Editing Gilbert Ryle (section)

====Knowing-how and knowing-that====
{{main|Descriptive knowledge|Procedural knowledge}}
A distinction deployed in ''The Concept of Mind'', between 'knowing-how' and 'knowing-that', has attracted independent interest. This distinction is also the origin of procedural (''knowing-how'') and declarative (''knowing-that'') models of [[long-term memory]].<ref name=":2">[[Jason Stanley]] and [[Timothy Williamson]], [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2678403 "Knowing How"], ''[[Journal of Philosophy]]'', '''98''' (8): 411–444, 2001.</ref> This distinction is widely accepted in philosophy.<ref name=":2" />

{{Cquote
| quote = Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction which is quite familiar to all of us between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do things. In their theories of knowledge they concentrate on the discovery of truths or facts, and they either ignore the discovery of ways and methods of doing things or else they try to reduce it to the discovery of facts. They assume that [[intelligence]] equates with the [[contemplation]] of propositions and is exhausted in this contemplation.
| author = Gilbert Ryle
| source = [[Aristotelian Society]] Presidential Address, 1945.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ryle |first=Gilbert |date=1945 |title=Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4544405 |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |volume=46 |pages=1–16 |issn=0066-7374}}</ref>
}}

An example of the distinction can be knowing how to tie a [[reef knot]] and knowing that [[Queen Victoria]] died in 1901.