Editing Absurdism (section)

=== For ===
Various popular arguments are often cited in favor of absurdism. Some focus on the future by pointing out that nothing we do today will matter in a million years.<ref name="Nagel2012"/><ref name="Hamer2020">{{cite book |last1=Hamer |first1=Thom |title=A Critique of Humoristic Absurdism. Problematizing the Legitimacy of a Humoristic Disposition Toward the Absurd |date=2020 |publisher=Utrecht: Utrecht University |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HAMACO-13 |chapter=2. The Notion of the Absurd}}</ref> A similar line of argument points to the fact that our lives are insignificant because of how small they are in relation to the universe as a whole, both concerning their spatial and their temporal dimensions. The thesis of absurdism is also sometimes based on the problem of [[death]], i.e. that there is no final end for us to pursue since we are all going to die.<ref name="Nagel2012"/><ref name="Aronson2011"/> In this sense, death is said to destroy all our hard-earned achievements like career, wealth, or knowledge. This argument is mitigated to some extent by the fact that we may have positive or negative effects on the lives of other people as well. But this does not fully solve the issue since the same problem, i.e. the lack of an ultimate end, applies to their lives as well.<ref name="Nagel2012"/> [[Thomas Nagel]] has objected to these lines of argument based on the claim that they are circular: they assume rather than establish that life is absurd. For example, the claim that our actions today will not matter in a million years does not directly imply that they do not matter today. And similarly, the fact that a process does not reach a meaningful ultimate goal does not entail that the process as a whole is worthless since some parts of the process may contain their justification without depending on a justification external to them.<ref name="Nagel2012">{{cite book |last1=Nagel |first1=Thomas |title=Mortal Questions |date=2012 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-60471-1 |pages=11–23 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/mortal-questions/absurd/F6799C54D1AC056A0F879D8841657D45 |chapter=2. The Absurd}}</ref><ref name="Hamer2020"/>

Another argument proceeds indirectly by pointing out how various great thinkers have obvious irrational elements in their systems of thought. These purported mistakes of reason are then taken as signs of absurdism that were meant to hide or avoid it.<ref name="Baltzer-Jaray2014"/><ref name="Hiekel2021"/> From this perspective, the tendency to posit the existence of a benevolent God may be seen as a form of [[defense mechanism]] or [[wishful thinking]] to avoid an unsettling and inconvenient truth.<ref name="Baltzer-Jaray2014"/> This is closely related to the idea that humans have an inborn desire for meaning and purpose, which is dwarfed by a meaningless and indifferent universe.<ref name="Yalom2020">{{cite book |last1=Yalom |first1=Irvin D. |title=Existential Psychotherapy |year=2020 |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-1-5416-4744-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nI7VDwAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=10. Meaninglessness}}</ref><ref name="Andrews2016">{{cite journal |last1=Andrews |first1=Mary |date=April 2016 |title=The Existential Crisis |journal=Behavioral Development Bulletin |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=104–109 |doi=10.1037/bdb0000014}}</ref><ref name="Butenaitė2016">{{cite journal |last1=Butenaitė |first1=Joana |last2=Sondaitė |first2=Jolanta |last3=Mockus |first3=Antanas |date=2016 |title=Components of Existential Crisis: A Theoretical Analysis |journal=International Journal of Psychology: A Biopsychosocial Approach |volume=18 |pages=9–27 |doi=10.7220/2345-024X.18.1|doi-access=free }}</ref> For example, [[René Descartes]] aims to build a philosophical system based on the absolute certainty of the "[[I think, therefore I am]]" just to introduce without a proper justification the existence of a benevolent and non-deceiving God in a later step in order to ensure that we can know about the external world.<ref name="Baltzer-Jaray2014"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Skirry |first1=Justin |title=Descartes, Rene |url=https://iep.utm.edu/rene-descartes/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=26 April 2022}}</ref> A similar problematic step is taken by [[John Locke]], who accepts the existence of a God beyond [[sensory experience]], despite his strict [[empiricism]], which demands that all knowledge be based on sensory experience.<ref name="Baltzer-Jaray2014"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Uzgalis |first1=William |title=John Locke: 4.2 Human Nature and God's Purposes |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/#HumaNatuGodsPurp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=26 April 2022 |date=2020}}</ref>

Other theorists argue in favor of absurdism based on the claim that meaning is [[Relations (philosophy)|relational]]. In this sense, for something to be meaningful, it has to stand in relation to something else that is meaningful.<ref name="Fox2019"/><ref name="Hiekel2021">{{cite journal |last1=Hiekel |first1=Susanne |date=2021 |title=Meaning Nihilism? Is Our Life Absurd? |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HIEMN |journal=Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=3–21 |doi=10.1007/s42048-020-00089-x |s2cid=230988892|url-access=subscription }}</ref> For example, a word is meaningful because of its relation to a language or someone's life could be meaningful because this person dedicates their efforts to a higher meaningful project, like serving God or fighting poverty. An important consequence of this characterization of meaning is that it threatens to lead to an [[infinite regress]]:<ref name="Fox2019"/><ref name="Hiekel2021"/> at each step, something is meaningful because something else is meaningful, which in its turn has meaning only because it is related to yet another meaningful thing, and so on.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Cameron |first1=Ross |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinite-regress/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Romane |title=Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=1988 |volume=2 |pages=369–380 |doi=10.2307/2214081 |jstor=2214081 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVIR|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This infinite chain and the corresponding absurdity could be avoided if some things had intrinsic or ultimate meaning, i.e. if their meaning did not depend on the meaning of something else.<ref name="Fox2019"/><ref name="Hiekel2021"/> For example, if things on the large scale, like God or fighting poverty, had meaning, then our everyday engagements could be meaningful by standing in the right relation to them. However, if these wider contexts themselves lack meaning then they are unable to act as sources of meaning for other things. This would lead to the absurd when understood as the conflict between the impression that our everyday engagements are meaningful even though they lack meaning because they do not stand in a relation to something else that is meaningful.<ref name="Fox2019"/>

Another argument for absurdism is based on the attempt of assessing standards of what matters and why it matters. It has been argued that the only way to answer such a question is in reference to these standards themselves. This means that, in the end, it depends only on us, that "what seems to us important or serious or valuable would not seem so if we were differently constituted". The circularity and groundlessness of these standards themselves are then used to argue for absurdism.<ref name="Nagel2012"/><ref name="Hamer2020"/>