Editing Islam in Turkey (section)

==== Multi-party period ====
Following the loosening of authoritarian political control in 1946, a large number of people began to openly call for a return to traditional religious practices. During the 1950s, even certain political leaders found it expedient to join religious leaders in advocating more state respect for religion.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Öztürk|first=Ahmet Erdi|date=2019-02-26|title=An alternative reading of religion and authoritarianism: the new logic between religion and state in the AKP's New Turkey|journal=Southeast European and Black Sea Studies|volume=19|pages=79–98|doi=10.1080/14683857.2019.1576370|s2cid=159047564|issn=1468-3857|url=http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5406/1/An-alternative-reading-of-religion-and-authoritarianism.pdf|access-date=4 June 2020|archive-date=22 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201122121007/http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/5406/1/An-alternative-reading-of-religion-and-authoritarianism.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

A more direct manifestation of the growing reaction against secularism was the revival of the Sufi brotherhoods. Not only did suppressed Sufi orders such as the [[Qadiriyya|Kadiri]], [[Mevlevi]], [[Nakşibendi]], [[Khalidiyya|Khālidiyyā]] and [[Al-Ṭarīqah al-Tijāniyyah]] reemerge, but new movements were formed, including the [[Nursi|Nur]] [[Nur Movement|Cemaat]]i, [[Gülen movement]], [[Süleymancı|Sülaymānīyyā]], [[Community of İskenderpaşa]] and [[İsmailağa]]. The Tijāni became especially militant in confronting the state, damaging monuments to Atatürk to symbolize their opposition to his policy of secularization. This was, however, an isolated incident and only involved one particular [[Sheikh]] of the order. Throughout the 1950s, there were numerous trials of Ticani and other Sufi leaders for anti-state activities.

Simultaneously, some movements, notably the Süleymancı and Nurcular, cooperated with those politicians perceived as supportive of pro-Islamic policies. The Nurcular eventually advocated support for Turkey's [[Multi-party system|multi-party political system]], and one of its offshoots, the [[Gülen movement]], had supported the [[True Path Party]] while the [[Hüseyin Hilmi Işık|Işıkçılar]] and [[Enver Ören]] had openly supported the [[Motherland Party (Turkey)|Motherland Party]] since the mid-1980s.
[[File:ANKARA_KOCATEPE_CAMİİ.jpg|left|thumb|[[Kocatepe Mosque]], [[Ankara]].]]

The demand for restoration of religious education in public schools began in the late 1940s. The government initially responded by authorizing religious instruction in state schools for those students whose parents requested it. Under the rule of the [[Democrat Party (Turkey, 1946–1961)|Democrat Party]] during the 1950s, religious education was made compulsory in secondary schools unless parents made a specific request to have their children excused. Religious education was made compulsory for all primary and secondary school children in 1982.

The reintroduction of religion into the school curriculum raised the question of religious higher education. The seculars believed that Islam could be "reformed" if future leaders were trained in state-controlled seminaries. To further this goal, the government in 1949 established a faculty of divinity at [[Ankara University]] to train teachers of Islam and imams. In 1951 [[Democrat Party (Turkey, historical)|the Democrat Party]] government set up special secondary schools ([[İmam Hatip school]]s) for the training of imams and preachers. The number of these schools expanded rapidly to over 250 during the 1970s, when the pro-Islam [[National Salvation Party]] participated in coalition governments. Following the [[1980 Turkish coup d'état|1980 coup]], the military, although secular in orientation, viewed religion as an effective means to counter [[Socialism|socialist]] ideas and thus authorized the construction of 90 more İmam Hatip high schools.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Islam experienced [[political rehabilitation]] due to center-right secular leaders perceiving religion as a potential bulwark in their ideological struggle with center-left secular leaders. A small advocacy group that became extremely influential was the [[Intellectuals' Hearth]] ({{langx|tr|Aydınlar Ocağı}}), an organization that holds the beliefs that true Turkish culture is a synthesis of the Turks' pre-Islamic traditions and Islam. According to the Hearth, Islam not only constitutes an essential aspect of Turkish culture, but is a force that can be regulated by the state to help socialize the people to be obedient citizens acquiescent to the overall secular order. After the 1980 coup, many of the Hearth's proposals for restructuring schools, colleges, and state broadcasting were adopted. The result was a purge from these state institutions of more than 2,000 intellectuals perceived as espousing leftist ideas incompatible with the Hearth's vision of Turkey's national culture.
[[File:Blue_Mosque_2.jpg|thumb|262px|Interior of the [[Sultan Ahmed Mosque]], Istanbul, built in 1616.]]

The state's more tolerant attitude toward Islam encouraged the proliferation of private religious activities, including the construction of new mosques and [[Qur'an]] schools in the cities, the establishment of Islamic centers for research on and conferences about Islam and its role in Turkey, and the establishment of religiously oriented professional and women's journals. The printing of newspapers, the publication of religious books, and the growth of innumerable religious projects ranging from health centers, child-care facilities, and youth hostels to financial institutions and consumer cooperatives flourished. When the government legalized private broadcasting after 1990, several Islamic radio stations were organized. In the summer of 1994, the first Islamic television station, [[Kanal 7]], began broadcasting, first in [[Istanbul]] and then in [[Ankara]].

Although the [[Tariqa|tarikah]] have played a seminal role in Turkey's religious revival and in the mid-1990s still published, several of the country's most widely circulated religious journals and newspapers, a new phenomenon, ''[[İslamcı Aydın]]'' (the Islamist intellectual), unaffiliated with the traditional Sufi orders, emerged during the 1980s. Prolific and popular writers such as [[Ali Bulaç]], [[Rasim Özdenören]], and [[İsmet Özel]] drew upon their knowledge of Western philosophy, [[Marxist]] sociology, and radical Islamist political theory to advocate for a modern Islamic perspective that does not hesitate to criticize societal issues while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ethical values and spiritual dimensions of religion. [[Islamism|Islamist]] intellectuals are harshly critical of Turkey's secular intellectuals, whom they fault for trying to do in Turkey what Western intellectuals did in Europe: substitute worldly [[materialism]], in its [[Capitalism|capitalist]] or socialist version, for religious values.

On 15 July 2016, a [[coup d'état]] was attempted in Turkey against state institutions by a faction within the [[Turkish Armed Forces]] with connections to the Gülen movement, citing an erosion in secularism.