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Signalling theory
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== Models of signalling interactions == {{further|Game theory}} Perhaps the most popular tool to investigate signalling interactions is [[game theory]]. A typical model investigates an interaction between a signaller and a receiver. Games can be symmetrical or asymmetric. There can be several types of asymmetries including asymmetry in resources or asymmetry of information. In many asymmetric games the receiver is in a possession of a resource that the signaller wants to get (resource asymmetry). Signallers can be a of different types, the type of any given signaller is assumed to be hidden (information asymmetry). Asymmetric games are frequently used to model mate choice (sexual selection){{sfn|Grafen|1990}} or parent-offspring interactions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Godfray |first=H. C. J. |date=July 1991 |title=Signalling of need by offspring to their parents |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/352328a0 |journal=Nature |volume=352 |issue=6333 |pages=328–330 |doi=10.1038/352328a0 |bibcode=1991Natur.352..328G |s2cid=4288527|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Godfray |first=H. C. J. |date=July 1995b |title=Signaling of Need between Parents and Young: Parent-Offspring Conflict and Sibling Rivalry |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/285784 |journal=The American Naturalist |volume=146 |issue=1 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.1086/285784 |s2cid=86107046|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |date=1996-12-22 |title=Begging signals and parent–offspring conflict: do parents always win? |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1996.0245 |journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences |volume=263 |issue=1377 |pages=1677–1681 |doi=10.1098/rspb.1996.0245 |s2cid=144227428|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=Szamado /> Asymmetric games are also used to model interspecific interactions such as predator-prey,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Ramesh |first1=Divya |last2=Mitchell |first2=William A. |date=December 2018 |title=Evolution of signalling through pursuit deterrence in a two-prey model using game theory |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2018.10.012 |journal=Animal Behaviour |volume=146 |pages=155–163 |doi=10.1016/j.anbehav.2018.10.012 |s2cid=53714343|url-access=subscription }}</ref> host-parasite{{sfn|Archetti|2000}} or plant-pollinator signalling.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sun |first1=Shan |last2=Leshowitz |first2=Michael I. |last3=Rychtář |first3=Jan |date=2018-04-27 |title=The signalling game between plants and pollinators |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-24779-0 |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=8 |issue=1 |page=6686 |doi=10.1038/s41598-018-24779-0 |pmid=29703897 |pmc=5923245 |bibcode=2018NatSR...8.6686S}}</ref> Symmetric games can be used to model competition for resources, such as animals fighting for food or for a territory.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Enquist |first=Magnus |date=November 1985 |title=Communication during aggressive interactions with particular reference to variation in choice of behaviour |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0003-3472(85)80175-5 |journal=Animal Behaviour |volume=33 |issue=4 |pages=1152–1161 |doi=10.1016/s0003-3472(85)80175-5 |s2cid=53200843|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Számadó |first=Szabolcs |date=April 2003 |title=Threat Displays are not Handicaps |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2003.3176 |journal=Journal of Theoretical Biology |volume=221 |issue=3 |pages=327–348 |doi=10.1006/jtbi.2003.3176 |pmid=12642112 |bibcode=2003JThBi.221..327S|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
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