Editing Rational choice model (section)

== Applications ==
Rational choice theory has become increasingly employed in [[social sciences]] other than [[economics]], such as [[sociology]], [[evolutionary theory]] and [[political science]] in recent decades.<ref>{{cite web|last=Scott|first=John|title=Rational Choice Theory|url=http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090227085005/http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm|archive-date=2009-02-27|access-date=2008-07-30}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Evolutionary Game Theory|year=2021|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/|archive-date=2010-07-11|access-date=2015-08-15|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100711203835/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/|url-status=live}}</ref> It has had far-reaching impacts on the study of [[political science]], especially in fields like the study of interest groups, [[Voting theory|elections]], behaviour in legislatures, [[Coalitions of parties|coalitions]], and [[bureaucracy]].<ref name="dunleavy">{{cite book|last=Dunleavy|first=Patrick|title=Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Models in Political Science|publisher=Pearson|year=1991|location=London}}{{page?|date=January 2025}}</ref> In these fields, the use of rational choice theory to explain broad social phenomena is the subject of controversy.<ref>Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro (1994). ''Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science''. New Haven: Yale University Press.{{ISBN?}}</ref><ref name="Controversy">{{cite book|last=Friedman|first=Jeffrey|title=The Rational Choice Controversy|publisher=Yale University Press|year=1996}}{{ISBN?}}</ref>

===Rational choice theory in political science===
Rational choice theory provides a framework to explain why groups of rational individuals can come to collectively irrational decisions. For example, while at the individual level a group of people may have common interests, applying a rational choice framework to their individually rational preferences can explain group-level outcomes that fail to accomplish any one individual's preferred objectives. Rational choice theory provides a framework to describe outcomes like this as the product of rational agents performing their own cost–benefit analysis to maximize their self-interests, a process that doesn't always align with the group's preferences.<ref>Rakner, L (1996) Rational choice and the problem of institutions. A discussion of rational choice institutionalism and its application by Robert Bates Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 1996:6)</ref>

==== Rational choice in voting behavior ====
Voter behaviour shifts significantly thanks to rational theory, which is ingrained in human nature, the most significant of which occurs when there are times of economic trouble. An example in economic policy, economist [[Anthony Downs]] concluded that a high income voter ‘votes for whatever party he believes would provide him with the highest utility income from government action’,<ref>Anthony Downs (1957). "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", ''Journal of Political Economy'', Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 135–150</ref> using rational choice theory to explain people's income as their justification for their preferred tax rate.

Downs' work provides a framework for analyzing tax-rate preference in a rational choice framework. He argues that an individual votes if it is in their rational interest to do so. Downs models this utility function as B + D > C, where B is the benefit of the voter winning, D is the satisfaction derived from voting and C is the cost of voting.<ref>Downs, A (1957) "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy", ''Journal of Political Economy'', vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 135–150</ref> It is from this that we can determine that parties have moved their policy outlook to be more centric in order to maximise the number of voters they have for support. It is from this very simple framework that more complex adjustments can be made to describe the success of politicians as an outcome of their ability or failure to satisfy the utility function of individual voters.

==== Rational choice theory in international relations ====
Rational choice theory has become one of the major tools used to study international relations. Proponents of its use in this field typically assume that states and the policies crafted at the national outcome are the outcome of self-interested, politically shrewd actors including, but not limited to, politicians, lobbyists, businesspeople, activists, regular voters and any other individual in the national audience. The use of rational choice theory as a framework to predict political behavior has led to a rich literature that describes the trajectory of policy to varying degrees of success. For example, some scholars have examined how states can make credible threats to deter other states from a (nuclear) attack.<ref>T.C. Schelling (1960). ''The Strategy of Conflict''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing (1977). ''Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; R. Powell (1990). ''Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref> Others have explored under what conditions states wage war against each other.<ref>Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981). "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War," ''International Studies Quarterly'', 25(4), pp. 541–568; J.D. Fearon (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War," ''International Organization'', 49(3), pp. 379–414.</ref> Yet others have investigated under what circumstances the threat and imposition of international economic sanctions tend to succeed and when they are likely to fail.<ref>Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff (1997). "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis," ''American Journal of Political Science'', 41(2), pp. 608–618; Daniel W. Drezner (1999). ''The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lisa L. Martin (1992). ''Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions''. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Claas Mertens, [[doi:10.1093/isq/sqae016|Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions?, ''International Studies Quarterly'', Vol. 68, Iss. 2, June 2024]]</ref>

=== Rational choice theory in social interactions ===
Rational choice theory and social exchange theory involves looking at all social relations in the form of costs and rewards, both tangible and non tangible.

According to Abell, Rational Choice Theory is "understanding individual actors... as acting, or more likely interacting, in a manner such that they can be deemed to be doing the best they can for themselves, given their objectives, resources, circumstances, as they seem them".<ref>{{Cite book|author=Coleman, James Samuel|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/801949422|title=Foundations of social theory|date=1990|publisher=The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press|isbn=0-674-31225-2|oclc=801949422}}</ref> Rational Choice Theory has been used to comprehend the complex social phenomena, of which derives from the actions and motivations of an individual. Individuals are often highly motivated by their wants and needs.

By making calculative decisions, it is considered as rational action. Individuals are often making calculative decisions in social situations by weighing out the pros and cons of an action taken towards a person. The decision to act on a rational decision is also dependent on the unforeseen benefits of the friendship. Homan mentions that actions of humans are motivated by punishment or rewards. This reinforcement through punishments or rewards determines the course of action taken by a person in a social situation as well. Individuals are motivated by mutual reinforcement and are also fundamentally motivated by the approval of others.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Browning|first1=Gary|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QaUgne7fgYUC&q=rational+choice+theory&pg=PA126|title=Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present|last2=Halcli|first2=Abigail|last3=Webster|first3=Frank|year=1999|publisher=Sage|isbn=978-1-84920-217-6|language=en}}</ref> Attaining the approval of others has been a generalized character, along with money, as a means of exchange in both Social and Economic exchanges. In Economic exchanges, it involves the exchange of goods or services. In Social exchange, it is the exchange of approval and certain other valued behaviors.

Rational Choice Theory in this instance, heavily emphasizes the individual's interest as a starting point for making social decisions. Despite differing view points about Rational choice theory, it all comes down to the individual as a basic unit of theory. Even though sharing, cooperation and cultural norms emerge, it all stems from an individual's initial concern about the self.<ref>{{Citation|title=Social Exchange and Rational Choice at the Micro Level: Looking Out for #1|date=2008|url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-76522-8_7|work=Contemporary Sociological Theory: An Integrated Multi-Level Approach|pages=165–193|editor-last=Johnson|editor-first=Doyle Paul|place=New York|publisher=Springer|language=en|doi=10.1007/978-0-387-76522-8_7|isbn=978-0-387-76522-8|access-date=2021-04-28|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

G.S Becker offers an example of how Rational choice can be applied to personal decisions, specifically regarding the rationale that goes behind decisions on whether to marry or divorce another individual.  Due to the self-serving drive on which the theory of rational choice is derived, Becker concludes that people marry if the expected utility from such marriage exceeds the utility one would gain from remaining single, and in the same way couples would separate should the utility of being together be less than expected and provide less (economic) benefit than being separated would.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Becker|first1=Gary S.|last2=Landes|first2=Elisabeth M.|last3=Michael|first3=Robert T.|date=Dec 1977|title=An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1837421|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=85|issue=6|pages=1141–1187|doi=10.1086/260631|jstor=1837421|s2cid=53494363|archive-date=2022-01-19|access-date=2022-01-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220119224313/https://www.jstor.org/stable/1837421|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>  Since the theory behind rational choice is that individuals will take the course of action that best serves their personal interests, when considering relationships it is still assumed that they will display such mentality due to deep-rooted, self-interested aspects of human nature.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kamarck|first=Andrew M.|title=Economics as a Social Science: An Approach to Nonautistic Theory|publisher=University of Michigan Press|year=2009|location=Ann Arbor|pages=22–44|chapter= 3: Self-Interest}}</ref>

Social Exchange and Rational Choice Theory both comes down to an individual's efforts to meet their own personal needs and interests through the choices they make. Even though some may be done sincerely for the welfare of others at that point of time, both theories point to the benefits received in return. These returns may be received immediately or in the future, be it tangible or not.

Coleman discussed a number of theories to elaborate on the premises and promises of rational choice theory. One of the concepts that He introduced was Trust.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Coleman|first=James. S|title=Exchange and Rational Choice Theory|isbn=|url=https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/38627_4.pdf|pages=36–54|archive-date=2021-04-28|access-date=2021-04-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210428061404/https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/38627_4.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> It is where "individuals place trust, in both judgement and performance of others, based on rational considerations of what is best, given the alternatives they confront".<ref name=":0" />  In a social situation, there has to be a level of trust among the individuals. He noted that this level of trust is a consideration that an individual takes into concern before deciding on a rational action towards another individual. It affects the social situation as one navigates the risks and benefits of an action. By assessing the possible outcomes or alternatives to an action for another individual, the person is making a calculated decision. In another situation such as making a bet, you are calculating the possible lost and how much can be won. If the chances of winning exceeds the cost of losing, the rational decision would be to place the bet. Therefore, the decision to place trust in another individual involves the same rational calculations that are involved in the decision of making a bet.

Even though rational theory is used in Economics and Social settings, there are some similarities and differences. The concept of reward and reinforcement is parallel to each other while the concept of cost is also parallel to the concept of punishment. However, there is a difference of underlying assumptions in both contexts. In a social setting, the focus is often on the current or past reinforcements, with no guarantee of immediate tangible or intangible returns from another individual in the future. In Economics, decisions are made with heavier emphasis on future rewards.

Despite having both perspectives differ in focus, they primarily reflect on how individuals make different rational decisions when given an immediate or long-term circumstances to consider in their rational decision making.