Editing Lin Biao (section)

==Politician==
===Illness===

Lin Biao continued to suffer from poor health after 1949, and chose to avoid high-profile military and political positions. His status led him to be appointed to a number of high-profile positions throughout most of the 1950s, but these were largely honorary and carried few responsibilities. He generally delegated or neglected many of the formal political responsibilities that he was assigned, usually citing his poor health.<ref name="MMW141" />

After Lin's injury in 1938, he suffered from ongoing physical and mental health problems. A theory holds that his lifelong health problems may have resulted from the injury.<ref name=":Chatwin">{{Cite book |last=Chatwin |first=Jonathan |title=The Southern Tour: Deng Xiaoping and the Fight for China's Future |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781350435711}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=33-34}} His exact medical condition is not well understood, partially because his medical records have never been publicly released. Dr. [[Li Zhisui]], then one of Mao's personal physicians, believed that Lin suffered from [[neurasthenia]] and [[hypochondria]]. He became ill whenever he perspired, and suffered from phobias about water, wind, cold,<ref name="Qiu145" /> light, and noise.<ref name="Lee170" /> He was said to become nervous at the sight of rivers and oceans in traditional Chinese paintings, and suffered from diarrhea, which could be triggered by the sound of running water.<ref name="Qiu145">Qiu ''The Culture of Power''. 145</ref> Li's account of Lin's condition is notably different from the official Chinese version.

In another study, Lin is described as having symptoms similar to those seen in patients of [[schizoid personality disorder]]. Lin's personality traits including his aloofness, lack of interest in social relationships, secretiveness, and emotional coldness he exhibited during the Cultural Revolution; indeed, all of these were symptoms very similar to those seen in individuals who suffer from schizoid personality disorder. The challenge of Lin's personality problems in conjunction with the turbulent political climate of the Cultural Revolution impacted his overall ability to govern his position.<ref>Luna, Adrian. "Bringing the Inside Out: Health, Personality, Politics, and the Tragedy of Lin Biao" VDM Verlag, January 2008.</ref>

Lin suffered from excessive headaches, and spent much of his free time consulting Chinese medical texts and preparing traditional Chinese medicines for himself. He suffered from insomnia, and often took sleeping pills.<ref name="Hannam and Lawrence 2-3">Hannam and Lawrence 2–3</ref> He ate simple meals, did not smoke, and did not drink alcohol.<ref name="Qiu145" /> As his condition progressed, his fear of water led to a general refusal to either bathe or eat fruit. Because of his fear of wind and light, his office was gloomy and lacked any ventilation. Some accounts have suggested that Lin became a drug addict, either to opium<ref name="Lee170" /> or morphine.

As early as 1953, Soviet doctors diagnosed Lin as suffering from [[manic depression]]. Lin's wife, [[Ye Qun]], rejected this diagnosis, but it was later confirmed by Chinese doctors. Lin's fragile health made him vulnerable, passive, and easily manipulated by other political figures, notably Ye Qun herself.<ref name="Qiu145" />

Lin's complaints got worse with time and age. In the years before his death, the fiancée of Lin's son reported that Lin became extremely distant and socially and politically detached, even to the extent that he never read books or newspapers. His passivity made him difficult to connect with at any meaningful level: "usually he just sat there, blankly". In Lin's rare periods of activity, he used his time mostly to complain about, and seek treatment for his large variety of medical issues.<ref name="HL2" />

===Alliance with Mao===
{{Maoism sidebar|people}}
Lin, like most of the Politburo, initially held serious reservations about China's entry into the [[Korean War]], citing the devastation that would result if the "imperialists" (Americans) detonated an atomic bomb in Korea or China. Lin later declined to lead forces in Korea, citing his ill health.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 142–143, 145</ref>  In early October 1950, Peng Dehuai was named commander of the Chinese forces bound for Korea, and Lin went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. Lin flew to the Soviet Union with Zhou Enlai and participated in negotiations with [[Joseph Stalin]] concerning Soviet support for China's intervention, indicating that Mao retained his trust in Lin.
Due partially to his periods of ill health and physical rehabilitation in the [[Soviet Union]], Lin was slow to rise to power. In the early 1950s Lin was one of five major leaders given responsibility for civil and military affairs, controlling a jurisdiction in central China. In 1953 he was visited by [[Gao Gang]], and was later suspected of supporting him.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 164, 166</ref> In 1955 Lin was named to the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo]].<ref name="MMW141" /> 

In February 1958 Peng Dehuai, then China's [[Minister of National Defense (China)|Defense Minister]], gave a speech for the fortieth anniversary of the [[Red Army|Soviet Red Army]] in which he suggested increasing the military cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Mao wanted to distance China from the Soviet Union, and began grooming Lin Biao as a viable successor to Peng.<ref>Domes 82</ref> In 1958 Lin joined the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo Standing Committee]]<ref name="Lee172">Lee 172</ref> and became one of China's [[Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|Vice-chairmen]]. After the 1959 [[Lushan Conference]], at which Peng criticized Mao's disastrous [[Great Leap Forward]], Peng was arrested and removed from all government positions.<ref name="MMW141" /> Privately, Lin agreed with Peng and was strongly opposed to Peng being purged, but Lin's fear of being purged himself kept him from publicly opposing Mao's efforts to purge Peng,<ref name="Hux1">Hu Xingdou 1</ref> and Lin publicly condemned Peng as a "careerist, a conspiracist, and a hypocrite".<ref>Barnouin and Yu 183</ref> Under Mao's direction, Peng was disgraced and put under indefinite house arrest.<ref name="Hux1" /> Lin became the senior leader most publicly supportive of Mao following the Great Leap Forward,<ref>Barnouin and Yu 191</ref> during which Mao's economic policies caused an artificial famine in which tens of millions of people starved to death.<ref>Yang. Section I</ref> For example, Lin publicly defended Mao during the [[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference]] in 1962.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book|last=He|first=Henry|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YCm3DAAAQBAJ&q=7000+people+meeting+china+1962&pg=PT314|title=Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China|year= 2016|publisher=[[Routledge]]|isbn=978-1-315-50043-0|language=en}}</ref>

Lin initially refused to replace Peng, but eventually accepted the position at the insistence of Mao Zedong. As Defense Minister, Lin's command of the PLA was second only to Mao, but he deferred many of his responsibilities to subordinates. The most important figures to whom Lin deferred the day-to-day operations of China's armed forces were [[Luo Ruiqing]], Chief of Staff, and [[He Long]], the [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Vice-chairman]].<ref name="MMW141" />
[[File:China 10th Anniversary Parade in Beijing 01.jpg|thumb|right|380px|On 1 October 1959, Lin Biao, as defense minister, surveyed the honor guards at the military parade celebrating the [[10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China|10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China]].]]
As Defense Minister, Lin's policies differed from those of his predecessor. Lin attempted to reform China's armed forces based on political criteria: he abolished all signs and privileges of rank, purged members considered sympathetic to the USSR, directed soldiers to work part-time as industrial and agricultural workers, and indoctrinated the armed forces in [[Maoism|Mao Zedong Thought]].<ref>Snow. "Biographical Notes".</ref> Lin's system of indoctrination made it clear the Party was in command of China's armed forces, and Lin ensured that the army's political commissars enjoyed great power and status in order to see that his directives were followed.<ref name="Lee172" /> Lin implemented these reforms in order to please Mao, but privately was concerned that they would weaken the PLA (which they did).<ref name="Qiu80" /> Mao strongly approved of these reforms,<ref name="MMW141" /> and conscientiously promoted Lin to a series of high positions.<ref name="Qiu15">Qiu ''The Culture of Power''. 15</ref>

Lin used his position as Minister of Defense to flatter Mao by promoting Mao's cult of personality.<ref name="Tanner522">Tanner (2009) 522</ref> Lin devised and ran a number of national Maoist propaganda campaigns based on the PLA, the most successful of which was the "learn from [[Lei Feng]]" campaign, which Lin began in 1963.<ref>Ebrey 442</ref> Because he was the person most responsible for directing the "learn from Lei Feng" campaign, Lin may have directed the forging of ''Lei Feng's Diary'', upon which the propaganda campaign was based.<ref name="Tanner522" />

Because of Lin's fragile health, Ye Qun controlled many aspects of Lin's public life during the 1960s, including who would see Lin and what others would know about him. Mao encouraged Ye to act on Lin's behalf, giving her an unusual amount of power and responsibility. In 1965 Mao asked Ye to publicly criticize Lin's chief of staff, Luo Ruiqing, on Lin's behalf, even though Ye did not yet hold any high political position. When Lin discovered that Ye had done so (after Luo was purged), he was angry at Ye, but powerless to alter Luo's disgrace.<ref>Qiu ''The Culture of Power''. 149</ref>

Lin often read speeches prepared by others, and allowed his name to be placed on articles that he did not write, as long as these materials supported Mao. One of the most famous articles published in Lin's name<ref>Teiwes and Sun 5</ref> was the 20,000-word pamphlet on revolution in developing countries, ''Long Live the Victory of the People's War!'', which was released in 1965.<ref name="Crean">{{Cite book |last=Crean |first=Jeffrey |title=The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-23394-2 |edition= |series=New Approaches to International History series |location=London, UK |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=100}} This article made Lin one of China's leading interpreters of Mao's political theories. The article likened the "emerging forces" of the poor in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the "rural areas of the world", while the affluent countries of the West were likened to the "cities of the world". Eventually the "cities" would be encircled by revolutions in the "rural areas", following theories prevalent in Mao Zedong Thought.<ref name="Lee172" /> Lin made no promise that China would fight other people's wars, and foreign revolutionaries were advised to depend mainly on "self-reliance".

Lin worked closely with Mao, promoting [[Mao's cult of personality]]. Lin directed the compilation of some of Chairman Mao's writings into a handbook, the ''[[Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong]]'', which became known as ''the Little Red Book''.<ref>Han</ref> Lin Biao's military reforms and the success of the 1962 [[Sino-Indian War]] impressed Mao. A propaganda campaign called "learn from the People's Liberation Army" followed. In 1966, this campaign widened into the [[Cultural Revolution]].