Editing Channel Dash (section)

===Operation Cerberus===
Hitler preferred the Channel route and responsibility was delegated to {{lang|de|Marine-Gruppenkommando West}} (Naval Command West, Admiral [[Alfred Saalwächter]]) for planning and operational directions; Ciliax was commander of the Brest Group (flagship, ''Scharnhorst''). Care was taken to choose the best route to avoid British minefields and to steam at high speed. Minesweepers cleared channels through the British mines and marked with buoys (from 3 to 9 February, Bomber Command laid 98 mines in the channels). U-boats were sent for meteorological observations and several destroyers steamed westward down the Channel to Brest to strengthen the escort screen.{{sfn|Martienssen|1949|pp=121–123}} To have the longest period of darkness possible, the departure was to be four days before the [[new moon]] and at {{nowrap|7:30 p.m.,}} to benefit from a [[spring tide]] flowing up the Channel, which would add speed and possibly lift the ships over mines.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=150}}

Air cover was to be provided by the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} and six destroyers would escort the Brest Group on the first leg, to be joined by ten E-boats at dawn; a mixture of E-boats, [[R-boat]]s and small craft would join at [[Cap Gris Nez]]. During January, the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} and {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} rehearsed for the operation but the ships had lost seaworthiness and many technicians and experts had been transferred from Brest to more pressing duties. By 9 February, the ships had completed their trials in Brest roads and the sortie was set for 11 February.{{sfn|Roskill|1962|p=150}} Morale of the crews was high, no sabotage had occurred at Brest and the crews went ashore freely. Among locals there was no doubt that the ships were preparing to depart and as a deception, tropical helmets were brought on board, French dock workers loaded oil barrels marked "For Use in the Tropics" and false rumours were spread around town.{{sfn|Ruge|1957|p=264}}

===={{lang|de|Unternehmen Donnerkeil}}====

{{see also|Operation Donnerkeil}}

Hans Jeschonnek, {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} chief of staff, refused to guarantee the success of Cerberus or to reinforce the fighter forces in the west. [[Adolf Galland]] was given command of the air operation, to be called {{lang|de|Unternehmen Donnerkeil}} (Operation Thunderbolt).{{sfn|Hooton|1994|p=114}} Details of the plan were arranged with {{lang|de|[[Oberst]]}} ([[Colonel]]) [[Karl Koller (general)|Karl Koller]], chief of staff of {{lang|de|[[Luftflotte 3]]}} (Air Fleet 3 {{lang|de|[[Generalfeldmarschall]]}} [[Hugo Sperrle]]).{{sfn|Hooton|2010|p=121}} Some training units were mobilised to make up for the bulk of the {{lang|de|[[Jagdwaffe]]}} being absent in the [[Soviet Union]]. The {{lang|de|Funkhorchdienst}} (signals intelligence service, General [[Wolfgang Martini]]) attempted to jam British radio-telephone frequencies by using a technique to increase atmospheric interference and reduced the performance of British coastal radars by slowly increasing their jamming. [[Dornier Do 217]]s of {{lang|de|[[Kampfgeschwader 2]]}} (Bomber Wing 2) were to fly electronic deception sorties over the western Channel to divert British aircraft. {{lang|de|[[9th Air Corps (Germany)|Fliegerkorps IX]]}} ({{lang|de|[[General der Flieger]]}} [Air Force General] [[Joachim Coeler]]) prepared to bomb RAF bases in south-western England and to attack British naval forces attempting to intercept the Brest Group. [[Aufklärungsgruppe 123|''Fernaufklärungsgruppe'' 123]] (Long-range Reconnaissance Wing 123) was to keep watch on both ends of the Channel and support {{lang|de|Fliegerkorps IX}}.{{sfn|Hooton|1994|pp=114–115}}

The convoy route was divided into three sectors using the {{lang|de|Jafü}} (Fighter Sector) boundaries but to ensure local control [[Max Ibel]], the former commander of {{lang|de|[[Jagdgeschwader 27]]}} (Fighter Group 27) was appointed {{lang|de|Jagdfliegerführer Schiff}} ({{lang|de|Jafü Schiff}}, Fighter Controller: Ship) and embarked on ''Scharnhorst'' as a signals officer to communicate with {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} units during the operation. Eight rehearsals, involving around {{nowrap|450 sorties,}} were made from 22 January to 10 February. The {{lang|de|[[Jagdgeschwader]]}} (day fighter wings) and the night fighters of {{lang|de|[[Nachtjagdgeschwader 1]]}} (Night Fighter Wing 1), were swiftly to prepare aircraft for the next sortie by rearming and refuelling in no more than thirty minutes.{{sfn|Hooton|1994|pp=114–115}} Galland decided that the aircraft should fly high and low cover, the low groups flying under British coastal radar. A standing patrol of least {{nowrap|16 fighters}} was to be maintained, in two formations of eight aircraft for their patrol altitudes, with each formation in two {{lang|de|Schwärme}} of four aircraft. One {{lang|de|Schwarm}} was to fly out to sea and one towards land in a zigzag and all {{lang|de|Schwärme}} were to fly back and forth along the line of ships in wide figures of eight, in radio silence. Every sortie was timed to allow the fighters {{nowrap|30 minutes}} over the ships, just enough time for relieved units to refuel, rearm and return. During {{lang|de|Donnerkeil}}, the relieving sortie arrived after only 20 minutes which meant that fighter cover for half the dash would be {{nowrap|32 fighters.}}{{sfn|Weal|1996|p=16}}