Editing Dictator game (section)

== The effect of the sum available for distribution ==
Forsythe et al. (1994) found that doubling the available sum from $5 to $10 did not change the proportion of the “pie” the dictator allocated to the recipient.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Forsythe |first1=Robert |last2=Horowitz |first2=Joel L. |last3=Savin |first3=N. E. |last4=Sefton |first4=Martin |date=1994-05-01 |title=Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825684710219 |journal=Games and Economic Behavior |volume=6 |issue=3 |pages=347–369 |doi=10.1006/game.1994.1021 |issn=0899-8256|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Similarly, Carpenter et al. (2005) observed that increasing the sum from $10 to $100 did not affect the relative share given by the dictator.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Carpenter |first1=Jeffrey |last2=Verhoogen |first2=Eric |last3=Burks |first3=Stephen |date=2005-03-01 |title=The effect of stakes in distribution experiments |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0165176504003118 |journal=Economics Letters |volume=86 |issue=3 |pages=393–398 |doi=10.1016/j.econlet.2004.08.007 |issn=0165-1765}}</ref>

However, List and Cherry (2008) found that increasing the sum from $10 to $100 led to an increase in donations, but by less than the proportional increase in the total amount.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=List |first1=John A. |last2=Cherry |first2=Todd L. |date=2008-01-01 |title=Examining the role of fairness in high stakes allocation decisions |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268106001478 |journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |volume=65 |issue=1 |pages=1–8 |doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.021 |issn=0167-2681}}</ref> 

Engel (2011) conducted a meta-analysis and concluded that as the available sum increased, dictators tended to keep a larger proportion for themselves.<ref name="Engel-2011" />

Expanding the dictator’s range of choices also influenced behavior. List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) allowed dictators to not only give money but also take money from the recipient.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=List |first=John A. |date=June 2007 |title=On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/519249 |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=115 |issue=3 |pages=482–493 |doi=10.1086/519249 |issn=0022-3808}}</ref> This led to decreased generosity, although only a few participants opted for full selfishness. Nonetheless, some chose to take money from the recipient.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bardsley |first=Nicholas |date=2008-06-01 |title=Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact? |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2 |journal=Experimental Economics |language=en |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=122–133 |doi=10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2 |issn=1573-6938|hdl=10.1007/s10683-007-9172-2 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>