Editing Thomas Schelling (section)

==Notable works==
{{anchor|The Strategy of Conflict}}
===''The Strategy of Conflict'' (1960)===
''The Strategy of Conflict'', which Schelling published in 1960,<ref name=":5">{{cite book |title=The Strategy of Conflict |last=Schelling |first=Thomas C. |year=1980 |edition=Reprint, illustrated and revised. |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0674840317 |page=309 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7RkL4Z8Yg5AC&q=thomas+schelling+strategy+of+conflict |access-date=September 21, 2010}}</ref> pioneered the study of bargaining and [[strategic management|strategic behavior]] in what he refers to as "conflict behavior."<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last=Powell |first=Robert |date=2006 |title=War as a Commitment Problem |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818306060061 |journal=International Organization |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages= |doi=10.1017/s0020818306060061 |doi-broken-date=November 5, 2024 |issn=0020-8183 |via= |s2cid=15861342}}</ref> ''The Times Literary Supplement'' in 1995 ranked it as one of the 100 most influential books in the 50 years since 1945.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.interleaves.org/~rteeter/grttls.html|title=100 Most Influential Books Since the War (TLS)|first=Robert|last=Teeter|website=www.interleaves.org}}</ref> In this book Schelling introduced concepts such as the [[Focal point (game theory)|"focal point"]] and "credible commitment." In a 1961 review, International Relations scholar [[Morton Kaplan]] described the book as a "strikingly original contribution" and a "landmark in the literature."<ref name="Kaplan 1961 642–652">{{Cite journal |last=Kaplan |first=Morton A. |date=1961 |title=Strategy and International Politics |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/strategy-and-international-politics/B8D7B5793A4954C5BA499EC6F2AA78E8 |journal=World Politics |language=en |volume=13 |issue=4 |pages=642–652 |doi=10.2307/2009441 |jstor=2009441 |s2cid=144001424 |issn=1086-3338|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Schelling's book comprised a series of scholarly journal articles that he had published over the period 1957–1960.<ref name="Kaplan 1961 642–652"/>

Schelling encourages in his work a strategic view toward conflict that is equally "rational" and "successful."<ref name=":5" /> He believes that conflict cannot be based merely on one's intelligence but must also address the "advantages" associated with a course of action. He considers that the advantages that are  gleaned should be firmly fixed in a value system that is both "explicit" and "consistent."<ref name=":5" />

Also, conflict has a distinct meaning. In Schelling's approach, it is not enough to defeat an opponent, but one must also seize opportunities to co-operate of which there are usually many. He points out that it is only on the rarest of occasions, in what is known as "pure conflict," that the participants' interests are implacably opposed.<ref name=":5" /> He uses the example of "a war of complete extermination" to illustrate this phenomenon.<ref name=":5" />

Co-operation, if available, may take many forms and thus potentially involve everything from "deterrence, limited war, and disarmament" to "negotiation."<ref name=":5" /> Indeed, it is through such actions that participants are left with less of a conflict and more of a "bargaining situation."<ref name=":5" /> The bargaining itself is best thought of in terms of the other participant's actions, as any gains one might realize are highly dependent upon the "choices or decisions" of their opponent.<ref name=":5" />

Communication between parties, though, is another matter entirely. Verbal or written communication is known as "explicit," and involves such activities as "offering concessions."<ref name=":5" /> What happens, though, when this type of communication becomes impossible or improbable? This is when something called "tacit maneuvers" become important.<ref name=":5" /> Think of this as action-based communication. Schelling uses the example of one's occupation or evacuation of strategic territory to illustrate this latter communication method.

In an article celebrating Schelling's Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics,<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/11/AR2005101101336.html "A Nobel Laureate Who's Got Game"], ''The Washington Post'', October 12, 2005.</ref> [[Michael Kinsley]], ''[[Washington Post]]'' [[op-ed|op‑ed]] columnist and one of Schelling's former students, anecdotally summarizes Schelling's reorientation of game theory thus: "[Y]ou're standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You'll be released, and one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you persuade the other guy to give in, when the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both? Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don't have to convince him that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that, you win."

===''Arms and Influence'' (1966)===
Schelling's theories about war were extended in ''Arms and Influence'', published in 1966.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=0300002211|title=Arms and Influence – Schelling, Thomas C. – Yale University Press|date=January 7, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160107193224/http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=0300002211|archive-date=January 7, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Leites |first=Nathan |date=1967 |title=Weakening the Belief in General War: Schelling on Strikes |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/weakening-the-belief-in-general-war-schelling-on-strikes/49FC8EB55E8BEDBCF7A1A91B0EB1A4D9 |journal=World Politics |language=en |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=709–719 |doi=10.2307/2009722 |jstor=2009722 |issn=1086-3338|url-access=subscription }}</ref> According to the publisher, the book "carries forward the analysis so brilliantly begun in his earlier ''The Strategy of Conflict'' (1960) and ''Strategy and Arms Control'' (with [[Morton Halperin]], 1961), and makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on modern war and [[diplomacy]]." Chapter headings include ''The Diplomacy of Violence'', ''The Diplomacy of Ultimate Survival'' and ''The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm''.

Within the work, Schelling discusses military capabilities and how they can be used as bargaining power. Instead of considering only the choices that are available on a surface level, one can think ahead to try to influence the other party to come to the desired conclusion. Specifically, Schelling mentions the actions taken by the U.S. during the Cuban and Berlin crises and how they functioned as not only preparation for war but also signals. For example, Schelling points out that the bombing of North Vietnam "is as much coercive as tactical."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300143379/arms-and-influence|title=Arms and Influence {{!}} Yale University Press|website=yalebooks.yale.edu|access-date=2019-11-14}}</ref> Not only was the bombing to cripple their enemies armies, but it also served to bring Vietnam to the table for negotiations. Much of this writing was influenced largely due to Schelling's personal interest in Game Theory and its application to nuclear armaments.

Schelling's work influenced [[Robert Jervis]].''<ref name=":02">{{Cite web|last=Jervis|first=Robert|date=March 4, 2020|title=H-Diplo Essay 198- Robert Jervis on Learning the Scholar's Craft|url=https://issforum.org/essays/198-jervis|access-date=June 8, 2021|website=H-Diplo {{!}} ISSF|language=en-US}}</ref>''<ref>{{Cite web|last=Jervis|first=Robert|date=December 28, 2016|title=Thomas C. Schelling: A Reminiscence|url=https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/thomas-c-schelling-a-reminiscence/|access-date=December 10, 2021|website=War on the Rocks|language=en-US}}</ref>

===''Micromotives and Macrobehavior'' (1978)===
In 1969 and 1971, Schelling published widely cited articles dealing with [[race (classification of human beings)|racial]] dynamics and what he termed "a general theory of [[tipping point (sociology)|tipping]]."<ref>Thomas C. Schelling (1969) "Models of segregation," ''American Economic Review'', 1969, 59(2), [http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic185351.files/shelling1.pdf 488–493].<br />&nbsp;&nbsp; _____ (1971). "Dynamic Models of Segregation," ''Journal of Mathematical Sociology'', 1(2), pp. [https://web.archive.org/web/20140801170215/http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~aldous/157/Papers/Schelling_Seg_Models.pdf 143–186].</ref> In those papers, he showed that a preference that one's neighbors be of the same color, or even a preference for a mixture "up to some limit," can lead to total [[residential segregation|segregation]]. He thus argued that motives, malicious or not, were indistinguishable as to explaining the phenomenon of complete local separation of distinct groups. He used coins on graph paper to demonstrate his theory by placing pennies and dimes in different patterns on the "board" and then moving them one by one if they were in an "unhappy" situation.{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}

Schelling's dynamics has been cited as a way of explaining variations that are found in what are regarded as meaningful differences{{spaced ndash}}gender, age, race, ethnicity, language, sexual preference, and religion.  A cycle of such change, once it has begun, may have a self-sustaining momentum. Schelling's 1978 book ''Micromotives and Macrobehavior'' expanded on and generalized those themes<ref>Thomas C. Schelling (1978) ''Micromotives and Macrobehavior'', Norton. [http://books.wwnorton.com/books/978-0-393-32946-9/ Description], [https://books.google.com/books?id=DenWKRgqzWMC&pg=PA1= preview].</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Schelling|first1=Thomas C|journal=Handbook of Computational Economics|date=2006|publisher=Elsevier|pages=1639–1644|title=Some Fun, Thirty-Five Years Ago|volume=2|doi=10.1016/S1574-0021(05)02037-X|isbn=978-0444512536}}</ref> and is often cited in the literature of [[agent-based computational economics]].