Editing Problem of evil (section)

== Formulation ==
{{Further|Existence of God}}
The problem of evil refers to the challenge of reconciling the existence of evil and suffering with our view of the world, especially but not exclusively, with belief in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God who acts in the world.<ref name="IepEvidential" /><ref name="Harvey2013p141"/><ref name=boydp56>Gregory A. Boyd (2003), ''Is God to Blame?'' (InterVarsity Press), {{ISBN|978-0830823949}}, pp. 55–58</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Peter van Inwagen|title=The Problem of Evil|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iQhUrE8BYFIC|year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-954397-7|pages=6–10, 22, 26–30}}</ref><ref name="Edwards2001">{{cite book|first=Linda |last=Edwards |title=A Brief Guide to Beliefs: Ideas, Theologies, Mysteries, and Movements |url=https://archive.org/details/unset0000unse_s5t3 |url-access=registration |year=2001|publisher=Westminster John Knox Press |isbn=978-0-664-22259-8 |page=[https://archive.org/details/unset0000unse_s5t3/page/59 59]}}</ref>

The problem of evil may be described either experientially or theoretically.<ref name="IepEvidential" /> The experiential problem is the difficulty in believing in a concept of a loving God when confronted by evil and suffering in the real world, such as from epidemics, or wars, or murder, or natural disasters where innocent people become victims.<ref>{{cite book|first=John |last=Swinton |title=Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to the Problem of Evil |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sT42mz7G_68C |year=2007|publisher=Wm. B. Eerdmans |isbn=978-0-8028-2997-9 |pages=33–35, 119, 143 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=Susan |last=Neiman |title=Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=28ts5lckpOwC |date=2004 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0691117928 |pages=119–120, 318–322 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Micha de Winter |title=Socialization and Civil Society |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pHRJamJh7XMC |year=2012|publisher=Springer |isbn=978-94-6209-092-7 |pages=69–70 }}</ref> Theoretically, the problem is usually described and studied by religion scholars in two varieties: the logical problem and the evidential problem.<ref name="IepEvidential" />

One of the earliest statements of the problem is found in [[early Buddhist texts]]. In the [[Majjhima Nikāya]], the [[Gautama Buddha|Buddha]] (6th or 5th century [[Common Era|BCE]]) states that if a God created sentient beings, then due to the pain and suffering they feel, he is likely to be an [[Evil God challenge|evil God]].<ref name=":5">Westerhoff, Jan. “Creation in Buddhism” in Oliver, Simon. ''The Oxford Handbook of Creation'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming</ref>

===Logical problem of evil<!--'Logical problem of evil' redirects here-->{{anchor|Epicurus}}===
{{main|Epicurean paradox}}
[[File:Epikouros BM 1843.jpg|thumb|right|upright|The earliest statement of the problem of evil is attributed to Epicurus, but this attribution is uncertain.]]
The problem of evil possibly originates from the Greek philosopher [[Epicurus]] (341–270 BCE).<ref>The formulation may have been wrongly attributed to Epicurus by Lactantius, who, from his Christian perspective, regarded Epicurus as an [[atheist]]. According to Mark Joseph Larrimore, (2001), ''The Problem of Evil'', pp. xix–xxi. Wiley-Blackwell. According to [[Reinhold F. Glei]], it is settled that the argument of theodicy is from an academical source which is not only not epicurean, but even anti-epicurean. Reinhold F. Glei, ''Et invidus et inbecillus. Das angebliche Epikurfragment bei Laktanz, De ira dei 13, 20–21'', in: ''Vigiliae Christianae'' 42 (1988), pp. 47–58</ref> Hume summarizes Epicurus's version of the problem as follows: "Is [god] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"<ref>{{cite web |last1=Hume |first1=David |title=Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4583/4583-h/4583-h.htm |website=Project Gutenberg |access-date=17 June 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Hickson|first=Michael W.|editor1-last=McBrayer|editor1-first=Justin P.|editor2-last=Howard-Snyder|editor2-first=Daniel|date=2014|chapter=A Brief History of Problems of Evil|title=The Blackwell Companion to The Problem of Evil|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J0ScAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT26|location=Hoboken, New Jersey|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|isbn=978-1-118-60797-8|pages=6–7}}</ref>

The logical argument from evil is as follows:
{{blockquote|
P1. If an [[omnipotent]], [[omnibenevolent]] and [[omniscient]] god exists, then evil does not.

P2. There is evil in the world.

C1. Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god does not exist.}}

This argument is of the form {{lang|la|[[modus tollens]]}}: if its premise (P1) is true, the conclusion (C1) follows of necessity. To show that the first premise is plausible, subsequent versions tend to expand on it, such as this modern example:<ref name="IepEvidential" />

{{blockquote|
P1a. God exists.

P1b. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.

P1c. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.

P1d. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils.

P1e. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and knows every way in which those evils could be prevented.

P1f. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.

P1. If there exists an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient God, then no evil exists.

P2. Evil exists (logical contradiction).}}

Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the 'logical' problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed premises lead to a [[logical]] [[contradiction]] that cannot all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the suggestion that God would want to prevent all evils and therefore cannot coexist with any evils (premises P1d and P1f), but there are existing responses to every premise (such as [[Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense|Plantinga's response to P1c]]), with defenders of theism (for example, [[Augustine of Hippo|St. Augustine]] and [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]]) arguing that God could exist and allow evil if there were good reasons.

If God lacks any one of these qualities{{snd}}omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence{{snd}}then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. [[Process theology]] and [[open theism]] are modern positions that limit God's omnipotence or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology) based on free will in others.

===Evidential problem of evil<!--'Logical problem of evil' and 'Evidential argument from evil' redirect here-->===
The evidential problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version of the problem) seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the [[probability]] of the truth of theism.<ref>For detailed discussion of this issue, see {{cite journal |last1=Benton |first1=Matthew A. |last2=Hawthorne |first2=John |last3=Isaacs |first3=Yoaav |title=Evil and Evidence |journal=Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion |date=2016 |volume=7 |pages=1–31 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-875770-2 |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/BENEAE-5.pdf}}</ref> Both absolute versions and relative versions of the evidential problems of evil are presented below.

A version by [[William L. Rowe]]:
# There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
# An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
# (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.<ref name="IepEvidential" />

Another by [[Paul Draper (philosopher)|Paul Draper]]:
# Gratuitous evils exist.
# The hypothesis of indifference, ''i.e.'', that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
# Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Paul |last=Draper |title=Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists |journal=Noûs |volume=23 |issue=3 |pages=331–350 | year=1989 |doi=10.2307/2215486 |jstor=2215486}}</ref>

[[Skeptical theism]] is an example of a theistic challenge to the premises in these arguments.

===Problem of evil and animal suffering===
{{See also|Wild animal suffering|Predation problem|Evolutionary theodicy}}
[[File:Deerfire high res edit.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.3|[[William L. Rowe]]'s example of [[natural evil]]: "In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering."<ref name=rowe336>{{cite journal|last=Rowe|first=William L.|author-link=William L. Rowe|year=1979|title=The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism|journal=American Philosophical Quarterly|volume=16|pages=336–337}}</ref> Rowe also cites the example of human evil where an innocent child is a victim of violence and thereby suffers.<ref name=rowe336/>]]

The problem of evil has also been extended beyond human suffering, to include suffering of animals from cruelty, disease and evil.<ref name=inwagenp120>{{cite book|author=Peter van Inwagen|title=The Problem of Evil|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iQhUrE8BYFIC |year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-954397-7 |pages=120, 123–126, context: 120–133 }}</ref> One version of this problem includes animal suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators, natural disasters, over the history of evolution.<ref name=Creeganp44>{{cite book|author=Nicola Hoggard Creegan|title=Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xB1pAgAAQBAJ |year=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-993185-9 |pages=44–55}}</ref> This is also referred to as the Darwinian problem of evil,<ref>{{cite book|first=Michael |last=Murray |title=Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering |url=https://archive.org/details/natureredint_murr_2008_000_9051094 |url-access=registration |year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press  |isbn=978-0-19-155327-1 |page=[https://archive.org/details/natureredint_murr_2008_000_9051094/page/n19 8]}}</ref><ref name=almeidap193/> after [[Charles Darwin]] who wrote in 1856: "What a book a Devil's chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low & horridly cruel works of nature!", and in his later autobiography said: "A being so powerful and so full of knowledge as a God who could create the universe, is to our finite minds omnipotent and omniscient, and it revolts our understanding to suppose that his benevolence is not unbounded, for what advantage can there be in the sufferings of millions of the lower animals throughout almost endless time? This very old argument from the existence of suffering against the existence of an intelligent first cause seems to me a strong one".<ref name="Murray2008">{{cite book|first=Michael |last=Murray |title=Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering |url=https://archive.org/details/natureredint_murr_2008_000_9051094 |url-access=registration |year=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press  |isbn=978-0-19-155327-1 |page=[https://archive.org/details/natureredint_murr_2008_000_9051094/page/n13 2]}}, cites letter to J. D. Hooker (Darwin Correspondence Project, "Letter no. 1924," accessed on 9 May 2021, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-1924.xml)</ref><ref name="CD bio90">{{cite book |last= Darwin |first= Charles |year = 1958  |editor-last  = Barlow |editor-first = Nora |editor-link  = Nora Barlow |title = The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809–1882. With the original omissions restored. Edited and with appendix and notes by his granddaughter Nora Barlow  |url = http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&itemID=F1497&viewtype=text |location= London |publisher = Collins |page=[http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=92&itemID=F1497&viewtype=text 90] |access-date=2021-05-09|website=darwin-online.org.uk}}</ref>

The second version of the problem of evil applied to animals, and avoidable suffering experienced by them, is one caused by some human beings, such as from animal cruelty or when they are shot or slaughtered. This version of the problem of evil has been used by scholars including [[John Hick]] to counter the responses and defenses to the problem of evil such as suffering being a means to perfect the morals and greater good because animals are innocent, helpless, amoral but sentient victims.<ref name=inwagenp120/><ref>{{cite book|first=Diogenes |last=Allen |editor=Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams|title=The Problem of Evil |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nqNwUSj7U7QC |year=1990|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-824866-8 |pages=204–206 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=William L.|last=Rowe|title=William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion: Selected Writings|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M4GdWhLtZzAC&pg=PA61 |year=2007|publisher=Ashgate |isbn=978-0-7546-5558-9 |pages=61–64 (the fawn's suffering example) }}</ref> Scholar Michael Almeida said this was "perhaps the most serious and difficult" version of the problem of evil.<ref name=almeidap193>{{cite book|first=Michael J.|last=Almeida|title=Freedom, God, and Worlds|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=chSSBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193|year=2012|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-964002-7 |pages=193–194 }}</ref> The problem of evil in the context of animal suffering, states Almeida, can be stated as:<ref>{{cite book|first=Michael J.|last=Almeida|title=Freedom, God, and Worlds|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=chSSBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA193|year=2012|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-964002-7 |pages=194–195, for the complete context and alternate formulations see pp. 194–217 }}</ref>{{Refn|group=note|Nicola Creegan has presented the logical and evidential versions of the problem of evil when applied to animal suffering.<ref name=Creeganp44/>}}

# God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good.
# The evil of extensive animal suffering exists.
# Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world.
# Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world only if God does actualize an evolutionary perfect world.
# Necessarily, God actualized an evolutionary perfect world.
# If #1 is true then either #2 or #5 is true, but not both. This is a contradiction, so #1 is not true.