Editing Ethical intuitionism (section)

===Inessential connotations===
Traditionally, intuitionism was often understood as having several other commitments:

# [[Moral realism]], the view that there are [[Objectivity (philosophy)|objective]] facts of morality (as held by [[Mark de Bretton Platts|Mark Platts]]).
# [[Ethical non-naturalism]], the view that these evaluative facts cannot be reduced to natural fact.
# [[Foundationalism#Classical foundationalism|Classical foundationalism]], i.e., the view that intuited moral beliefs are: infallible (indefeasible), indubitable (irresistibly compelling), incorrigible, certain, or understandable without reflection.
# The view that moral properties are "simple" (as held by G. E. Moore).
# The view that moral truths are knowable ''only'' by intuition.
However, none of these positions are essential to the view; most ethical intuitionists (such as [[G. E. Moore]] and [[W. D. Ross]]) simply happen to have held those views as well.{{sfn|Audi|2004|p={{pn|date=March 2024}}}}{{sfn|Sturgeon|2002}}

Furthermore, intuitionists are often understood to be essentially committed to the existence of a special [[Faculty psychology|psychological faculty]] that reliably produces true moral intuitions.{{sfn|Williams|2011|p={{pn|date=March 2024}}}}{{sfn|Mackie|1977|p=38}} Few intuitionists, however, have explicitly required such a faculty exist, and some, such as [[Richard Price]], would have explicitly denied it exists.{{sfn|Brink|1989|p=109}}

====Pluralism====
Secondly, sometimes the term "ethical intuitionism" is associated with a pluralistic, [[Deontological ethics|deontological]] position in [[normative ethics]], a position defended by most ethical intuitionists, with [[Henry Sidgwick]] and [[G. E. Moore]] being notable exceptions.