Editing Intentionality (section)

== Basic intentionality types according to Le Morvan ==
Working on the intentionality of vision, belief, and knowledge, Pierre Le Morvan (2005)<ref>{{cite journal |author=Pierre Le Morvan |year=2005 |title=Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, And Opaque |journal=Journal of Philosophical Research |volume=30 |pages=283–302 |url=http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/JPR_Proof.pdf |access-date=21 December 2012 |doi=10.5840/jpr20053039 |archive-date=27 September 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120927153500/http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/JPR_Proof.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> has distinguished between three basic kinds of intentionality that he dubs "transparent", "translucent", and "opaque" respectively. The threefold distinction may be explained as follows. Let's call the "intendum" what an intentional state is about, and the "intender" the subject who is in the intentional state. An intentional state is transparent if it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) it is genuinely relational in that it entails the existence of not just the intender but the intendum as well, and (ii) substitutivity of identicals applies to the intendum (i.e. if the intentional state is about a, and a = b, then the intentional state is about b as well). An intentional state is translucent if it satisfies (i) but not (ii). An intentional state is opaque if it satisfies neither (i) nor (ii).