Editing Signaling game (section)

==Applications of signaling games==
Signaling games describe situations where one player has information the other does not have. These situations of asymmetric information are very common in economics and behavioral biology. <!--Situations with asymmetric information are also common in other social sciences. examples?-->

===Philosophy===
The first signaling game was the [[Lewis signaling game]], which occurred in [[David K. Lewis]]' Ph. D. dissertation (and later book) ''Convention''. See<ref>{{cite book |last=Lewis |first=D. |year=1969 |title=Convention. A Philosophical Study |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge }}</ref>  Replying to [[W.V.O. Quine]],<ref>{{cite book |author-link=W.V.O. Quine |last=Quine |first=W. V. O. |year=1936 |chapter=Truth by Convention |title=Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead |pages=90–124 |publisher=Longmans, Green & Co. |location=London |isbn=978-0-8462-0970-6 }} (Reprinting)</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Quine |first=W. V. O. |year=1960 |title=Carnap and Logical Truth |journal=Synthese |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=350–374 |doi=10.1007/BF00485423 }}</ref> Lewis attempts to develop a theory of [[convention (norm)|convention]] and [[meaning (linguistics)|meaning]] using signaling games.  In his most extreme comments, he suggests that understanding the equilibrium properties of the appropriate signaling game captures all there is to know about meaning:

:I have now described the character of a case of signaling without mentioning the meaning of the signals: that two lanterns meant that the redcoats were coming by sea or whatever. But nothing important seems to have been left unsaid, so what has been said must somehow imply that the signals have their meanings.<ref>Lewis (1969), p. 124.</ref>

The use of signaling games has been continued in the philosophical literature. Others have used [[evolutionary game theory|evolutionary models]] of signaling games to describe the emergence of language. Work on the emergence of language in simple signaling games includes models by Huttegger,<ref>{{cite journal |last=Huttegger |first=S. M. |year=2007 |title=Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning |journal=[[Philosophy of Science (journal)|Philosophy of Science]] |volume=74 |issue=1 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.1086/519477 }}</ref> Grim, ''et al.'',<ref>{{cite book |last1=Grim |first1=P. |first2=T. |last2=Kokalis |first3=A. |last3=Alai-Tafti |first4=N. |last4=Kilb |first5=Paul |last5=St. Denis |year=2001 |chapter=Making Meaning Happen |title=Technical Report #01-02 |series=Stony Brook: Group for Logic and Formal Semantics SUNY, Stony Brook }}</ref> Skyrms,<ref>{{cite book |author-link=Brian Skyrms |last=Skyrms |first=B. |year=1996 |title=Evolution of the Social Contract |location=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-55471-8 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author-link=Brian Skyrms|last=Skyrms |first=B. |year=2010 |title=Signals Evolution, Learning & Information|location=New York|publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn= 978-0-19-958082-8 }}</ref> and Zollman.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Zollman |first=K. J. S. |year=2005 |title=Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning |journal=Philosophy of Science |volume=72 |issue=1 |pages=69–85 |doi=10.1086/428390 }}</ref>  Harms,<ref>{{cite journal |last=Harms |first=W. F. |year=2000 |title=Adaption and Moral Realism |journal=Biology and Philosophy |volume=15 |issue=5 |pages=699–712 |doi=10.1023/A:1006661726993 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Harms |first=W. F. |year=2004 |title=Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes |location=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-81514-7 }}</ref> and Huttegger,<ref>{{cite journal |last=Huttegger |first=S. M. |year=2005 |title=Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives |journal=Erkenntnis |volume=66 |issue=3 |pages=409–436 |doi=10.1007/s10670-006-9022-1 }}</ref> have attempted to extend the study to include the distinction between [[Norm (philosophy)|normative]] and descriptive language.

===Economics===
{{Main|Signalling (economics)}}
The first application of signaling games to economic problems was [[Michael Spence]]'s [[#Education game|Education game]]. A second application was the [[#Reputation game|Reputation game]].

===Biology===
Valuable advances have been made by applying signaling games to several biological questions. Most notably, [[Alan Grafen]]'s (1990) [[handicap principle|handicap]] model of mate attraction displays.<ref>{{cite journal |author-link=Alan Grafen |last=Grafen |first=A. |year=1990 |title=Biological signals as handicaps |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |volume=144 |issue=4 |pages=517–546 |doi=10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80088-8 |pmid=2402153|bibcode=1990JThBi.144..517G }}</ref>  The antlers of stags, the elaborate plumage of [[peacock]]s and [[bird-of-paradise]], and the [[bird song|song]] of the [[nightingale]] are all such signals.  Grafen's analysis of biological signaling is formally similar to the classic monograph on economic market signaling by [[Michael Spence]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Spence |first=A. M. |year=1974 |title=Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related Processes |url=https://archive.org/details/marketsignalingi0000spen |url-access=registration |location=Cambridge |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-54990-6 }}</ref>  More recently, a series of papers by Getty<ref>{{cite journal |last=Getty |first=T. |year=1998 |title=Handicap signalling: when fecundity and viability do not add up |journal=Animal Behaviour |volume=56 |issue=1 |pages=127–130 |doi=10.1006/anbe.1998.0744 |pmid=9710469}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Getty |first=T. |year=1998 |title=Reliable signalling need not be a handicap |journal=Animal Behaviour |volume=56 |issue= 1|pages=253–255 |doi=10.1006/anbe.1998.0748 |pmid=9710484}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Getty |first=T. |year=2002 |title=Signaling health versus parasites |journal=[[The American Naturalist]] |volume=159 |issue=4 |pages=363–371 |doi=10.1086/338992 |pmid=18707421|bibcode=2002ANat..159..363G }}</ref><ref name="Getty06">{{cite journal |last=Getty |first=T. |year=2006 |title=Sexually selected signals are not similar to sports handicaps |journal=Trends in Ecology & Evolution |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=83–88 |doi=10.1016/j.tree.2005.10.016 |pmid=16701479 }}</ref> shows that Grafen's analysis, like that of Spence, is based on the critical simplifying assumption that signalers trade-off costs for benefits in an additive fashion, the way humans invest money to increase income in the same currency. This assumption that costs and benefits trade-off in an additive fashion might be valid for some biological signaling systems but not for multiplicative trade-offs, such as the survival cost – reproduction benefits trade-off that is assumed to mediate the evolution of sexually selected signals.

[[Charles Godfray]] (1991) modeled the begging behavior of nestling birds as a signaling game.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Godfray |first=H. C. J. |year=1991 |title=Signalling of need by offspring to their parents |journal=[[Nature (journal)|Nature]] |volume=352 |issue=6333 |pages=328–330 |doi=10.1038/352328a0 |bibcode=1991Natur.352..328G }}</ref>  The nestlings begging not only informs the parents that the nestling is hungry but also attracts predators to the nest. The parents and nestlings conflict. The nestlings benefit if the parents work harder to feed them than the parents' ultimate benefit level of investment. The parents are trading off investment in the current nestlings against investment in future offspring.

Pursuit deterrent signals have been modeled as signaling games.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Yachi |first=S. |year=1995 |title=How can honest signaling evolve? The role of the handicap principle |journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B |volume=262 |issue=1365 |pages=283–288 |doi=10.1098/rspb.1995.0207 }}</ref>  Thompson's gazelles are known sometimes to perform a '[[Stotting|stott]],' a jump into the air of several feet with the white tail showing, when they detect a predator. Alcock and others have suggested that this action signals the gazelle's speed to the predator. This action successfully distinguishes types because it would be impossible or too costly for a sick creature to perform. Hence, the predator is deterred from chasing a stotting gazelle because it is obviously very agile and would prove hard to catch.

The concept of [[information asymmetry]] in molecular biology has long been apparent.<ref>John Maynard Smith. (2000) The Concept of Information in Biology. Philosophy of Science. 67(2):177-194</ref> Although molecules are not rational agents, simulations have shown that through replication, selection, and genetic drift, molecules can behave according to signaling game dynamics. Such models have been proposed to explain, for example, the emergence of the genetic code from an RNA and amino acid world.<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Jee, J. |author2=Sundstrom, A. |author3=Massey, S.E. |author4=Mishra, B. | year=2013 | title= What can information-asymmetric games tell us about the context of Crick's 'Frozen Accident'? | journal= Journal of the Royal Society Interface| volume= 10 | issue= 88 | page=20130614 | doi=10.1098/rsif.2013.0614 | pmid=23985735 | pmc=3785830}}</ref>

{{See also|Sir Philip Sidney game}}