Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Universal pragmatics
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
===Examining the validity of speech=== Habermas claims that communication rests upon a non-egoistic understanding of the world, which is an idea he borrowed from thinkers like [[Jean Piaget]]. A subject capable of a de-centered understanding can take up three fundamentally different attitudes to the world. Habermas refers to such attitudes as ''dimensions of validity''. Specifically, this means individuals can recognize different standards for validity—i.e., that the validation of an [[empirical]] truth claim requires different methods and procedures than the validation of subjective truthfulness, and that both of those require different methods and procedures of validation than claims to normative rightness. These dimensions of validity can be summarized as claims to ''truth (IT), truthfulness (I),'' and ''rightness (WE)''. So the ability to differentiate between the attitudes (and their respective "worlds") mentioned above should be understood as an ability to distinguish between types of validity claims. M. Cooke provided the only book-length treatment of Habermas's [[communication theory]]. Cooke explains: :"when we adopt an objectifying attitude we relate, in the first instance to the objective world of facts and existing states of affairs [IT]; when we adopt a norm-conformative attitude we relate, in the first instance, to the social world of normatively regulated interactions [WE]; when we adopt an expressive attitude we relate, in the first instance to the subjective world of inner [[experience]] [I]". (Cooke 1994) This is fundamental to Habermas's analysis of communication. He maintains that the performance of any speech act necessarily makes reference to these dimensions of validity, by raising at least three validity claims. One way to grasp this idea is to take an inventory of the ways in which an attempt at communication can misfire, the ways a speech act can fail. A hearer may reject the offering of a speech act on the grounds that it is invalid because it: # presupposes or explicates states of affairs which are not the case (IT); # does not conform to accepted normative expectations (WE); # raises doubts about the intentions or sincerity of the speaker (I). Of course, from this, it follows that a hearer who accepts the offering of a speech act does so on the grounds that it is valid because it: # presupposes or explicates states of affairs that are true (IT); # conforms to accepted normative expectations (WE); # raises no doubts concerning the intentions or sincerity of the speaker (I). This means that when engaging in communication the speaker and hearer are inescapably oriented to the validity of what is said. A speech act can be understood as an offering, the success or failure of which depends upon the hearer's response of either accepting or rejecting the validity claims it raises. The three dimensions of validity pointed out above are implicated in any attempt at communication. Thus, communication relies on its being embedded within relations to various dimensions of validity. Any and every speech act is infused with inter-subjectively recognized claims to be valid. This implicitly ties communication to argumentation and various [[discourse|discursive]] procedures for the redemption of validity claims. This is true because to raise a validity claim in communication is to simultaneously imply that one is able to show, if challenged, that one's claim is justified. Communication is possible because speakers are accountable for the validity of what they say. This assumption of responsibility on the part of the speaker is described by Habermas as a ''"warranty"'', because in most cases the validity claims raised during communication are taken as [[wikt:justify|justified]], and communication proceeds on that basis. Similarly, hearers are accountable for their stance taken up in relation to the validity claims raised by the speaker. Both speaker and hearer are bound to the validity claims raised by the utterances they share during communication. They are bound by the weak obligations inherent in pursuing actions oriented towards reaching an understanding. Habermas would claim that this obligation is a rational one: :"With every speech act, by virtue of the validity claims it raises, the speaker enters into an interpersonal relationship of mutual obligation with the hearer: The speaker is obliged to support her claims with reasons if challenged, and the hearer is obliged to accept a claim unless he has good reason not to do so. The obligation in question is, in the first instance, not a moral one but a rational one -- the penalty of failure to fulfill it is the charge not of immorality but of irrationality -- although clearly the two will often overlap" (Cooke, 1994). This begins to point towards the idea of [[communicative rationality]], which is the potential for [[rationality]] that is implicit in the validity basis of everyday communication, the shape of reason that can be extracted from Habermas's formal-pragmatic analyses. :"The modern -- decentered -- understanding of the world has opened up different dimensions of validity; to the extent that each dimension of validity has its own standards of truth and falsity and its own modes of justification for determining these, one may say that what has been opened up are dimensions of rationality" (Cooke, 1994). However, before the idea of communicative rationality can be described, the other direction of Habermas's formal pragmatic analyses of communication needs to be explained. This direction looks towards the idealized presuppositions of communication.
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)