Editing Indian Ocean raid (section)

===Attack on Colombo===
{{main|Easter Sunday Raid}}
Japanese intelligence on the morning of 5 April 1942 indicated that British carriers were absent, and the Japanese morning air search was limited accordingly.<ref name="Tully_Yu_5"/> At dawn, Japanese aerial reconnaissance aircraft flew off to the south-west and north-west; they would fly out to a maximum of {{convert|200|mi|km}} over the next few hours. A reconnaissance Fulmar launched from Force A at 08:00 spotted one of the Japanese aircraft at the extreme edge of the south-west search area at 08:55 about {{convert|140|mi|km}} ahead of Force A.<ref name="Boyd_372">Boyd, p. 372</ref>

Shortly after 06:00<ref name="Boyd_371">Boyd, p. 371</ref> Nagumo's force began launching 91 bombers and 36 fighters for the strike on Colombo.<ref name="Roskill_26"/> British early warning failed to detect and identify the incoming strike,<ref name="Stuart_2014_38-41">Stuart 2014, p. 38–41</ref> forcing British pilots to [[Scrambling (military)|scramble]] under fire when the first Japanese aircraft appeared over them at 07:45. The effective defence of the [[Ratmalana Airport|Ratmalana]] airbase by British fighters<ref name="Stuart_2014_42-43">Stuart 2014, p. 42–43</ref> left the harbour exposed. The [[armed merchant cruiser]] {{HMS|Hector|F45|6}},<ref name="Stuart_2014_43"/> the Norwegian tanker ''Soli''<ref name="Stuart_2014_47">Stuart 2014, p. 47</ref> and the old destroyer {{HMS|Tenedos|H04|6}} were sunk; three other ships were damaged. The port was damaged<ref name="Stuart_2014_43">Stuart 2014, p. 43</ref> but was not put out of action.<ref name="Roskill_26"/> 20 of the 41 British fighters that took off were destroyed.<ref name="Stuart_2014_33"/> At least one fighter was damaged and made incapable of flight while attempting to take off. The six Swordfish of 788 NAS arrived during the battle and were shot down.<ref name="Stuart_2014_42"/> The Japanese lost seven aircraft.<ref name="Stuart_2014_33"/>

Nagumo changed course to west-southwest at 08:30<ref name="Boyd_371"/> – unknowingly causing the opposing fleets to steam toward one another<ref name="Boyd_373"/> – and recovered the Colombo strike from 09:45 to 10:30.<ref name="Boyd_373"/>

The size of the airstrike on Colombo was Somerville's first concrete evidence that the Japanese force contained more than the two carriers he expected. Nonetheless he continued to steam toward the enemy at 18 knots. Radar-based fighter direction would allow Force A to avoid surprise attack by neutralizing shadowing Japanese aircraft.<ref name="Boyd_372"/>