Editing Accountability (section)

== Non-electoral ==
Governments are held accountable if citizens can punish or reward the government to influence it to pursue their best interests.{{r|:1}} While scholars who study democratic theory emphasize the role of elections in ensuring accountability,<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite journal|last=Barro|first=Robert J.|date=March 1973|title=The control of politicians: An economic model|journal=Public Choice|volume=14-14|issue=1|pages=19–42|doi=10.1007/bf01718440|s2cid=154999534|issn=0048-5829}}
|2={{Cite journal|last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Burgess|first2=Robin|date=2002|title=The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India|journal=SSRN Working Paper Series|doi=10.2139/ssrn.319012|s2cid=8657561|issn=1556-5068|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2308/1/The_Political_Economy_of_Government_Responsiveness_Theory_and_Evidence_from_India.pdf}}
|3={{Cite journal|last=Ferejohn|first=John|date=1986|title=Incumbent performance and electoral control|journal=Public Choice|volume=50|issue=1–3|pages=5–25|doi=10.1007/bf00124924|s2cid=153577661|issn=0048-5829}}
|4={{Citation|last1=Manin|first1=Bernard|title=Elections and Representation|date=13 September 1999|work=Democracy, Accountability, and Representation|pages=29–54|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-64616-1|last2=Przeworski|first2=Adam|last3=Stokes|first3=Susan C.|doi=10.1017/cbo9781139175104.002}}
|5={{Cite book|last=Schumpeter|first=Joseph A.|date=5 April 2010|title=Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy|doi=10.4324/9780203857090|isbn=9780203857090}}
}}</ref> another strand of scholars investigates non-electoral forms of accountability in democracies and non-democracies<ref name="Madestam 1633–1685">{{Cite journal|last1=Madestam|first1=Andreas|last2=Shoag|first2=Daniel|last3=Veuger|first3=Stan|last4=Yanagizawa-Drott|first4=David|date=30 September 2013|title=Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement*|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=128|issue=4|pages=1633–1685|doi=10.1093/qje/qjt021|issn=0033-5533|url=https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/137648/1/Do_political_protests_akz_man.pdf}}</ref><ref name="Bratton 419">{{Cite journal|last1=Bratton|first1=Michael|last2=van de Walle|first2=Nicolas|date=July 1992|title=Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=24|issue=4|pages=419|doi=10.2307/422153|issn=0010-4159|jstor=422153}}</ref><ref name=":24">{{Cite journal|last1=Anderson|first1=Sarah E.|last2=Buntaine|first2=Mark T.|last3=Liu|first3=Mengdi|last4=Zhang|first4=Bing|date=8 May 2019|title=Non-Governmental Monitoring of Local Governments Increases Compliance with Central Mandates: A National-Scale Field Experiment in China|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=63|issue=3|pages=626–643|doi=10.1111/ajps.12428|s2cid=164557135|issn=0092-5853|url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ss13791}}</ref><ref name=":26">{{Cite journal|last1=Baldwin|first1=Kate|last2=Holzinger|first2=Katharina|date=16 June 2019|title=Traditional Political Institutions and Democracy: Reassessing Their Compatibility and Accountability|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=52|issue=12|pages=1747–1774|doi=10.1177/0010414019852686|s2cid=197832991|issn=0010-4140|url=http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-icfg5bmham6a3}}</ref> and the conditions that make unelected leaders represent the interests of the general public.<ref name=":25">{{Cite journal|last=Tsai|first=Lily|date=2007|title=Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=101|issue=2|pages=355–372|doi=10.1017/S0003055407070153|s2cid=146348780}}</ref><ref name=":27">{{Cite book|title=The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa|last=Baldwin|first=Kate|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2015}}</ref><ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite book|title=Making autocracy work|last=Besley|first=Timothy J.|date=2007|publisher=Centre for Economic Policy Research|oclc=255778387}}
|2={{Cite journal|last=Baldwin|first=Kate|title=Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=52|issue=12|pages=1925–1956|doi=10.1177/0010414018774372|issn=0010-4140|year=2019|s2cid=158062055}}
}}</ref>

=== Political protests ===
Political changes after protests can be the result of the protests ''per se'', or symptoms of shifts in political preferences underneath the observable phenomena of the protests. One study of the [[Tea Party movement]] in the United States has shown that protests ''per se'' have an impact on political change.<ref name="Madestam 1633–1685"/>

Other scholars studied the effect of protests on political changes in developing countries. Mass protests instigated by economic hardship and political repression occurred in 16 [[Sub-Saharan Africa|sub-Saharan]] African countries, and 21 governments in the region implemented significant political reforms, such as the adoption of multi-party elections.<ref name="Bratton 419"/> Authoritarian regimes in Africa distorted the market and reduced the cost of farm produce in favor of urban workers at the cost of rural farmers in the 1980s to prevent urban unrest, which is more visible and easier to mobilize than rural protests.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Bates|first=Robert|title=Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies|publisher=University of California Press|year=1981}}</ref>

=== Selectorates ===
Belsky ''et al.'' point out that whereas, under more democratic governance, accountability is built into the institution of the state by a habit of regular elections, accountability in autocratic regimes<ref name=":28">{{citation|last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Kudamatsu|first2=Masayuki|title=Making Autocracy Work|date=May 2007|series=LSE STICERD Research Paper No. DEDPS48|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3764/1/Making_Autocracy_Work.pdf}}</ref> relies on a selectorate—a group that legitimizes or delegitimizes the autocrat's powers according to [[selectorate theory]]. Selectorates are those on whom a leader depends in order to hold onto power, and those who have the ability to depose a leader.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bueno de Mesquita |first1=Bruce |last2=Morrow |first2=James D. |last3=Siverson |first3=Randolph M. |last4=Smith |first4=Alastair |date=17 September 2002 |title=Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=32 |issue=4 |pages=559–590 |doi=10.1017/s0007123402000236 |doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |issn=0007-1234 |s2cid=40514840}}</ref> When a selectorate's hold on power is not overly dependent on the leader in office, selectorates can remove poorly performing leaders, and this accountability by selectorates renders it possible for autocracies to perform better for the benefit of all.<ref name=":28" /> Beyond that, institutions{{Specify|reason=what sorts of institutions?|date=July 2023}} can act as credible restraints on autocracy as well.{{How|date=July 2023}}

=== Civil societies ===
In democracies, voluntary associations, interest groups, and associational activity can improve the performance of the government.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite journal|last1=Boix|first1=Carles|last2=Posner|first2=Daniel N.|s2cid=4503343|date=October 1998|title=Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government Performance|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=28|issue=4|pages=686–693|doi=10.1017/s0007123498000313|issn=0007-1234}}
|2={{Cite journal|last1=EDWARDS|first1=BOB|last2=FOLEY|first2=MICHAEL W.|date=September 1998|title=Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam|journal=American Behavioral Scientist|volume=42|issue=1|pages=124–139|doi=10.1177/0002764298042001010|s2cid=144681913|issn=0002-7642}}
|3={{Cite book|title=Civil Society: The critical History of an Idea|last=Ehrenberg|first=John|publisher=New York University Press|year=1999}}
|4={{Cite book|title=Making Democracy Work|last1=Putnam|first1=Robert D.|last2=Leonardi|first2=Robert|last3=Nonetti|first3=Raffaella Y.|s2cid=155009926|date=27 May 1994|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-2074-0|doi = 10.2307/j.ctt7s8r7}}
}}</ref> One study showed that civil society organizations such as [[Non-governmental organization|NGOs]] can increase the performance of local government according to the central government's standards by monitoring and disclosing information about local government performance in authoritarian regimes like China.<ref name=":24" /> Solidarity groups in rural China, in which members share moral obligations and interests, can hold local officials accountable as well<ref name=":25" /> when (i) the solidarity group encompasses everyone under the local government's jurisdiction, and (ii) local officials are embedded in the group as members. The social standing and recognition of these groups encourages local officials to perform well, as they value high moral standing in the group.<ref name=":25" />

At the local level, various accountability measures exist that impact the job performance of elected officials.<ref name=":6">{{cite journal|last=Ofosu|first=George Kwaku|date=2 August 2019|title=Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=113|issue=4|pages=963–979|doi=10.1017/s0003055419000479|s2cid=201385531|issn=0003-0554|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101596/1/ofosu_fairelections.pdf}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{cite journal|last=Carreri|first=Maria|s2cid=160023663|date=2018|title=Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors|journal=SSRN Working Paper Series|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3239492|issn=1556-5068}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{cite journal|last1=Berry|first1=Christopher R.|last2=Howell|first2=William G.|date=August 2007|title=Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=69|issue=3|pages=844–858|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00579.x|s2cid=42972242|issn=0022-3816}}</ref> In Uganda, civil society organizations (CSOs) that divulge to the public how well an incumbent is performing their job duties, in a district with an upcoming competitive election, increase the performance of the politician for the rest of their term.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Grossman|first1=Guy|last2=Michelitch|first2=Kristin|s2cid=15659219|date=1 February 2018|title=Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=112|issue=2|pages=280–301|doi=10.1017/s0003055417000648|issn=0003-0554}}</ref> In contrast to these works, a [[meta-analysis]] released in 2019 uncovers no effects from CSO voter information campaigns on political accountability after examining the results from seven trials across six countries.<ref>{{cite book |date=4 July 2019|editor-last=Dunning|editor-first=Thad|editor2-last=Grossman|editor2-first=Guy|editor3-last=Humphreys|editor3-first=Macartan|editor4-last=Hyde|editor4-first=Susan D.|editor5-last=McIntosh|editor5-first=Craig|editor6-last=Nellis|editor6-first=Gareth|title=Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning|doi=10.1017/9781108381390|isbn=9781108381390|s2cid=243627947}}</ref> In Ghana, election-day monitoring of polling centers for district-level positions, as well as an increase in the awareness of monitoring in an upcoming election, increases job performance among incumbents, who spend more of their annual [[Constituency Development Fund]] allocations from the central government on public goods for the electorate.<ref name=":6" /> In locales with weaker institutions, when citizens elect leaders with higher levels of competency, these officials have a greater ability to overcome the barriers of bad informal institutions, and deliver more goods and long-term investment projects for the constituency without needing to raise taxes.<ref name=":7" /> Additionally, many local elections are for positions that involve performing jobs with a single function, such as a school board member or a [[sheriff]]. These elected officials are held accountable to their positions mainly through information provided to the public through the media.<ref name=":8" /> When the media focuses attention on data trends associated with these positions, constituents are then able to use this information to retrospectively vote for or against an incumbent based on their performance in office.<ref name=":8" />

=== Public opinion polls ===
Approval ratings generated through public opinion polling create a measure of job performance during an incumbent's term that has implications for whether the official will retain their seat, or if reelection will even be sought.<ref name=":9">{{cite journal|last=Highton|first=Benjamin|date=May 2008|title=Job Approval and Senate Election Outcomes in the United States|journal=Legislative Studies Quarterly|volume=33|issue=2|pages=245–261|doi=10.3162/036298008784311019|issn=0362-9805}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Adam R.|last2=Jacobson|first2=Gary C.|s2cid=154373150|date=December 2008|title=Party, Performance, and Strategic Politicians: The Dynamics of Elections for Senator and Governor in 2006|journal=State Politics & Policy Quarterly|volume=8|issue=4|pages=384–409|doi=10.1177/153244000800800403|issn=1532-4400}}</ref> These approval ratings predict election outcomes when combined with other factors included in [[Bayesian network|Bayesian]] Model Averaging forecasts.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Erikson|first1=Robert S.|last2=Bafumi|first2=Joseph|last3=Wilson|first3=Bret|date=October 2001|title=Was the 2000 Presidential Election Predictable?|journal=Political Science & Politics|language=en|volume=34|issue=4|pages=815–819|doi=10.1017/S1049096501000750|s2cid=153487954|issn=1049-0965}}</ref> In the United States, senator job approval ratings affect whether a senator will retire, the quality of candidates that seek to challenge them, the amount of money the senator can raise to seek reelection if they decide to run, and the outcome of the election itself.<ref name=":9" /> Strategic incumbent senators will seek reelection less when their approval ratings are low during their time in office.<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":10" />
=== Shared interests ===
Traditional leaders in [[Zambia]] provide local public goods despite the fact that they lack an electoral incentive to do so.<ref name=":27" /> Many customary chiefs never leave the communities they lead and depend on local sources for a significant portion of their income; thus, traditional leaders may facilitate bringing in local public goods and benefit from the community's development over time just like stationary bandits{{definition needed|reason=what are "stationary bandits"??|date=July 2023}} in Olson's argument.{{definition needed|reason=what is "Olson's argument"?|date=July 2023}}<ref name=":26" /><ref name=":27" />