Editing Sino-Soviet split (section)

=== Discontents of de-Stalinization ===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B0628-0015-035, Nikita S. Chruschtschow.jpg|thumb|The Sino-Soviet split initially arose in the late 1950s over the ideological divergence between Soviet leader [[Khrushchev]]'s policies of De-Stalinisation and peaceful coexistence and Mao's affirmation of Stalinism and confrontation with the West. By the late 1970s, the positions were reversed; the [[Cold War#New Cold War (1979–1985)|New Cold War]] was beginning with the Soviet Union and the West in confrontation and [[China–United States relations#Normalization|China having achieved rapprochement with the United States]].]]
In early 1956, Sino-Soviet relations began deteriorating, following Khrushchev's [[de-Stalinization]] of the USSR, which he initiated with the speech ''[[On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences|On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences]]'' that criticized [[Stalin]] and [[Stalinism]] – especially the [[Great Purge]] of Soviet society, of the rank-and-file of the [[Soviet Armed Forces]], and of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU). In light of de-Stalinization, the CPSU's changed ideological orientation – from Stalin's confrontation of the West to Khrushchev's [[peaceful coexistence]] with it – posed problems of ideological credibility and political authority for Mao, who had emulated Stalin's style of leadership and practical application of Marxism–Leninism in the development of [[socialism with Chinese characteristics]] and the PRC as a country.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=49-50}}

The [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956]] against the rule of Moscow was a severe political concern for Mao, because it had required military intervention to suppress, and its occurrence weakened the political legitimacy of the Communist Party to be in government. In response to that discontent among the European members of the Eastern Bloc, the Chinese Communist Party denounced the USSR's de-Stalinization as [[Marxist revisionism|revisionism]], and reaffirmed the Stalinist ideology, policies, and practices of Mao's government as the correct course for achieving socialism in China. This event, indicating Sino-Soviet divergences of Marxist–Leninist practice and interpretation, began fracturing "monolithic communism" — the Western perception of absolute ideological unity in the Eastern Bloc.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=62–63}}

From Mao's perspective, the success of the Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with the West would geopolitically isolate the PRC;{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010||page=48}} whilst the Hungarian Revolution indicated the possibility of revolt in the PRC, and in China's sphere of influence. To thwart such discontent, Mao launched in 1956 the [[Hundred Flowers Campaign]] of political liberalization – the freedom of speech to criticize government, the bureaucracy, and the CCP publicly. However, the campaign proved too successful when [[Anti-Rightist Campaign|blunt criticism of Mao was voiced]].{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=71–73}} Consequent to the relative freedoms of the de-Stalinized USSR, Mao retained the Stalinist model of Marxist–Leninist economy, government, and society.

Ideological differences between Mao and Khrushchev compounded the insecurity of the new communist leader in China. Following the Chinese civil war, Mao was especially sensitive to ideological shifts that might undermine the CCP. In an era saturated by this form of ideological instability, Khrushchev's anti-Stalinism was particularly impactful to Mao. Mao saw himself as a descendent in a long Marxist–Leninist lineage of which Stalin was the most recent figurehead. Chinese leaders began to associate Stalin's successor with anti-party elements within China. Khrushchev was pinned as a revisionist. Popular sentiment within China regarded Khrushchev as a representative of the upper-class, and Chinese Marxist-Leninists viewed the leader as a blight on the communist project. While the two nations had significant ideological similarities, domestic instability drove a wedge between the nations as they began to adopt different visions of communism following the death of Stalin in 1953.

Popular sentiment within China changed as Khrushchev's policies changed. Stalin had accepted that the USSR would carry much of the economic burden of the Korean War, but, when Khrushchev came to power, he created a repayment plan under which the PRC would reimburse the Soviet Union within an eight-year period. However, China was experiencing significant food shortages at this time, and, when grain shipments were routed to the Soviet Union instead of feeding the Chinese public, faith in the Soviets plummeted. These policy changes were interpreted as Khrushchev's abandonment of the communist project and the nations' shared identity as Marxist-Leninists. As a result, Khrushchev became Mao's scapegoat during China's food crisis.{{sfnp|Lüthi|2010|pages=76–77}}