Editing Predatory pricing (section)

===Short-term loss rules and the Areeda-Turner test ===
In 1975, Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner developed a short-run cost-based test, widely referred to as the 'Areeda-Turner rule'.<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last1=Areeda|first1=Phillip|last2=Turner|first2=Donald|date=1975|title=Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=88|issue=4|pages=697–733|doi=10.2307/1340237|jstor=1340237}}</ref> The rules are based on short term focus due to the long run focus being too speculative and inefficient. The Areeda-Turner rule suggests prices at or above reasonable expected average variable costs (AVC) are presumed to be lawful, but prices below AVC are presumed to be unlawful and anti-competitive.<ref name=":02"/>

In EU law, the approach to testing for predatory pricing under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has been explained in a number of important cases.

In ''ECS/AKZO'', the European Commission did not adopt the Areeda-Turner rule.<ref>''ECS/AKZO'' ([https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985D0609&from=EN IV/30.698] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308225632/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985D0609&from=EN |date=2021-03-08 }}) Commission decision of 14 December 1985, para 76</ref> The Court of Justice upheld this decision for the inclusion of other factors (such as proof of intention to eliminate competition) to be taken into consideration alongside a cost-based analysis.<ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:4905ac67-5a02-44a0-ae93-7724be6073b0.0002.06/DOC_2&format=PDF Case 62/86] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308110005/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar%3A4905ac67-5a02-44a0-ae93-7724be6073b0.0002.06%2FDOC_2&format=PDF |date=2021-03-08 }}, ''AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities'' [1991] ECR I-03359, para 65</ref> Instead, the Court in ''AKZO'' suggested that if a dominant firm sets prices below AVC, the predatory pricing is presumed to be abusively predatory due to the assumed intention to eliminate competitors rather than maximize profits.<ref name="Case 62/86"/> However, a strategy would not be presumed predatory were a dominant firm to set prices above AVC but below ATC unless evidence were provided to show dominant firm's plan to eliminate competition.<ref name="eur-lex.europa.eu"/> Additionally, if a dominant firm sets prices above ATC, the firm is most commonly not found guilty of predatory pricing, though, still may be proven anti-competitive if potential for substantial consumer harm is discovered.<ref>''ECS/AKZO'' ([https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985D0609&from=EN IV/30.698] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308225632/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985D0609&from=EN |date=2021-03-08 }}) Commission decision of 14 December 1985, para 79</ref> The ''AKZO'' test was reaffirmed in ''Tetra Pak II'',<ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61994CJ0333&from=EN Case 333/94 P] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308132553/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61994CJ0333&from=EN |date=2021-03-08 }}, ''Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities'' [1996] ECR I-5951, para 41</ref> and ''France Télécom''.<ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62007CJ0202&from=EN Case 202/07 P] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309045840/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62007CJ0202&from=EN |date=2021-03-09 }}, ''France Télécom SA v Commission of the European Communities'' [2009] ECR I-2369, para 8</ref>

In ''Post Danmark I'', the Court of Justice developed upon ''AKZO'' by stating that prices above average incremental costs but below ATC would not likely be ruled abusive under Article 102 of the TFEU if there was no evidence the dominant firm deliberately intended to eliminate competition.<ref>[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0209&from=en Case 209/10] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308175109/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0209&from=en |date=2021-03-08 }}, ''Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet'' [2012] EU:C:2012:172, para 44</ref>