Editing Concorde (section)

===Cabinet response, treaty===
While the development teams met, the French Minister of Public Works and Transport [[Robert Buron]] was meeting with the UK Minister of Aviation [[Peter Thorneycroft]], and Thorneycroft told the cabinet that France was much more serious about a partnership than any of the US companies.{{sfn|Conway|2005|p=71}} The various US companies had proved uninterested, likely due to the belief that the government would be funding development and would frown on any partnership with a European company, and the risk of "giving away" US technological leadership to a European partner.{{sfn|Conway|2005|p=69}}

When the STAC plans were presented to the UK cabinet, the economic considerations were considered highly questionable, especially as these were based on development costs, now estimated to be {{GBPConvert|150|m|year=1961|lk=on|showdate=no|mode=historical}}, which were repeatedly overrun in the industry. The Treasury Ministry presented a negative view, suggesting that the project in no way would have any positive financial returns for the government, especially because "the industry's past record of over-optimistic estimating (including the recent history of the TSR.2) suggests that it would be prudent to consider" the cost "to turn out much too low."{{sfn|Conway|2005|p=71}}

This led to an independent review of the project by the Committee on Civil Scientific Research and Development, which met on the topic between July and September 1962. The committee rejected the economic arguments, including considerations of supporting the industry made by Thorneycroft. Their report in October stated that any direct positive economic outcome would be unlikely, but that the project should still be considered because everyone else was going supersonic, and they were concerned they would be locked out of future markets. The project apparently would not be likely to significantly affect other, more important, research efforts.{{sfn|Conway|2005|p=71}}

At the time, the UK was pressing for admission to the [[European Economic Community]], and this became the main rationale for moving ahead with the aircraft.{{sfn|Conway|2005|p=66}} The development project was negotiated as an international treaty between the two countries rather than a commercial agreement between companies, and included a clause, originally asked for by the UK government, imposing heavy penalties for cancellation. This treaty was signed on 29 November 1962.<ref name="earlyhist">{{cite web |url=http://www.concordesst.com/history/eh1.html#a |title=Early History |work=Concorde History |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110124174147/http://concordesst.com/history/eh1.html#a |archive-date=24 January 2011 |access-date=8 September 2007 |url-status=live}}</ref> [[Charles de Gaulle]] vetoed the UK's entry into the European Community in a speech on 25 January 1963.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Hollingworth |first1=Clare |last2=Prittie |first2=Terence |date=25 January 2018 |title=French determined to block Britain's entry to Common Market – archive, 1963 |newspaper=[[The Guardian]] |location=London |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/25/french-france-block-britain-entry-common-market-de-gaulle-1963 |access-date=28 February 2021 |url-status=live |archive-date=14 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414095431/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/25/french-france-block-britain-entry-common-market-de-gaulle-1963}}</ref>