Editing Mind (section)

== Relation to matter ==
=== Mind–body problem ===
{{main|Mind–body problem}}

The mind–body problem is the difficulty of providing a general explanation of the relationship between mind and body, for example, of the link between thoughts and brain processes. Despite their different characteristics, mind and body interact with each other, like when a bodily change causes mental discomfort or when a limb moves because of an [[intention]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=11–12}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=3–4}} }}</ref> The mind–body problem came to particular prominence in modern philosophy as a result of Descartes' metaphysical distinction between mind and body. Earlier philosophers typically did not see mind and body as contrasting principles.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Westphal|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=EY0nDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 12–13, 21–22]}} | {{harvnb|Crane|Patterson|2000|pp=2–5}} }}</ref>{{efn|According to [[Aristotle]]'s [[hylomorphism]], for example, they are complementary principles: the soul is the form of the body while the body is the matter of the soul.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crane|Patterson|2000|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Shields|2020|loc=§ 2. Hylomorphism in General}} }}</ref>}} Following Descartes' philosophy, minds were often conceived as substantial entities able to exist on their own. Now they are more commonly seen as capacities rather than independent entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=2–3, 5–6}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=5–8, 68–69}} | {{harvnb|McQueen|McQueen|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ho5KEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} | {{harvnb|Morton|2005|p=603}} }}</ref>

[[File:Dualism-vs-Monism.png|thumb|right|upright=1.3|alt=Diagram of approaches to the mind–body problem. It shows dualism in the form of Cartesian dualism on the left side. It presents monism in the forms of physicalism, idealism, and neutral monism on the right side.|Different approaches toward resolving the mind–body problem<ref>{{harvnb|Kind|Stoljar|2023|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_VC_EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT19 § Introduction]}}</ref>]]

According to [[substance dualism]], minds or souls exist as independent [[Substance theory|entities]] in addition to material things. This view implies that, at least in principle, minds can exist without bodies.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=34–36}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=13, 41–42}} | {{harvnb|Matheson|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6dM5DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 12]}} }}</ref> [[Property dualism]] is another view, saying that mind and matter are not independent entities but different [[Property (philosophy)|properties]] that apply to the same individual.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=5, 202–203}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=44}} }}</ref> [[Monism|Monist]] views, by contrast, state that reality is made up of only one kind. According to metaphysical [[Idealism|idealists]], for instance, everything is mental.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=5}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=44, 47–48}} }}</ref>{{efn|There are other forms of idealism that assert slightly different positions, such as [[transcendental idealism]] and [[absolute idealism]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Alston|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4JNlDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 97]}} | {{harvnb|Guyer|Horstmann|2023|loc=§ 1. Introduction}} }}</ref>}} They understand material things as mental phenomena, for example, as ideas or perceptions.<ref>{{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=246}}</ref> According to [[Neutral monism|neutral monists]], by contrast, the world is at its most fundamental level neither physical nor mental but neutral. They see physical and mental concepts as convenient but superficial ways to describe reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=256}}</ref>

The monist view most influential since the 20th century has been [[physicalism]], also referred to as [[materialism]],{{efn|The two terms are usually treated as synonyms but some theorists distinguish them by holding that materialism is restricted to [[matter]] while physicalism is a wider term that includes additional physical phenomena, like [[force]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Marcum|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1arGI9NZcAkC&pg=PA19 19]}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iqGLAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref>}} which states that everything is physical.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|p=68}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2024|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=48}} | {{harvnb|Kind|2020|loc=§ 3. Physicalism}} }}</ref> According to [[Eliminative materialism|eliminative physicalism]], there are no mental phenomena, meaning that things like beliefs and desires do not form part of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=71–72}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=75–76}} }}</ref> [[Reductive physicalism|Reductive physicalists]] defend a less radical position: they say that mental states exist but can, at least in principle, be completely described by physics without the need for special sciences like psychology. For example, [[Behaviorism|behaviorists]] aim to analyze mental concepts in terms of observable behavior without resorting to internal mental states.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=72–73, 102–104}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=48–52}} }}</ref> [[Type identity theory]] also belongs to reductive physicalism and says that mental states are the same as brain states.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ravenscroft|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=f1EAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA47 47]}} | {{harvnb|Stoljar|2024|loc=§ 2.2.1 Type Physicalism}} }}</ref> While [[Non-reductive physicalism|non-reductive physicalists]] agree that everything is physical, they say that mental concepts describe physical reality on a more abstract level that cannot be articulated by physics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=129–130}} | {{harvnb|Bigaj|Wüthrich|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1bW9CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA357 357]}} }}</ref> According to [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]], mental concepts do not describe the internal constitution of physical substances but functional roles within a system.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=62}} }}</ref> One consequence of this view is that mind does not depend on brains but can also be [[Multiple realizability|realized by other systems]] that implement the corresponding functional roles, possibly also computers.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=§ 1. What Is Functionalism?}} | {{harvnb|Jaworski|2011|pp=136–137}} }}</ref> A different approach, found in the tradition of [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], aims to dissolve the mind–body problem by arguing that it is based on an artificial dichotomy not present in the phenomenological description of experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grünberg|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=44YzwTjH2goC&pg=PA237 237]}} | {{harvnb|Smith|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ayBv_ywapFEC&pg=PA124 124]}} | {{harvnb|Priest|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zaWJAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA66 66]}} }}</ref>

The [[hard problem of consciousness]] is a central aspect of the mind–body problem: it is the challenge of explaining how physical states can give rise to conscious experience. Its main difficulty lies in the [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|subjective]] and qualitative nature of consciousness, which is unlike typical physical processes. The hard problem of consciousness contrasts with the "easy problems" of explaining how certain aspects of consciousness function, such as perception, memory, or learning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weisberg|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Stating the Problem}} | {{harvnb|Blackmore|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=WycuAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 33–35]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|pp=39–40}} }}</ref>

=== Brain areas and processes ===
Another approach to the relation between mind and matter uses empirical observation to study how the brain works and which brain areas and processes are associated with specific mental phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Opris|Casanova|Lebedev|Popescu|2017|pp=69–70}} | {{harvnb|Barrett|2009|pp=326–327}} }}</ref> The brain is the central organ of the [[nervous system]] and is present in all [[vertebrates]] and the majority of [[invertebrates]]. The [[human brain]] is of particular complexity and consists of about 86 billion [[neuron]]s, which communicate with one another via [[synapse]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Popescu|Opris|2017|pp=23–24}} | {{harvnb|Scanlon|Sanders|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hXR0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA178 178]}} | {{harvnb|Yukalov|Sornette|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NMslBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 38]}} | {{harvnb|Pal|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FdBcEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA145 145]}} }}</ref> They form a complex [[Neural network (biology)|neural network]] and cognitive processes emerge from their electrical and chemical interactions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Athreya|Mouza|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Uc3BDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA52 52–53]}} | {{harvnb|Schoenberg|Marsh|Lerner|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=67SDJTaAIwIC&pg=PA60 60]}} | {{harvnb|Benarroch|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ekwwEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA437 437–438]}} }}</ref> The human brain is divided into regions that are associated with different functions. The main regions are the [[hindbrain]], [[midbrain]], and [[forebrain]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/brain § Brain]}} | {{harvnb|Schoenberg|Marsh|Lerner|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=67SDJTaAIwIC&pg=PA66 66]}} }}</ref> Many biological functions associated with basic survival are the responsibility of the hindbrain and midbrain. Higher mental functions, ranging from thoughts to motivation, are primarily localized in the forebrain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sanderson|Huffman|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gmfDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA59 59–61]}} | {{harvnb|Saab|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=EFu-_qZiEN4C&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Scanlon|Sanders|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hXR0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA178 178–180]}} }}</ref>

[[File:Gray726-Brodman-prefrontal.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram of a side-view of the brain with the prefrontal cortex colored in orange|The [[cerebral cortex]] is divided into various areas with distinct functions, like the [[prefrontal cortex]] (shown in orange) responsible for [[executive functions]].<ref name="auto3">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Athreya|Mouza|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Uc3BDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA52 52–53]}} | {{harvnb|Opris|Casanova|Lebedev|Popescu|2017|p=70}} | {{harvnb|Schoenberg|Marsh|Lerner|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=67SDJTaAIwIC&pg=PA69 69–72]}} }}</ref>]]

The primary operations of many of the main mental phenomena are located in specific areas of the forebrain. The [[prefrontal cortex]] is responsible for [[executive functions]], such as planning, decision-making, problem-solving, and working memory.<ref name="auto3"/> The [[sensory cortex]] processes and interprets sensory information, with different subareas dedicated to different senses, like the [[Visual cortex|visual]] and the [[auditory area]]s. A central function of the [[hippocampus]] is the formation and retrieval of long-term memories. It belongs to the [[limbic system]], which plays a key role in the regulation of emotions through the [[amygdala]]. The [[motor cortex]] is responsible for planning, executing, and controlling voluntary movements. [[Broca's area]] is a separate region dedicated to [[speech production]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Athreya|Mouza|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Uc3BDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA52 52–53]}} | {{harvnb|Schoenberg|Marsh|Lerner|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=67SDJTaAIwIC&pg=PA76 76–77]}} | {{harvnb|Benarroch|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ekwwEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA437 437–438]}} }}</ref> The activity of the different areas is additionally influenced by [[neurotransmitter]]s, which are [[Cell signaling|signaling molecules]] that enhance or inhibit different types of neural communication. For example, [[dopamine]] influences motivation and pleasure while [[serotonin]] affects mood and appetite.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reisyan|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=k_3NCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA91 91–92]}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018|loc=[https://dictionary.apa.org/neurotransmitter § Neurotransmitter]}} | {{harvnb|Khushboo|Kumar|Sharma|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=CQXaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA116 116]}} }}</ref>

The close interrelation of brain processes and the mind is seen by the effect that physical changes of the brain have on the mind. For instance, the consumption of [[psychoactive drugs]], like caffeine, [[antidepressants]], alcohol, and [[psychedelics]], temporarily affects [[Neurochemistry|brain chemistry]] with diverse effects on the mind, ranging from increased attention to mood changes, impaired cognitive functions, and [[hallucination]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Winkelman|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=SxfOEAAAQBAJ&pg=RA1-PA24 24]}} | {{harvnb|Meyer|Meyer|Farrar|Biezonski|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8fhgEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 27]}} | {{harvnb|Frankish|Kasmirli|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5Himf4mFKskC&pg=PA107 107]}} | {{harvnb|Bunge|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AnKoBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA18 18]}} }}</ref> Long-term changes to the brain in the form of [[neurodegenerative diseases]] and [[brain injuries]] can lead to permanent alterations in mental functions. [[Alzheimer's disease]] in its first stage deteriorates the hippocampus, reducing the ability to form new memories and recall existing ones.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dash|Villemarette-Pitman|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=M1jSCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 30–31]}} | {{harvnb|Turkington|Mitchell|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=SA2X3ZHUZaEC&pg=PT133 115]}} }}</ref> An often-cited case of the effects of brain injury is [[Phineas Gage]], whose prefrontal cortex was severely damaged during a work accident when an iron rod pierced through his skull and brain. Gage survived the accident but his [[personality]] and social attitude changed significantly as he became more impulsive, irritable, and anti-social while showing little regard for social conventions and an impaired ability to plan and make rational decisions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Macmillan|Lena|2010|pp=641–643}} | {{harvnb|Marsh|Melvill|Morgan|Norris|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Q6B-AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA44 44]}} }}</ref> Not all these changes were permanent and Gage managed to recover and adapt in some areas.<ref>{{harvnb|Macmillan|Lena|2010|p=655}}</ref>