Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Guy Simonds
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
===Northwest Europe 1944−1945=== [[File:Monty and Simonds.jpg|thumb|left|General Montgomery (eighth from left) talking with Lieutenant-General Simonds (ninth from left) and other senior officers of II Canadian Corps at Corps Headquarters in the Normandy bridgehead, France, July 20, 1944]] In January 1944 he was recalled to the United Kingdom and, after being promoted to lieutenant-general on January 6,<ref name="Generals of World War II"/> was made [[General officer commanding|General Officer Commanding]] [[II Canadian Corps]],<ref name=juno/> which went on to take part in the [[Operation Overlord|Battle of Normandy]] and the subsequent advance through France. At the age of just forty, Simonds was purported to be the youngest corps commander in the [[British Empire]].{{sfn|Granatstein|2005|p=163}} Simonds made numerous personnel changes: The Chief Engineer, Chief Medical Officer and the Commander Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) were sacked, and [[F. F. Worthington]] was replaced as commander of the [[4th Canadian Division|4th Canadian (Armoured) Division]].{{sfn|Granatstein|2005|p=163}} Talented officers such as [[George Kitching]], [[Bruce Matthews (Canadian Army officer)|Bruce Matthews]] and [[Geoffrey Walsh]] were brought by Simonds from Italy to II Corps.<ref name="DDD_221">Dancocks, p. 221.</ref> In his instructions to his officers in February 1944, Simonds noted that the [[Wehrmacht]] always fought its defensive battles the same way; namely a thinly manned series of outposts, behind which were a series of strongly held dug-in positions that could bring down interlocking machine gun and mortar fire.<ref name="Perrun 2003 p.143">Perrun (2003) p.143</ref> Simonds further noted the Wehrmacht would always launch aggressive counter-attacks in face of an Allied attack, stating: <blockquote>...success of the offensive battle hinges on the defeat of the German counter-attacks, with sufficient of our own reserves in hand to launch a new phase as soon as the enemy strength has spent itself. The defeat of these counter-attacks must form part of the original plan of attack which must include arrangements for artillery support and forward moves of infantry-supporting weapons—including tanks—on the objective.<ref name="Perrun 2003 p.143"/></blockquote> As Simonds had been trained as a "gunner", as artillerymen were known in the Canadian Army, artillery played a significant role in his planning for offensives with the divisions attacking along narrow points as divisional artillery was only capable of supporting one brigade at a time.<ref name="Perrun 2003 p.143"/> [[File:Bernard Montgomery shows Winston Churchill the battle situation.jpg|thumb|right|General Sir Bernard Montgomery shows Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] the battle situation on a map held by the commander of II Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General Simonds, during Churchill's visit to Normandy, July 22, 1944. Lieutenant-General [[Miles Dempsey]], the commander of the British Second Army, looks on.]] Simonds, by his own admission, was bad-tempered, unable to tolerate those he regarded as fools, and had a headstrong streak, which he attempted to check by maintaining a cold "glacial" composure.<ref name="English 1991 p. 191"/> Simonds always spoke with a strong English accent, and his personality never inspired any affection from the men under his command who regarded him as a "cold Englishman".<ref name="English 1991 p. 191"/> One Canadian brigadier wrote that Simonds "was not a man one could love. In my heart I knew, however, that I would rather serve under his type than under a kindly, but less driving commander; the former is much more likely to win battles."<ref name="Perrun 2003 p.143"/> Simonds had a long-standing feud with his fellow British immigrant Charles Foulkes, going back to their days as students at the Staff College where Simonds had received greater recognition than Foulkes. Both Foulkes and Simonds were ambitious men with strong ruthless streaks, and together with Lieutenant General Harry Crerar, who had "a nasty streak of his own", the three officers were the ones most responsible for the command decisions of the Canadians in the Normandy campaign.<ref name="English 1991 p. 191"/> Relations between Simonds and Crerar, were very poor as Crerar had attempted to sack Simonds as commander of the 5th Canadian Division in December 1943.<ref>English (1991) p. 186-187.</ref> However, Simonds was a favorite of Montgomery, who viewed Simonds as the most talented Canadian general in the entire war, and Montgomery blocked Crerar's attempts to send Simonds back to Canada.<ref>English (1991) p. 186-188.</ref> Once II Corps was activated, Simonds would direct four major attacks during the [[Operation Overlord|Battle of Normandy]] in five weeks: Operations [[Operation Atlantic|Atlantic]] (the Canadian part of [[Operation Goodwood]]), [[Operation Spring|Spring]], [[Operation Totalize|Totalize]] and [[Operation Tractable|Tractable]]. After Operation Spring, Simonds tried to sack Foulkes as commander of 2nd Canadian Division, writing that Foulkes "did not [show] the right qualities to command 2nd Division", but was blocked by Crerar, who kept Foulkes on to nettle Simonds.<ref>English (1991) p. 250.</ref> Simonds has often been criticized for his reliance on heavy bombers to "blast" open a way for Operation Totalize, but the Canadian historian Jody Perrun argued that the marked inferiority of the [[M4 Sherman|Sherman]] tanks to the [[Panther tank|Panther]] and [[Tiger I|Tiger]] tanks of the Germans meant that Simonds had no other choice, but to use air power to even the odds given that both the Panthers and Tigers had more powerful guns and heavier armor than the Shermans.<ref>Perrun (2003) p. 139</ref> Perrun has charged too many historians have taken at face value the disparaging remarks about Simonds's command by SS-''Brigadeführer'' [[Kurt Meyer|Kurt "Panzer" Meyer]], the commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division ''Hitlerjugend'', who spoke as if the Sherman tanks were the equal of the Tiger and Panther tanks, and charged that the Canadians were insufficiently aggressive in armored operations and too reliant upon air support.<ref>Perrun (2003) pp. 138–139</ref> A principal problem for Simonds was that his tank crews were loath to face the Panthers and Tigers on open ground given their guns could not knock either type of tank except at very close range while the guns of the Panthers and Tigers could knock a Sherman at long range.<ref>Perrun (2003) p.139-140</ref> Perrun argued that Meyer's claims that Simonds lacked aggression failed to take into account the weaknesses of the Sherman tanks, and Simonds designed his operations with the aim of counter-acting the flaws of the Shermans by providing for air and artillery support to even the odds.<ref>Perrun (2003) p.175-176</ref> [[File:HM King George VI With the British Liberation Army in Belgium, October 1944 TR2418.jpg|thumb|left|Brigadier J. A. W. Bennett is made a Commander of the British Empire by King [[George VI]] at the headquarters of the First Canadian Army in Belgium, October 1944. Lieutenant-General Simonds, wearing a black beret and having just been made a Companion of the Order of the Bath, stands a short distance away, and behind him is Field Marshal Montgomery.]] For Totalize (beginning August 7, 1944), which involved a night attack, numerous navigation aids were devised, along with heavy bomber support. Having learned from Operation Spring, Simonds devised the "[[Kangaroo (armoured personnel carrier)|Kangaroo]]", an early [[armoured personnel carrier]] converted from non-operational armoured vehicles "defrocked [[M7 Priest|Priests]]".<ref name=juno/><ref name="Keegan">Keegan, John. (1982) ''Six Armies in Normandy.'' New York: The Viking Press. p. 253. {{ISBN|0-670-64736-5}}</ref> Granatstein characterizes the plan as "brilliant if too complicated",{{sfn|Granatstein|2005|p=169}} in that it did not account for the inexperience of the troops. The two commanders of the armored divisions tasked with leading the assault, George Kitching and Stanisław Maczek both objected to Simonds's plans for a "mailed fist" assault on narrow fronts as allowing the Germans to concentrate their forces for counter-attack, but Simonds argued the planned heavy bombing attack by American bombers would disorganize the Germans enough to allow a breakthrough.<ref>Zuehlke (2011) p.284.</ref> As Maczek's English was very poor and Simonds spoke no Polish, the two generals spoke in French, in which Maczek was fluent.<ref name="Zuehlke 2011 p.285">Zuehlke (2011) p.285.</ref> Simonds insisted that his French was not that good and so Kitching translated for him.<ref name="Zuehlke 2011 p.285"/> Kitching later accused Simonds of being better at French than what he pretended as the interval for translations gave him more room to develop arguments to dismiss Maczek's concerns.<ref name="Zuehlke 2011 p.285"/> [[File:Simonds.jpg|right|thumb|From left to right: [[Christopher Vokes]], [[Harry Crerar]], [[Bernard Montgomery|Sir Bernard Montgomery]], [[Brian Horrocks]] (both British Army), Guy Simonds, [[Daniel Spry]] and [[Bruce Matthews (Canadian Army officer)|Bruce Mathews]], all pictured here in February 1945 during [[Operation Veritable]].]] During Operation Totalize, the American bombers who were supposed to hit the German lines instead carpet-bombed the II Canadian Corps's artillery and assembling areas, badly disorganizing the offensive.<ref>Perrun (2003) p.167-168</ref> While the offensive was derailed by the American "friendly fire", the aggressive Meyer took advantage of the pause to stop the advances of both the 1st Polish Armored Division at St. Aignan and the 4th Canadian Armored Division at Langannerie.<ref>Perrun (2003) p.168</ref> Simonds's plan for Totalize had called for Canadian heavy and medium artillery to support the Canadian and Polish tanks as they advanced, but the accidental American bombing of the Canadian artillery had robbed the Allied armor of the expected fire support. Simonds, knowing of the weakness of the Sherman tanks, which were both under-armored and under-gunned, had planned for his artillery to knock out Meyer's Tigers and Panthers, and expected the Germans to counter-attack at once with their armor.<ref name="Perrun 2003 p.172-173">Perrun (2003) p.172-173</ref> The next day, Simonds sent the Worthington Force, comprising a battlegroup of the British Columbia regiment and the Algonquin regiment, which however took a wrong turn, and was annihilated by Meyer who sent his Tiger and Panther tanks against the Shermans.<ref>Perrun (2003) p.169</ref> Tractable, on August 14, used a smoke screen in an attempt to shield armour from German anti-tank weaponry. The Canadian historian Desmond Morton wrote that Operation Tractable should have been a disaster as the Wehrmacht had captured a copy of the Canadian operations plan the night before, but despite this, the assault by the II corps under the cover of smoke ended with the Canadians taking Falaise on 16 August 1944.<ref name="Morton 1999 p.216">Morton (1999) p.216.</ref> Afterwards, Simonds had the task of closing the "Falaise Gap" with the 1st Polish Armored Division under Major General [[Stanisław Maczek]] leading the way and engaging in desperate fighting at the ''Maczuga'' (Mace) as the Poles called [[Hill 262]] as the German Army Group B sought to escape from Normandy.<ref name="Morton 1999 p.216"/> Though the 1st Polish Division was nearly destroyed several times as the Germans pushed their way out of Normandy, the Poles at the ''Maczuga'' and the Canadians at St. Lambert finally closed the "Falaise Gap" on August 21, 1944.<ref name="Morton 1999 p.216"/> Despite its name, the II Canadian Corps had Polish and British divisions operating under Simonds's command. [[File:The Life and work Edward G Malindine, Photojournalist and Official Army Photographer 1906 - 1970 HU102819.jpg|thumb|left|[[Field marshal (United Kingdom)|Field Marshal]] [[Bernard Montgomery|Montgomery]] with his staff, army, corps and division commanders at Walbeck, Germany, March 22, 1945. Standing in the third row, seventh from the left, is Lieutenant General Simonds.]] In September 1944, Simonds temporarily took charge of the [[First Canadian Army]] from Lieutenant-General [[Harry Crerar]], who was recovering from a bout of dysentery, and [[Battle of the Scheldt|led the liberation]] of the mouth of the [[Scheldt|Scheldt River]].<ref name=juno/> "By most accounts, Simonds’ assumption of command reinvigorated the army HQ; where Crerar managed, Simonds commanded."<ref name="No easy thing">{{cite web | url=http://www.canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/3-Wakelam-Command-in-the-Canadian-Army.pdf | title=No easy thing Senior Command in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945 | access-date=August 9, 2012 | author=Wakelam, Randall}}</ref> When Crerar resumed command with the First Army, Simonds resumed his command of II Canadian Corps for the [[Western Front (World War II)|liberation of North-Western Europe]].<ref name=juno/>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)