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Indeterminism
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====Aristotle==== {{main|Four causes}} [[Aristotle]] described four possible causes (material, efficient, formal, and final). Aristotle's word for these causes was αἰτίαι (''aitiai'', as in ''[[wikt:aetiology|aetiology]]''), which translates as causes in the sense of the multiple factors responsible for an event. Aristotle did not subscribe to the simplistic "every event has a (single) cause" idea that was to come later. In his ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' and ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Aristotle said there were [[Accident (philosophy)|accidents]] (συμβεβηκός, ''[[sumbebekos]]'') caused by nothing but chance (τύχη, ''tukhe''). He noted that he and the early physicists found no place for chance among their causes. {{quote|We have seen how far Aristotle distances himself from any view which makes chance a crucial factor in the general explanation of things. And he does so on conceptual grounds: chance events are, he thinks, by definition unusual and lacking certain explanatory features: as such they form the complement class to those things which can be given full natural explanations.<ref name="Hankinson">{{cite book |chapter=Causes |title=Blackwell Companion to Aristotle |last=Hankinson |first=R.J. |year=2009 |page=223}}</ref>|R.J. Hankinson |"Causes" in ''Blackwell Companion to Aristotle ''}} Aristotle opposed his accidental chance to necessity: <blockquote> Nor is there any definite cause for an accident, but only chance (τυχόν), namely an indefinite (ἀόριστον) cause.<ref>Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Book V, 1025a25</ref> </blockquote> <blockquote> It is obvious that there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible apart from the actual processes of generation and destruction; for if this is not true, everything will be of necessity: that is, if there must necessarily be some cause, other than accidental, of that which is generated and destroyed. Will this be, or not? Yes, if this happens; otherwise not.<ref>Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Book VI, 1027a29-33</ref> </blockquote>
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