Editing Theory of categories (section)

==Modern development==
Kant and Hegel accused the Aristotelian table of categories of being '[[Wiktionary:rhapsodic|rhapsodic]]', derived arbitrarily and in bulk from experience, without any systematic [[necessity (logic)|necessity]].<ref>{{cite journal|author=[[Enrico Berti]]|url=https://journals-openedition-org.translate.goog/estetica/2024?_x_tr_sl=it&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=it&_x_tr_pto=wapp|title=Sono ancora utili oggi le categorie di Aristotele?|journal=Nuove Ontologie|number=39|year=2008|doi=10.4000/estetica.2024|pages=57–72|language=it|doi-access=free}}</ref>

The early modern dualism, which has been described above, of Mind and Matter or Subject and Relation, as reflected in the writings of Descartes underwent a substantial revision in the late 18th century. The first objections to this stance were formulated in the eighteenth century by [[Immanuel Kant]] who realised that we can say nothing about [[Substance theory|Substance]] except through the relation of the subject to other things.<ref>''Op.cit.3'' p.87</ref> 

For example: In the sentence "This is a house" the substantive subject "house" only gains meaning in relation to human use patterns or to other similar houses. The category of Substance disappears from [[Category (Kant)|Kant's tables]], and under the heading of Relation, Kant lists ''inter alia'' the three relationship types of Disjunction, Causality and Inherence.<ref>''Ibid.'' pp.107,113</ref> The three older concepts of Quantity, Motion and Quality, as [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce]] discovered, could be subsumed under these three broader headings in that [[Quantity]] relates to the subject through the relation of [[Logical disjunction|Disjunction]]; Motion relates to the subject through the relation of [[Causality]]; and [[Quality (philosophy)|Quality]] relates to the subject through the relation of [[Inherence]].<ref>''Op.cit.5'' pp.148-179</ref> Sets of three continued to play an important part in the nineteenth century development of the categories, most notably in [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|G.W.F. Hegel's]] extensive tabulation of categories,<ref>Stace W.T. ''The Philosophy of Hegel'' (Macmillan & Co, London, 1924)</ref> and in [[Categories (Peirce)|C.S. Peirce's categories]] set out in his work on the logic of relations. One of Peirce's contributions was to call the three primary categories Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness<ref>''Op.cit.5'' pp.148-179</ref> which both emphasises their general nature, and avoids the confusion of having the same name for both the category itself and for a concept within that category.

In a separate development, and building on the notion of primary and secondary categories introduced by the Scholastics, [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] introduced the idea that secondary or "derivative" categories could be derived from the primary categories through the combination of one primary category with another.<ref>''Op.cit.3'' p.116</ref> This would result in the formation of three secondary categories: the first, "Community" was an example that Kant gave of such a derivative category; the second, "[[Linguistic modality|Modality]]", introduced by Kant, was a term which Hegel, in developing Kant's dialectical method, showed could also be seen as a derivative category;<ref>Hegel G.W.F. ''Logic'' (tr. Wallace W., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975) pp.124ff</ref> and the third, "Spirit" or "Will" were terms that [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]]<ref>''Op.cit.15''</ref> and [[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer]]<ref>Schopenhauer A. ''On the Four-Fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason''  1813 (tr. Payne E., La Salle, Illinois, 1974)</ref> were developing separately for use in their own systems. [[Karl Jaspers]] in the twentieth century, in his development of existential categories, brought the three together, allowing for differences in terminology, as Substantiality, Communication and Will.<ref>Jaspers K. ''Philosophy'' 1932 (tr. Ashton E.B., University of Chicago Press, 1970) pp.117ff</ref> This pattern of three primary and three secondary categories was used most notably in the nineteenth century by [[Peter Mark Roget]] to form the six headings of his [[Roget's Thesaurus|Thesaurus]] of English Words and Phrases. The headings used were the three objective categories of Abstract Relation, Space (including Motion) and Matter and the three subjective categories of Intellect, Feeling and Volition, and he found that under these six headings all the words of the English language, and hence any possible predicate, could be assembled.<ref>Roget P.M. ''Roget's Thesaurus: The Everyman Edition'' 1952 (Pan Books, London, 1972)</ref>

===Kant===
{{main|Category (Kant)}}

In the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1781), [[Immanuel Kant]] argued that the [[Category (Kant)|categories]] are part of our own mental structure and consist of a set of ''a priori'' concepts through which we interpret the world around us.<ref>	''Op.cit.3'' p.87</ref> These concepts correspond to twelve logical functions of the understanding which we use to make judgements and there are therefore two tables given in the ''Critique'', one of the Judgements and a corresponding one for the [[Category (Kant)|Categories]].<ref>''Ibid.'' pp.107,113</ref> To give an example, the logical function behind our reasoning from ground to consequence (based on the [[Hypothetical syllogism|Hypothetical relation]]) underlies our understanding of the world in terms of cause and effect (the [[Causality|Causal relation]]). In each table the number twelve arises from, firstly, an initial division into two: the Mathematical and the Dynamical; a second division of each of these headings into a further two: Quantity and Quality, and Relation and Modality respectively; and, thirdly, each of these then divides into a further three subheadings as follows.

{{col-begin}}
{{col-break}}
Table of Judgements

Mathematical
*Quantity
**Universal
**Particular
**Singular
*Quality
**Affirmative
**Negative
**Infinite
Dynamical
*Relation
**Categorical
**Hypothetical
**Disjunctive
*Modality
**Problematic
**Assertoric
**Apodictic
{{col-break}}
Table of Categories

Mathematical
*[[Quantity]]
**Unity
**Plurality
**[[Absolute (philosophy)|Totality]]
*[[Quality (philosophy)|Quality]]
**[[Reality]]
**[[Negation]]
**Limitation
Dynamical
*[[Relation of Ideas|Relation]]
**[[Inherence]] and [[Subsistence economy|Subsistence]] ([[Substance theory|substance]] and [[accident]])
**[[Causality]] and Dependence ([[cause]] and [[Result|effect]])
**Community (reciprocity)
*[[Modal logic|Modality]]
**[[Logical possibility|Possibility]]
**[[Existence]]
**[[Need|Necessity]]
{{col-end}}

[[Critique of the Kantian philosophy|Criticism of Kant's system]] followed, firstly, by [[Arthur Schopenhauer]], who amongst other things was unhappy with the term "Community", and declared that the tables "do open violence to truth, treating it as nature was treated by old-fashioned gardeners",<ref>Schopenhauer A. ''The World as Will and Representation'' (tr. Payne A., Dover Publications, London, New York, 1966) p.430</ref> and secondly, by [[Walter Terence Stace|W.T.Stace]] who in his book ''The Philosophy of Hegel'' suggested that in order to make Kant's structure completely symmetrical a third category would need to be added to the Mathematical and the Dynamical.<ref>''Op.cit.15'' p.222</ref> This, he said, Hegel was to do with his category of concept.

===Hegel===
[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|G.W.F. Hegel]] in his ''[[Science of Logic]]'' (1812) attempted to provide a more comprehensive system of categories than Kant and developed a structure that was almost entirely triadic.<ref>''Ibid.''</ref> So important were the categories to Hegel that he claimed the first principle of the world, which he called the "[[Absolute spirit|absolute]]", is "a system of categories&nbsp;{{omission}} the categories must be the reason of which the world is a consequent".<ref>''Ibid.'' pp.63,65</ref>

Using his own logical method of [[Aufheben|sublation]], later called the [[Hegelian dialectic]], reasoning from the abstract through the negative to the concrete, he arrived at a hierarchy of some 270 categories, as explained by [[Walter Terence Stace|W.&nbsp;T.&nbsp;Stace]]. The three very highest categories were "logic", "nature" and "spirit". The three highest categories of "logic", however, he called "being", "essence", and "notion" which he explained as follows:

* Being was differentiated from Nothing by containing with it the concept of the "[[Other (philosophy)|other]]", an initial internal division that can be compared with Kant's category of disjunction. Stace called the category of Being the sphere of common sense containing concepts such as consciousness, sensation, quantity, quality and measure.
* [[Essence]]. The "other" separates itself from the "one" by a kind of motion, reflected in Hegel's first synthesis of "[[Becoming (philosophy)|becoming]]". For Stace this category represented the sphere of science containing within it firstly, the thing, its form and properties; secondly, cause, effect and reciprocity, and thirdly, the principles of classification, identity and difference. 
* [[Notion (philosophy)|Notion]]. Having passed over into the "Other" there is an almost [[Neoplatonism#Return to the One|neoplatonic return]] into a higher unity that in embracing the "one" and the "other" enables them to be considered together through their inherent qualities. This according to Stace is the sphere of philosophy proper where we find not only the three types of logical proposition: disjunctive, hypothetical, and categorical but also the three [[Transcendentals|transcendental concepts]] of beauty, goodness and truth.<ref>''Op.cit.18'' pp.124ff</ref>

[[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer's]] category that corresponded with "notion" was that of "idea", which in his ''Four-Fold Root of Sufficient Reason'' he complemented with the category of the "will".<ref>''Op.cit.20''</ref> The title of his major work was ''[[The World as Will and Representation|The World as Will and Idea]]''. The two other complementary categories, reflecting one of Hegel's initial divisions, were those of Being and Becoming. At around the same time, [[Johann Wolfgang von Goethe|Goethe]] was developing his colour theories in the {{lang|de|[[Theory of Colours|Farbenlehre]]}} of 1810, and introduced similar principles of combination and complementation, symbolising, for Goethe, "the primordial relations which belong both to nature and vision".<ref>Goethe J.W. von, ''The Theory of Colours'' (tr. Eastlake C.L., MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970) p.350</ref> [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]] in his ''[[Science of Logic]]'' accordingly asks us to see his system not as a tree but as a circle.