Editing Majority rule (section)

=== Agenda manipulation ===
{{Main|McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem}}
If voter's preferences are defined over a multidimensional option space, then choosing options using pairwise majority rule is unstable. In most cases, there will be no [[Condorcet winner criterion|Condorcet winner]] and any option can be chosen through a sequence of votes, regardless of the original option. This means that adding more options and changing the order of votes ("agenda manipulation") can be used to arbitrarily pick the winner.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Cox |first1=Gary W. |author-link=Gary W. Cox |title=Positive Changes in Political Science |last2=Shepsle |first2=Kenneth A. |author-link2=Kenneth Shepsle |pages=20–23 |chapter=Majority Cycling and Agenda Manipulation: Richard McKelvey's Contributions and Legacy |date=2007 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-472-06986-6 |editor-last=Aldrich |editor-first=John Herbert |series=Analytical perspectives on politics |location=Ann Arbor, Michigan |editor-last2=Alt |editor-first2=James E. |editor-last3=Lupia |editor-first3=Arthur}}</ref>