian Journal of Political Science|date=17 December 2008|volume=41|issue=4|page=815|doi=10.1017/S0008423908081110|s2cid=154599342}}</ref> Polarization in multiparty systems can also be defined along two ideological extremes, like in the case of [[India]] in the 1970s. Ideological splits within a number of India's major parties resulted in two polarized coalitions on the right and left, each consisting of multiple political parties.<ref name="davey-72">{{cite journal|last=Davey|first=Hampton|title=Polarization and Consensus in Indian Party Politics|journal=Asian Survey|date=1 August 1972|volume=12|issue=8|pages=701–716|doi=10.2307/2643110|jstor=2643110}}</ref>

Political fund-raisers and donors can also exert significant influence and control over legislators. Party leaders are expected to be productive fund-raisers, in order to support the party's campaigns. After ''[[Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission]]'', special interests in the U.S. were able to greatly impact elections through increased undisclosed spending, notably through [[Super PACs|Super political action committees]]. Some, such as ''[[The Washington Post|Washington Post]]'' opinion writer [[Robert G. Kaiser|Robert Kaiser]], argued this allowed wealthy people, corporations, unions, and other groups to push the parties' policy platforms toward ideological extremes, resulting in a state of greater polarization.<ref name="mann-12" /><ref name="kaiser-10">{{cite book|last=Kaiser|first=Robert G.|title=So damn much money : the triumph of lobbying and the corrosion of American government|year=2010|publisher=Vintage Books|location=New York|isbn=978-0307385888|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AJxU1MzQZVoC|edition=1st Vintage Books}}</ref> Other scholars, such as Raymond J. La Raja and David L. Wiltse, note that this does not necessarily hold true for mass donors to political campaigns. These scholars argue a single donor who is polarized and contributes large sums to a campaign does not seem to usually drive a politician toward political extremes.<ref name="la-raja-11">{{cite journal|last=La Raja|first=R.J.|author2=Wiltse, D.L.|title=Don't Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of Political Parties: Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972–2008|journal=American Politics Research|date=13 December 2011|volume=40|issue=3|pages=501–530|doi=10.1177/1532673X11429845|s2cid=143588919}}</ref><ref name="tam-cho-07">{{cite journal|last=Tam Cho|first=Wendy K.|author2=Gimpel, James G.|title=Prospecting for (Campaign) Gold|journal=American Journal of Political Science|date=1 April 2007|volume=51|issue=2|pages=255–268|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00249.x|url=http://cho.pol.illinois.edu/wendy/papers/krige.pdf|access-date=22 April 2013|archive-date=3 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403154456/http://cho.pol.illinois.edu/wendy/papers/krige.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>