Editing Harm principle (section)

== Broader definitions of harm ==
In the same essay, Mill further explains the principle as a function of two maxims:

{{Blockquote| The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people, if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that ''for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments, if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection.'' (LV2)}}

The second of these maxims has become known as the social authority principle.<ref>{{cite book|first=Philip J.|last=Rossi|title=The Social Authority of Reason|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SahGghysPCEC&q=social+authority+principle&pg=PA60|publisher=[[SUNY Press]]|location=Albany, New York|date=2012|isbn=978-0791483367|page=60}}</ref>

However, the second maxim also raises the question of broader definitions of harm, including harm to the society. Harm is not limited to harm to another individual but can extend to groups or communities, without specifying the affected individuals.

This is an important principle for the purpose of determining harm that only manifests gradually over time—such that the resulting harm can be anticipated, but does not yet exist at the time that the action causing harm was taken. It also applies to other issues—which range from the right of an entity to discharge broadly polluting waste on private property, to broad questions of licensing, and to the right of [[sedition]].

Harm can also result from a failure to meet an obligation. Morality generates obligations. Duty may be exacted from a person in the same way as a debt, and it is part of the notion of duty that a person may be rightfully compelled to fulfill it.<ref name="On Liberty" /><ref name="Oliveira" />