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===Epistemology=== Epicurus considered [[sense perception]] to be the foundation of knowledge. Although he had explained perception in terms of his atomic theory, he also designed his theory of knowledge to be independent of his atomism, as he intended it to serve as justification for his philosophy of nature. Since Epicurus believed that sense perceptions were the basis of our knowledge, errors can only arise in how we judge those perceptions; although the senses sometimes receive contradictory information, they are the only means by which we receive information from the external world, and, recognizing the limits of our senses, it is necessary to use reason (''[[dianoia]]'') in order to organize the information we receive and determine whether our sense-organs are functioning correctly. However, reason still ultimately depends on the senses; Epicurus did not believe in the existence of [[abstract objects]] such as [[Plato]]'s [[Theory of Forms]] that are derived entirely from thought.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=48-49}} ==== Criteria of truth ==== In order to make judgements about the information we receive from our senses, Epicurus proposed three [[Problem of the criterion|criteria of truth]] which constituted the method through which we gain knowledge:{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|page=85}} sensations (''aisthêsis''), preconceptions (''prolepsis''), and feelings (''pathê'').{{sfn|Asmis|2009|pp=93=94}} Sensations are the first and main criterion of truth for Epicureans; when judgments about things are formed, they can be verified or corrected through further closer examination,{{sfn|O'Keefe| 2010 | pp=97–98}} which eventually allows the observer to obtain "clear vision" (''enargeia''), a sensation of an object that is unchanged by further judgments or opinions and is a clear and direct perception of that object.{{sfn|Asmis|2009|p=85}}{{sfn|Sharples|1996|p=12-16}} Preconceptions, Epicurus' second criterion of truth, are the concepts of what different things are that are formed in a person's mind through prior sense data, the background knowledge required for learning which allows an observer to make judgments about the things that are perceived.When a word that relates to the preconception is used, these preconceptions are summoned up by the mind into the person's thoughts.{{sfn|O'Keefe|2010|pp=101–104}} Epicurus' third criterion of truth are "choices and avoidances" which are the feelings of pleasure and pain which determine our actions. If something is pleasurable, we pursue that thing, and if something is painful, we avoid that thing. They are analogous to sensations in that they are a means of perception, but they perceive our internal state as opposed to external things.{{sfn|Asmis|2009|pp=93=94}} ==== Principle of Multiple Explanations ==== {{anchor|Principle of Multiple Explanations}} Epicurus applied his theory of knowledge to his understanding of nature; for understanding natural phenomena, we cannot rely on direct sense impressions alone, but must rely on inferences based on preconceptions. Hypotheses about phenomena that cannot be directly observed must be tested via relation to known observable facts, from which they are considered either contested or non-contested; a hypothesis that is not observable can be accepted as true if it is not contested by any explanations or observable phenomena.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=52-56}} However, a hypothesis can still be contested by other explanations without being directly ''contradicted'' by observable phenomena, so long as it is inconsistent with other potential explanations for how similar phenomena that can be closely observed are produced. For example, with the existence of atoms and void, Epicurus argues that there are no other possible explanations for the world we observe, so we must accept them as true. On the other hand, for various meteorological and cosmological phenomena, such as thunder and lightning or the waxing and waning of the moon and the motions of the stars, Epicurus produces several different possible explanations for the causes underlying the observed phenomena. Since none of the multiple explanations proposed can be verified or falsified, we must list them all and consider each of them to be possible, and cannot accept any of them as true.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=52-56}} Although Epicurus conceded that it may not be feasible to exhaustively list all possible causes, he believed it is still preferable to list several, rather than one, as becoming fixated on one possible explanation for all phenomena allows for the possibility of [[mythology]] and [[divine intervention]] as explanations, despite the fact that these have never been directly observed.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=52-56}} ==== Epilogism ==== {{main|Epilogism}} In addition to deductions based on the criteria of truth and inference of explanations based on observation, Epicurus also used a proof-free method of philosophical argumentation which he called ''[[Epilogism]]'' ({{lang|grc|ἐπίλογισμός}}), often translated as "appraisal" or "assessment," which was intended to provide insight via reflection when neither observation nor preconceptions about a given phenomena could provide a consistent answer. For example, Epicurus claimed that although we do not have a preconception of time as an independent object, we nonetheless speak of having "a lot of time" or "little time" and we can arrive at a better understanding of how we conceive of time falling into discrete periods by reflecting on what we mean when we say "a lot of time." Epicurus also argued that we can arrive at insight on the relations between pleasure and pain, desire, and happiness through an assessment of our own sense experience, preconceptions and feelings beyond what we already know from them alone.{{sfn|Striker|2020|pp=56-58}}
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