Editing Battle of Halbe (section)

=== The Twelfth Army's attack and the Ninth Army's plan ===
The relief attempt by the Twelfth Army started on April 24 with General Wenck's XX Corps attacking east and northwards. During the night, the ''Theodor Körner RAD Division'' attacked the Soviet 5th Guards Mechanised Corps, under the command of General I. P. Yermakov, near [[Treuenbrietzen]]. The next day, the ''Scharnhorst'' Division started to engage the Soviet troops in and around [[Beelitz]] and caught the 4th Guards Tank Army's 6th Guards Mechanized Corps' open flank, overrunning rear-area units. While the ''Ulrich von Hutten'' Division tried to reach [[Potsdam]], with the ''Scharnhorst'' Division on its eastern flank, to open a corridor into Berlin, other elements of the Twelfth Army, as Wenck had agreed with Busse, pushed east to meet the Ninth Army.

In the words of Busse to Wenck, the Ninth Army was planning to push west "like a caterpillar". According to Busse's plan, the Tiger II heavy tanks of the 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion should lead this caterpillar. The metaphor is quite apt because, as the head led the way, the rear-guard in the tail was going to be engaged in just as heavy fighting trying to disengage from following Soviet forces.{{sfn|Beevor|2002|p=330}}

On the night of April 25/26, a new order was issued to the Ninth and Twelfth Armies by Hitler. It stipulated that:

* The Twelfth Army was to cut off the 4th Guards Tank Army by reaching the line Beelitz to [[Ferch, Brandenburg|Ferch]], and to attack eastwards to unite with the Ninth Army.
* The Ninth Army was to hold on to its eastern front between [[Spreewald]] and [[Fürstenwalde]], and to attack westward to link up with the Twelfth Army.
* Once both armies were combined, they were to attack northwards and open a corridor through the Red Army's encirclement of Berlin.{{sfn|Le Tissier|2005|p=89–90}}

The final army conference of the Ninth Army took place at 15:00 on April 28. At this point, contact was lost with the V Corps and the V SS Mountain Corps. The conference found that the only possible break-out route had to lead through Halbe. This was not difficult for the Soviet commanders to deduce as well, while, on the other hand, Ninth Army had virtually no information about the Soviet force dispositions between it and the Twelfth Army. From this conference onward, command and control within the Ninth Army collapsed. There was almost no contact between the Ninth Army headquarters and Army Group Vistula, and little contact with formations under Ninth Army command. There were few or no maps to guide planning or combat operations.

In his book ''Slaughter at Halbe'', [[Tony Le Tissier]] accused Busse of failing to exercise effective command and control of the encircled army, thereby contributing to the failure of successive break-out attempts.{{efn|name=Busse failure}} Le Tissier writes that Busse's initial movement of his HQ put him into a situation where he lost the ability to control the formations in the pocket. In his break-out plan, Ninth Army HQ was to be placed immediately behind the spearhead of the breakout, the 502nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion, which effectively reduced his ability to exercise command to the tactical level. He also accuses Busse of failing to adequately support the first breakout attempt (see below). The spearhead for the Ninth Army break-out plan on April 28 was to be the 502nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion with remaining elements of the [[Panzergrenadier Division Kurmark]]. These units were split into two wedges. The northern wedge included the 502nd SS Panzer, Ninth Army HQ, XI SS Panzer Corps HQ, and Panzergrenadier Division Kurmark HQ. Remnants of the 21st Panzer Division were to cover in a north-westerly direction, while remnants of the 32nd SS Division ''30. Januar'' was to cover the east and provide the rearguard.{{sfn|Le Tissier|2005|p=117–119}}