Editing Hermann Hoth (section)

==== Leading the 3rd Panzer Group ====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-265-0024-21A, Russland, Generäle Guderian und Hoth.jpg|thumb|Hoth (right) with [[Heinz Guderian]], commander of [[Panzer Group 2]], 21 June 1941]]
Hoth commanded the [[3rd Panzer Group]] during [[Operation Barbarossa]] in 1941.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=88}}{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=4}} This unit included the [[XXXIX Panzer Corps]], [[LVII Panzer Corps]], [[V Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|V Army Corps]], and [[VI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|VI Army Corps]]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} which consisted of four Panzer divisions (7th, [[12th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|12th]], [[19th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|19th]], and [[20th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|20th]]),{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Stary Bychóv'}}{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} three motorized divisions ([[14th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|14th]], [[20th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|20th]], 18th), and four infantry divisions ([[5th Jäger Division (Wehrmacht)|5th]], [[6th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|6th]], [[26th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|26th]], [[35th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|35th]]).{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} The 3rd Panzer Group fielded 626 tanks at the offensive's start.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=42}} In his diaries, Hoth expressed no doubts about or opposition to the invasion, mirroring the opinion of most high-ranking German commanders.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=10}} From a moral and ideological standpoint, Hoth believed that Russia had been overtaken by "[[Jewish Bolshevism]]", causing the country to turn away from its European heritage, transforming it into an expansionist, Asiatic, and despotic state as well as setting it on an unavoidable collision course with Germany. Hürter argued that Hoth's beliefs showcased remarkable similarities with Hitler's. Even after the war, Hoth continued to maintain that the invasion had been just based on these arguments.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=214}} Despite his belief in the necessity of the invasion, Hoth had misgivings about its strategic planning and execution. He tried to convince his superior, ''Generalfeldmarschall'' [[Fedor von Bock]], commander of [[Army Group Center]], that the 3rd Panzer Group had to operate with greater flexibility and prepare to strike deeper into the Soviet Union than intended by the [[Oberkommando des Heeres|high command]] (OKH). Bock rebuffed these requests.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=227}} Regardless of his misgivings, Hoth generally adhered to the decided-upon plans and Bock's commands during the invasion. Researcher Robert Kirchubel described him as a "team player" and reliable in crisis situations during Operation Barbarossa.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=16}}

In course of the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group broke through the Soviet border defenses with relative ease. Bock consequently released Hoth from the [[9th Army (Wehrmacht)|9th Army]], allowing him to operate more freely.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|pp=33, 35}} Guderian's [[2nd Panzer Group]]{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Stary Bychóv'}} and Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group proceeded to encircle [[Minsk]] as part of Army Group Center's operations,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=88}}{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=283}}{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=21}} trapping 300,000 [[Red Army]] soldiers and capturing or destroying 2,500 tanks.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=21}} At this point, Hoth again argued that the 3rd Panzer Group should move deeper into the Soviet territory and encircle more enemy troops before closing the pocket. This time he was supported by Bock, but they were overruled by the OKH.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|p=284}} Alongside Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, Hoth then pushed further to [[Battle of Smolensk (1941)|attack Smolensk]], believing that they had to continue their advance to not allow the Red Army to reorganize.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=47}} Before reaching the city, the panzer groups of Guderian and Hoth had almost outrun their supply lines, but were able to keep moving thanks to captured Soviet fuel depots. Hoth split his force into two, and secured vital crossings of the [[Daugava]] river on 3–4 July.{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Stary Bychóv'}} His panzer group then kept advancing between the Daugava and [[Dnieper]], capturing [[Vitebsk]].{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'Peremerka'}} The breakthrough of Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group at the Daugava-Dnieper line allowed for the encirclement of three Soviet armies.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=54}}{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=220}}

As the Wehrmacht advanced, questions arose about the treatment of suspected Red Army soldiers or deserters in civilian clothing. Hoth ordered the 3rd Panzer Group's officers to subject such individuals to a limited examination; if the officers concluded that the prisoners were Red Army soldiers, they were to be shot.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=367–368}} Like all German armies on the Eastern Front, Hoth's Panzer Group also implemented the [[Commissar Order]].{{sfn|Stahel|2015|p=28}} Following the war, Hoth was the only German general who admitted that he had agreed with the order, believing that the Soviet [[political commissar]]s could not be regarded as regular soldiers.{{sfn|Hürter|2007|pp=259, 395}} According to reports from subordinate units, the order was carried out on a widespread basis.{{sfn|Hebert|2010|p=259}}

In mid-July 1941, the 3rd Panzer Group was subordinated to [[Army Group North]] to shore up the flanks and attempted to seize [[Velikie Luki]].{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=88}}{{sfn|Zetterling|2017|loc=Chapter 6, Section 'The Kiev Pocket'}} This was part of a larger operation aimed at seizing [[Leningrad]].{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=33}} Hoth's forces were driven back on 20 July when Red Army forces broke through the German lines, prompting criticism from Bock for unnecessarily striking out too far to the north east.{{sfn|Stahel|2009}} In early August, Hitler ordered a southward diversion of the German advance at [[Bryansk]] to the objection of many leading German officers, including Hoth, who advocated for a continued direct drive to [[Moscow]].{{sfn|Jukes|2011|loc=Chapter 2}} In mid to late August, Hoth's forces faced another setback owing to heavy losses and dispersal of efforts: facing the heavily reinforced Soviet [[19th Army (Soviet Union)|19th Army]], he committed the 7th Panzer Division without infantry support, which resulted in what the historian [[David Stahel]] describes as a "debacle". The division's attack ran into fortified Soviet lines and was repulsed with the loss of 30 tanks.{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=408}} By September, the constant fighting had heavily depleted Hoth's force, as the 3rd Panzer Group had only about 250 tanks remaining.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=42}} Hoth's panzer group subsequently assisted in [[Battle of Moscow|Operation Typhoon]], the offensive to capture Moscow.{{sfn|Beevor|1999|p=33}} Stationed on the left flank, his force and the 9th Army were supposed to attack from [[Dukhovshchina, Smolensk Oblast|Dukhovshchina]] toward [[Vyazma]].{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=49}} As the plans for Operation Typhoon were discussed by the OKH and frontline commanders, Hoth argued for a delay of one day regarding the offensive, but was overruled.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=49}}

At the start of Operation Typhoon, the 3rd Panzer Group made good progress,{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=56}} though was slowed down by Soviet air attacks and the worn-down state of some of its units.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=60}} Hoth's force and the 9th Army successfully captured two bridges across the Dnieper east of [[Kholm-Zhirkovsky (urban locality)|Kholm-Zhirkovsky]] and were just {{Convert|60|km|mi|abbr=}} from Vyazma, close to achieving another encirclement, when they were stopped by counter-attacks ordered by General [[Ivan Konev]] on 3 October.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=62}} The resulting fighting and the exhaustion of its fuel supplies pinned down the 3rd Panzer Group until 6 October,{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=65}} when Hoth was able to restart the advance and sealed the [[Battle of Moscow#Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk|Vyazma-Bryansk pockets]].{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=77}} He was then redirected north to capture [[Rzhev]] and [[Tver|Kalinin]], even though this effectively removed the 3rd Panzer Group from the Battle of Moscow. Hitler and the OKH believed that the "fatal blow" to the Red Army had been already delivered at Vyazma-Bryansk, and hoped for more great encirclements.{{sfn|Stahel|2013|p=81}}