Editing Anti-Comintern Pact (section)

=== Japan ===

==== Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, Washington Naval Conference of 1922 ====
{{Main|Racial Equality Proposal|Washington Naval Conference}}

[[Japan during World War I|Japan had fought in the Great War]] on the side of the victorious [[Entente Powers]]. However, as part of the [[Washington Naval Conference|Washington Naval Conference of 1922]], the United States and United Kingdom successfully managed to both limit Japan's naval forces by treaty and to force Japan to surrender her gains in China made during World War I. While there were some advantages for Tokyo gained during the conference – it was granted parity with USA and UK in the Pacific Ocean and was entitled to build a navy that would outmatch the French and Italian navies, as well as being recognized as the world's only non-western colonial power – the treaty was unpopular in Japan. Japanese nationalists, as well as the Imperial Japanese Navy, denounced the treaty's restrictive aspects.<ref name="Boog-2001">{{Cite book |last1=Boog |first1=Horst |title=The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941–1943 |last2=Rahn |first2=Werner |last3=Stumpf |first3=Reinhard |last4=Wegner |first4=Bernd |publisher=Clarendon Press |year=2001 |series=Germany and the Second World War |volume=6 |location=Oxford |translator-last=Osers |translator-first=Ewald |display-authors=1 |author-link=Horst Boog}}</ref>{{Rp|193–194}}<ref name="Bix-2007">{{Cite book |last=Bix |first=Herbert P. |title=Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan |title-link=Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan |publisher=HarperCollins e-books |year=2007 |isbn=9780061570742 |location=New York City |author-link=Herbert P. Bix |orig-year=2000}}</ref>{{Rp|101}}

Culturally, the 1922 Washington Treaty was viewed as yet another betrayal by the Western powers, after the Japanese [[Racial Equality Proposal|proposals for guaranteed racial equality]] under the [[League of Nations]] had been rejected in 1919.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shimazu |first=Naoko |title=Japan, Race, and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 |year=1998 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=9780203207178}}</ref><ref name="Bix-2007" />{{Rp|68}} This perception of national humiliation was further accelerated by the economic downturn that Japan experienced in the 1920s, exemplified by the 1927 financial panic in Japan ([[Shōwa financial crisis]]), which had also caused political instability and the fall of the first cabinet of [[Reijirō Wakatsuki]], and by the 1929 [[Great Depression]].<ref name="Ohata-1976">{{Cite book |last=Ohata |first=Tokushiro |url=https://archive.org/details/deterrentdiploma00morl/page/1 |title=Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940: Selected Translations from Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, kaisen gaikō shi |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=1976 |isbn=9780231089692 |editor-last=Morley |editor-first=James William |location=New York City |pages=[https://archive.org/details/deterrentdiploma00morl/page/1 1–112] |translator-last=Baerwald |translator-first=Hans H. |chapter=The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935-1939 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/deterrentdiploma00morl}}</ref>{{Rp|9}} German historian [[Bernd Martin (historian)|Bernd Martin]] dubbed the Washington Naval Conference the "Japanese '[[Versailles Treaty|Versailles]]'."<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|607}}

==== Japanese societal militarization and aggression against China ====
{{Main|Mukden Incident|January 28 incident|Pacification of Manchukuo|Defense of the Great Wall|Battle of Rehe|Actions in Inner Mongolia (1933–1936)}}
[[File:Mukden 1931 japan shenyang.jpg|thumb|Japanese troops entering [[Shenyang]] during the 1931 [[Mukden Incident]]]]
The Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 began the period of Japanese aggression in Asia between 1931 and 1945, sometimes called the ''Fifteen Years War''.<ref name="Nish-2000">{{Cite book |title=The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931–2000 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2000 |isbn=9781403919670 |editor-last=Nish |editor-first=Ian |series=The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000 |volume=2 |location=Houndmills |editor-last2=Kibata |editor-first2=Yoichi}}</ref>{{Rp|1–2}}

The diplomatic reaction of the European great powers to Japan's attack against China was insufficient to stop the Japanese advance, despite continued Chinese appeals to the [[League of Nations]]. This attack, which had no central order from Tokyo precede it and was rather an autonomous decision by the [[Kwantung Army]] leadership,<ref name="Martin-1970" />{{Rp|608–609}} was kept confined to [[North East China]] by the Japanese commanders in the hopes that this would be enough to keep European responses lukewarm and thus further Japanese advances. This estimation proved to be accurate, and the United Kingdom in particular was more than happy to let Japan proceed in Manchuria as long as British interests in southern and central China remained undisturbed. Even after the [[Shanghai Incident]] of 28 January 1932, the British attitude remained on the whole friendly to the Japanese cause and indifferent towards Chinese pleas for assistance. Among the few exceptions to this were British efforts to bring about peace in the city of Shanghai itself, where the UK had direct economic interests.

The Japanese [[Pacification of Manchukuo]] on the other hand was viewed in Britain as a positive development that ultimately would help to disperse bandit activity.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|3–6}} In February 1932, the Japanese established a puppet state in North East China, the [[Manchukuo|State of Manchuria]], nominally headed by [[Puyi]], the dethroned last emperor of the [[Qing dynasty]] (r. 1908–1912, 1917).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Duara |first=Prasenjit |title=Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |year=2003 |isbn=0742525775 |location=Oxford}}</ref>{{Rp|65–73}}

Following the [[Lytton Report]], which laid the blame for the conflict in Manchuria firmly at the feet of the Japanese, [[Sir John Simon]], the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, failed to condemn Japan in his speech on 7 December 1932, and subsequently earned the favor of Japanese politicians such as [[Yōsuke Matsuoka]], who viewed the lackluster British response as further encouragement for the Japanese course in China. Japan left the League of Nations as a result of the Lytton Report in February 1933.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|6–7}}

The [[Tanggu Truce]] ended the hostilities in Manchuria, but Japanese ambition in China was not yet satisfied. Between 1933 and 1936, Japanese foreign minister [[Kōki Hirota]] pursued the {{transliteration|ja|Hirota wakyo gaiko}}, the 'friendly diplomacy of Hirota'. Summed up by the [[Amau Doctrine]] of 1934, Japan viewed itself as the protective power of all of East Asia, mirroring the role of the United States in the Americas under the [[Monroe Doctrine]] of 1823. This posturing was again permitted by the European great powers, and [[Neville Chamberlain]] even attempted to negotiate an Anglo–Japanese non-aggression pact to improve British relations with Japan in 1934.<ref name="Nish-2000" />{{Rp|6–7}} In secret, Hirota's foreign policy leadership set an array of highly ambitious goals for Japan's diplomacy. This included an industrial buildup in Manchukuo, the acquisition of resources from North China via subjugation, conquest of the western Pacific and South East Asia, and preparations for a war against the Soviet Union.<ref name="Bix-2007" />{{Rp|308}}{{Quote box
| quote = Cooperative diplomacy will not solve the present emergency, which is not an isolated incident but represents a world emergency that has come about despite the great efforts that have been made by all countries since the World War. Japan must take advantage of the glorious challenge posed by the Manchurian Incident and our withdrawal from the League of Nations. We must accept our fate, firmly refusing to be weakened by avoiding the challenge, and must have the courage to use this opportunity to formulate a great plan for our country's next hundred years.
| source = Ohata, Tokushiro (1976). "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William (ed.). "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 12. {{ISBN|9780231089692}}.
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| title = "The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It" (October 1934)
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}}The Japanese army in October 1934 published a pamphlet entitled "The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It", going directly against the attempt of diplomatic reconciliation that was at the same time (at least half-heartedly) attempted by the civilian government in Tokyo (named "Shidehara diplomacy" after former Prime Minister [[Kijūrō Shidehara]]). The pamphlet demanded a complete subjugation of all aspects of foreign and domestic policy to the all-encompassing question of "national defense" and the nation's preparation for total war. It further denounced "cooperative diplomacy", lauded the Japanese decision to withdraw from the League of Nations, and called upon Japan to accept its fate and to formulate a great plan for the next 100 years.

The military subsequently continued its practice of publishing pamphlets with overt political content without prior coordination with the civilian government. In November 1936, about the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact's conclusion, the army pamphlet "Perfecting the Army's Preparedness and the Spirit Required" advocated strengthening the army and openly called for the reform of the civilian government and the reform of the Japanese state to better suit the military's goals.<ref name="Ohata-1976" />{{Rp|12–13}}

==== Domestic power struggles about Japanese foreign policy ====
{{See also|Interservice rivalry#Japan}}The Japanese imperial state's system was dubbed "a cone without vertex" by Japanese historian [[Ken Ishida]]. The [[Imperial Japanese Army]] (IJA), [[Imperial Japanese Navy]] (IJN) and the Japanese foreign ministry each had its own agenda with regards as to how Japan should orient its foreign policy. The Japanese system, highly traditional and based around the spiritual and socio-cultural value of [[Emperor Hirohito]], also involved the imperial court, which served as a buffer between these three rival groups and the Emperor at the top, which allowed Hirohito to escape direct political responsibilities for any failures and setbacks that the system might produce.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ishida |first=Ken |title=Japan, Italy and the Road to the Tripartite Alliance |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2018 |isbn=9783319962238 |lccn=2018948205}}</ref>{{Rp|6–8}}

==== Japanese–Soviet fishery treaty negotiations and border disputes ====
At the time of the negotiations for the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Japanese government was also in negotiations with the Soviet government over fishing rights in the [[Sea of Japan]]. As the Anti-Comintern Pact's secret additional protocol between Germany and Japan against the USSR was to forbid political treaties by either state with the Soviet Union without the express consent of the other party to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japanese ambassador Mushanokōji was concerned whether the Pact would result in consequences for the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. He inquired about it in a letter to Ribbentrop after the signing of the treaty on 25 November, and also mentioned the issue of border questions between Japanese-controlled Manchukuo and the USSR. Ribbentrop confirmed the German government's assent that Japan was autonomous and free to proceed in the matters mentioned by Mushanokōji his reply on the same day.<ref name="Weinberg-1954" />{{Rp|198}}