Editing Critique of Practical Reason (section)

==Analytic: Chapter Three==
Acting morally requires being directly motivated by the moral law. If the person complies with what the moral law requires, but only because of a presupposed feeling rather than for the sake of the moral law alone, then their action has ''legality'' but not ''morality''. For Kant, moral actions must also be done out of the incentive of the moral law. An incentive or motivating spring (''Triebfeder'') is defined as the "subjective determining ground of the will of a being whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law",<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kant |first=Immanuel |title=Critique of Practical Reason|publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2015 |isbn=9781107467057 |pages=60|translator-last=Gregor|translator-first=Mary}}</ref><ref>Kant, KpV 5:72</ref> viz., the basis of action for the subject's will whose reason does not always conform to acting from the moral law.

As a free will, the will must act solely from the law and even push aside any inclinations and desires that might go against the moral law. We have a natural propensity to follow self-love and strive to please ourselves by satisfying our desires. We are also inclined to self-conceit and to think that we are the center of everything and deserve to do whatever we wish. The moral law restricts the "influence of self-love on the supreme practical principle"<ref>Kant, KpV 5:74</ref> and shoots down our self-conceit insofar as it has us make ourselves an unconditional practical rule for action over and above the moral law. Thus, the moral law humiliates us and produces in us respect for the moral law, which is a feeling that does not arise in us from sensual (empirical) impulses, but rather from pure reason through the awareness and recognition of the moral law's validity.

Kant ends this chapter by comparing the structure of the second critique  with the ''Critique of Pure Reason''. In comparing the former with the latter critique, Kant refers to the different structures of the analytical parts between the two works. Kant states that the Analytic of the ''Critique of Pure Reason'' begins by analyzing the a priori elements of sensibility (space and time), then examines the most fundamental and essential concepts of the human mind with regard to theoretical knowledge (the [[Category (Kant) | categories]]), and lastly ends with principles.<ref>Kant, KpV 5:89</ref><ref>It was actually the ''Doctrine of Elements'' that was divided in this way</ref> The train of thought in the second critique is reversed. Since the ''Critique of Practical Reason'' deals with a will which acts according to certain principles (the moral law), it had to search for a principle that gives instructions for moral action and thus start from the possibility a priori principles for moral action or conduct. From there, it proceeded to concepts (the purely rational concepts of absolutely good and evil), and lastly ended with how pure practical reason related to sensibility with regard to moral feeling (respect for the moral law).<ref>Kant, KpV 5:89-90</ref> Additionally, Kant also discusses his solution to the compatibility of natural determinism and human freedom against philosophers such as [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz | Leibniz]] (whose solution Kant calls "the freedom of a turnspit"<ref>Kant, KpV 5:97</ref>) and Hume.