Editing Deterrence theory (section)

===Proportionality===
Jentleson ''et al.'' provides further detail in relation to those factors.<ref name="Jentleson" /> Proportionality refers to the relationship between the defending state's scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instruments available for use to pursue them. The more the defending state demands of another state, the higher that state's costs of compliance and the greater need for the defending state's strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the benefits of compliance. That is a challenge, as deterrence is by definition a strategy of limited means. George (1991) goes on to explain that deterrence sometimes goes beyond threats to the actual use of military force, but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall short of full-scale use to succeed.<ref name="George_1991">{{Citation
|last=George
|first=A
|year=1991
|title=The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy
|work=Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War
|publisher=United States Institute of Peace Press
|place=Washington, D.C.
|pages=3–14
}}</ref>

The main source of disproportionality is an objective that goes beyond policy change to [[regime change]], which has been seen in Libya, Iraq, and North Korea. There, defending states have sought to change the leadership of a state and to policy changes relating primarily to their nuclear weapons programs.