Editing Correspondence theory of truth (section)

=== Vagueness or circularity === 
Either the defender of the correspondence theory of truth offers some accompanying theory of the world, or they do not.

If no theory of the world is offered, the argument is so vague as to be useless or even unintelligible: truth would then be supposed to be correspondence to some undefined, unknown or ineffable world.
It would in this case be difficult to see how a candid truth could be more certain than the world we are to judge its degree of correspondence against.

On the other hand, as soon as the defender of the correspondence theory of truth offers a theory of the world, they are operating in some specific ontological or scientific theory, which stands in need of [[justification (epistemology)|justification]].
But, the only way to support the truth of this world-theory that is allowed by the correspondence theory of truth, is correspondence to the real world. Hence the argument is inescapably circular.<ref name="See Michael Williams, 1977"/>