Editing Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (section)

== Legal issues and politics ==
[[File:Heatpipes.JPG|thumb|Most road crossings are simply buried deep, but this crossing on the [[Richardson Highway]] is close to the surface and employs [[thermosyphon]]s, special [[heat pipe]]s that conduct heat from the oil to the fins at the top of the pipes in order to avoid thawing the permafrost]]
[[File:Alyeska pipeline below surface 1987.jpg|thumb|Alyeska, buried pipeline with heat pipes, summer 1987]]
[[File:Aerial view of the trans Alaska oil pipeline.jpg|thumb|right|TAPS and the Dalton Highway crossing the Kanuti National Wildlife Refuge]]
In both the courts and Congress, Alyeska and the oil companies fought for the pipeline's construction amidst opposition concerning the pipeline's EIS (environmental impact statement). The arguments continued through 1971. Objections about the caribou herds were countered by observations of [[Davidson Ditch]], a water pipeline with the same diameter of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, which caribou were able to jump over.<ref>Coates, p. 210</ref> To those who argued that the pipeline would irrevocably alter Alaska wilderness, proponents pointed to the overgrown remnants of the [[Fairbanks Gold Rush]], most of which had been erased 70&nbsp;years later.<ref>Coates, p. 211</ref> Some pipeline opponents were satisfied by Alyeska's preliminary design, which incorporated underground and raised crossings for caribou and other big game, gravel and styrofoam insulation to prevent permafrost melting, automatic leak detection and shutoff, and other techniques.<ref>Coates, p. 231.</ref> Other opponents, including fishermen who feared tanker leaks south of Valdez, maintained their disagreement with the plan.<ref>Coates, pp. 220–223</ref>

All the arguments both for and against the pipeline were incorporated into the 3,500-page, 9-volume final environmental impact statement, which was released on March 20, 1972.<ref name="Coates227"/> Although Alaska Sen. [[Ted Stevens]] felt the statement "was not written by a proponent," it maintained the general approval for pipeline construction that was demonstrated in the draft statement.<ref>Coates, p. 228</ref> U.S. Secretary of the Interior [[Rogers Morton]] allowed 45 days of comment after the release, and conservationists created a 1,300-page document opposing the impact statement.<ref>Coates, p. 229</ref> This document failed to sway Judge Hart, who lifted the injunction on the project on August 15, 1972.<ref name="Coates235">Coates, p. 235</ref>

The environmental groups that had filed the injunction appealed the decision, and on October 6, 1972, the U.S. District Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., partially reversed Hart's decision. The appeals court said that although the impact statement followed the guidelines set by the National Environmental Policy Act, it did not follow the [[Mineral Leasing Act of 1920|Minerals Leasing Act]], which allowed for a smaller pipeline right of way than was required for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.<ref name="Coates235"/> The oil companies and Alyeska appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but in April 1973, the court declined to hear the case.<ref>Coates, pp. 236–237</ref>

=== Congressional issues ===
With the appeals court having decided that the Minerals Leasing Act did not cover the pipeline's requirements, Alyeska and the oil companies began lobbying Congress to either amend the act or create a new law that would permit a larger right-of-way. The Senate Interior Committee began the first hearings on a series of bills to that effect on March 9, 1973.<ref>Coates, p. 237</ref> Environmental opposition switched from contesting the pipeline on NEPA grounds to fighting an amendment to the leasing act or a new bill.<ref>Coates, pp. 237–239</ref> By the spring and summer of 1973, these opposition groups attempted to persuade Congress to endorse a Trans-Canada oil pipeline or a railroad. They believed the "leave it in the ground" argument was doomed to fail, and the best way to oppose the pipeline would be to propose an ineffective alternative which could be easily defeated.<ref>Coates, pp. 241–243</ref> The problem with this approach was that any such alternative would cover more ground and be more damaging environmentally than the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.<ref>Coates, p. 244</ref>

Hearings in both the U.S. Senate and the House continued through the summer of 1973 on both new bills and amendments to the Mineral Leasing Act. On July 13, an amendment calling for more study of the project—the Mondale-Bayh Amendment—was defeated.<ref>Coates, p. 245</ref> This was followed by another victory for pipeline proponents when an amendment by Alaska Sen. [[Mike Gravel]] was passed by the Senate. The amendment declared that the pipeline project fulfilled all aspects of NEPA and modified the Mineral Leasing Act to allow the larger right-of-way for the Alaska pipeline.<ref>Mead, p. 167</ref> Upon [[reconsider]]ation, the vote was tied at 49–49 and required the vote of vice president [[Spiro Agnew]], who supported the amendment;<ref>Coates, p. 246</ref> a&nbsp;similar amendment was passed in the House on August 2.<ref>Coates, p. 247</ref><ref name=thrbypv>{{cite news |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=euZVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=OuEDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5405%2C774368 |work=Eugene Register-Guard |location=(Oregon) |agency=UPI |title=Alaskans thrilled by pipeline vote |date=August 3, 1973 |page=3A}}</ref>

=== Oil crisis and authorization act ===
{{main|1973 oil crisis|Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act}}

On October 17, 1973, the [[Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries]] announced an [[1973 oil crisis|oil embargo]] against the United States in retaliation for its support of [[Israel]] during the [[Yom Kippur War]]. Because the United States imported approximately 35 percent of its oil from foreign sources,<ref>Mead, p. 161</ref> the embargo had a major effect. The price of gasoline shot upward, gasoline shortages were common, and rationing was considered. Most Americans began demanding a solution to the problem, and President Richard Nixon began lobbying for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline as at least a part of the answer.{{citation needed|date=November 2023}}

Nixon supported the pipeline project even before the oil crisis. On September 10, 1973, he released a message stating that the pipeline was his priority for the remainder of the Congressional session that year.<ref>Coates, p. 248</ref> On November 8, after the embargo had been in place for three weeks, he reaffirmed that statement. Members of Congress, under pressure from their constituents, created the [[Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act]], which removed all legal barriers from construction of the pipeline, provided financial incentives, and granted a right-of-way for its construction. The act was drafted, rushed through committee, and approved by the House on November 12, 1973, by a vote of 361–14–60. The next day, the Senate passed it, 80–5–15.<ref>Coates, p. 249</ref> Nixon signed it into law on November 16, and a federal right-of-way for the pipeline and transportation highway was granted on January 3, 1974.<ref>Facts, p. 76</ref> The deal was signed by the oil companies on January 23, allowing work to start.<ref>Mead, p. 204</ref>