Editing Clipper chip (section)

== Later debates ==
Following the [[Global surveillance disclosures (2013–present)|Snowden disclosures]] from 2013, [[Apple Inc.|Apple]] and [[Google]] stated that they would lock down all data stored on their smartphones with encryption, in such a way that Apple and Google themselves could not break the encryption even if ordered to do so with a warrant.<ref>{{Cite web| url=http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-apple-decrypt-your-iphone.html| title=Why can't Apple decrypt your iPhone?| date=2014-10-04| access-date=2014-10-06| archive-date=2014-10-09| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141009015745/http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/10/why-cant-apple-decrypt-your-iphone.html| url-status=live}}</ref> This prompted a strong reaction from the authorities, including the chief of detectives for the [[Chicago Police Department]] stating that "Apple['s [[iPhone]]] will become the phone of choice for the [[Think of the children|pedophile]]".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html|title=FBI blasts Apple, Google for locking police out of phones|newspaper=The Washington Post|author=Craig Timberg and Greg Miller|date=25 Sep 2014|access-date=1 Apr 2016|archive-date=10 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200210104938/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story.html|url-status=live}}</ref> An editorial in the ''Washington Post'' argued that "smartphone users must accept that they cannot be above the law if there is a valid search warrant", and after claiming to agree that backdoors would be undesirable, then suggested implementing a "golden key" backdoor which would unlock the data with a warrant.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compromise-needed-on-smartphone-encryption/2014/10/03/96680bf8-4a77-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html|title=Compromise needed on smartphone encryption|newspaper=The Washington Post|author=Editorial Board|date=3 Oct 2014|access-date=1 Apr 2016|archive-date=21 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200221214017/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compromise-needed-on-smartphone-encryption/2014/10/03/96680bf8-4a77-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141006/01082128740/washington-posts-braindead-editorial-phone-encryption-no-backdoors-how-about-magical-golden-key.shtml|title=Washington Post's Clueless Editorial On Phone Encryption: No Backdoors, But How About A Magical 'Golden Key'?|publisher=Tech Dirt|author=Mike Masnick|author-link=Mike Masnick|date=6 Oct 2014|access-date=1 Apr 2016|archive-date=21 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200221165633/https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141006/01082128740/washington-posts-braindead-editorial-phone-encryption-no-backdoors-how-about-magical-golden-key.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref>  The members of "The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption" 1997 paper, as well as other researchers at MIT, wrote a follow-up article in response to the revival of this debate, arguing that mandated government access to private conversations would be an even worse problem than it would have been twenty years before.<ref>{{cite tech report |title=Keys Under Doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications |first1=Harold |last1=Abelson |author-link1=Hal Abelson |display-authors=etal |date=July 6, 2015 |publisher=Massachusetts Institute of Technology |hdl = 1721.1/97690}}</ref>