Editing Experience (section)

=== Transparency ===
There is disagreement among theorists of experience concerning whether the subjective character of an experience is entirely determined by its contents. This claim has been called the "transparency of experience".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Siewert |first1=Charles |title=Is Experience Transparent? |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2004 |volume=117 |issue=1/2 |pages=15–41 |doi=10.1023/B:PHIL.0000014523.89489.59 |jstor=4321434 |s2cid=170961261 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321434 |issn=0031-8116|url-access=subscription }}</ref> It states that what it is like to undergo an experience only depends on the items presented in it. This would mean that two experiences are exactly alike if they have the same contents.<ref name="Crane"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chediak |first1=Karla |title=Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception |journal=Trans/Form/Ação |date=2016 |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=87–100 |doi=10.1590/S0101-31732016000200005 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHEIAT-5|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Gupta2012"/> Various philosophers have rejected this thesis, often with the argument that what matters is not just ''what'' is presented but also ''how'' it is presented. For example, the property of roundness can be presented visually, when looking at a sphere, or haptically, when touching the sphere.<ref name="Crane"/><ref name="Mitchell">{{cite journal |last1=Mitchell |first1=Jonathan |title=Another Look at Mode Intentionalism |journal=Erkenntnis |date=12 September 2020 |volume=87 |issue=6 |pages=2519–2546 |doi=10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4 |language=en |issn=1572-8420|doi-access=free }}</ref> Defenders of the transparency-thesis have pointed out that the difference between the experiences in such examples can be explained on the level of content: one experience presents the property of visual-roundness while the other presents felt-roundness.<ref name="Mitchell"/> Other counterexamples include blurry vision, where the blurriness is seen as a flawed representation without presenting the seen object itself as blurry.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pace |first1=Michael |title=Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience |journal=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |date=2007 |volume=88 |issue=3 |pages=328–354 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00296.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PACBVA|url-access=subscription }}</ref> It has been argued that only the universals present in the experience determine the subjective character of the experience. On this view, two experiences involving different particulars that instantiate exactly the same universals would be subjectively identical.<ref name="Gupta2012"/>