Editing DRE voting machine (section)

===Demonstrated laboratory attacks===
* [[Premier Election Solutions|Diebold Election Systems]] AccuVote-TS (Manipulation of the votes by the [[Princeton University]])<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/ |title=Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine |access-date=2011-05-19 |archive-date=2008-01-19 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119013008/http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
* [[Nedap]] ES3B (Manipulation of the votes by a citizen group)<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |title=Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer, a security analysis |access-date=2007-02-13 |archive-date=2010-01-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100107134107/http://wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>[http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/79106 Dutch citizens group cracks Nedap's voting computer] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070117143032/http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/79106 |date=2007-01-17 }}</ref>
* SDU voting computers (Violating the [[secret ballot|secrecy of the ballot]] using [[Van Eck phreaking]], tested by the Dutch secret service [[AIVD]])<ref>[http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/80302 Use of SDU voting computers banned during Dutch general elections] (Heise.de, 31. October 2006) {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080923142636/http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/80302 |date=September 23, 2008 }}</ref>

Attacks have also been performed on both DRE machines and optical scan voting machines, which count paper ballots. (See California study, "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter"<ref>"[http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2006-inter/2006-inter.pdf Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224102340/http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2006-inter/2006-inter.pdf |date=2021-02-24 }}"</ref>).

Whether it is a DRE or an optical scan machine, the opportunity for tampering applies to persons with inside access (including government workers) and to a lesser extent, outside hackers. Therefore, framing election tampering issues as "hacking" may not be an accurate framework for public concerns. Within the context of protecting voting rights, it would not matter whether vote alteration was done by an outsider or an insider. What is of most importance is the ability to perform an audit with a record generated and verified by the voter at the time their vote is cast, all of which is lost with the sole use of these DRE systems.