Editing Operation Linebacker II (section)

==Bombings==

===Initial phase===
The first three missions of the operation were flown as planned by SAC on three consecutive nights beginning on 18 December 1972. On the first night 129 bombers took off, 87 of them from Guam.<ref name = 'McCarthy 1'>McCarthy and Allison, p. 1.</ref><ref>Morocco, p. 148.</ref> 39 support aircraft of the Seventh Air Force, the Navy's Task Force 77 and the [[United States Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] supported the bombers by providing F-4 Phantom fighter escorts, [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief]] [[Wild Weasel]] SAM-suppression missions, Air Force [[Douglas B-66 Destroyer|Douglas EB-66 Destroyer]] and Navy [[Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler|Grumman EA-6 Prowler]] radar-jamming aircraft, chaff drops, [[KC-135]] refueling aircraft and search and rescue aircraft; the skies were dominated by American airpower to ensure the safety of the aircraft involved in the operation.<ref name = 'McCarthy9'>McCarthy and Allison, 1979, p. 9.</ref> One B-52 bomber pilot flying out of Guam recalled "We took off one airplane a minute out of Guam for hours. Just on time takeoff after on time takeoff."<ref>{{cite video | title=Interview with Michael J. (Mike) Connors, 1981 | url=http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-38a2e0-interview-with-michael-j-mike-connors-1981|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208052425/http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-38a2e0-interview-with-michael-j-mike-connors-1981| publisher=WGBH Media Library and Archives | date=21 April 1981|archive-date=8 December 2015}}</ref>

[[File:North Vietnamese Antiaircraft Weapons.jpg|thumb|upright|North Vietnamese anti-aircraft weapons]]
The targets of the first wave of bombers were the North Vietnamese airfields at [[Kép Air Base|Kép]], [[Phúc Yên Air Base|Phúc Yên]] and [[Hòa Lạc Air Base|Hòa Lạc]] and a warehouse complex at [[Yên Viên Railway Station|Yên Viên]] while the second and third waves struck targets around Hanoi. Three B-52's were shot down by the 68 [[surface-to-air missile]]s (SAMs) launched by North Vietnamese batteries, two B-52Gs from Andersen and a B-52D from U-Tapao.<ref name="Zaloga23">Zaloga 2007, p. 23</ref><ref name="Morocco, p. 150">Morocco, p. 150.</ref> Two of the B-52's were shot down over North Vietnam, while the third aircraft made it back to Thailand before crashing {"The 11 Days of Christmas" Marshall L. Michell III, pg 115}.  Two D models from Andersen with heavy battle damage managed to limp into U-Tapao for repairs.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 65.</ref> Of the three downed B-52's, parts of two crews were captured after bailing out over North Vietnam, while the third crew were all rescued in Thailand {"The 11 Days of Christmas" Marshall L. Michel III, pg 115}.   That same evening, an Air Force [[F-111]] Aardvark was shot down while on a mission to bomb the broadcasting facilities of [[Radio Hanoi]].<ref>Walter J. Boyne, ''Linebacker II''. Air Force Magazine, May 1997, Vol. 80, Number 11.</ref>{{page needed|date=December 2023}} Unlike Linebacker, which had been launched in response to a North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam, President Nixon did not address the nation on television to explain the escalation. Instead, Kissinger held a press conference at which he accused (at Nixon's behest) Le Duc Tho of having "backed off" on some of the October understandings.<ref>Ambrose, p. 405.</ref>

On the second night, 93 sorties were flown by the bombers. Their targets included the Kinh No Railroad and storage area, the [[Thái Nguyên]] thermal power plant, and the Yên Viên complex. Although 20 SAMs were launched and a number of the bombers were damaged, none were lost on the mission.<ref name = 'Zaloga23'/> SAC expected that the third (and supposedly last) night of the operation would proceed just as well as the previous one.{{Citation needed|date=October 2015}} The targets of the 99 bombers sent in on 20 December included the Yên Viên railyards, the Ai Mo warehouse complex, the Thái Nguyên power plant, a transshipment point at [[Bắc Giang]], the Kinh No Railroad complex and the Hanoi petroleum products storage area—all in or near Hanoi. The combination of repetitive tactics, degraded EW systems and limited jamming capability led to dire consequences when, as the official Air Force history of the campaign has stated, "all hell broke loose."<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 83.</ref>

The repetitious nature of the previous evening's strike profiles had allowed North Vietnamese air defense forces to anticipate strike patterns and to salvo 34 missiles into the target area.<ref name = 'Zaloga23'/> Four B-52Gs and three B-52Ds were lost in the first and third waves of the mission.<ref name = 'Zaloga23'/> A fourth D model, returning to Thailand, crashed in Laos. Only two of the eight downed crews were recovered by search and rescue aircraft.<ref name="Morocco, p. 150"/> The repercussions from the mission were fast and furious. SAC headquarters was under pressure from "many external sources" to "stop the carnage ... it has become a blood bath".<ref name="McCarthy and Allison, p. 85">McCarthy and Allison, p. 85.</ref> Of more concern was the position taken by many senior Air Force officers that they "would lose too many bombers and that airpower doctrine would be proven fallacious ... or, if the bombing were stopped, the same thing would occur".<ref name="McCarthy and Allison, p. 85"/>

The main problem seemed to lie within the headquarters of SAC, which had based its tactics on a MiG threat that had not materialized during the three missions. The tactics (flight paths, altitudes, formations, timing, etc.) had not varied. The Air Force explanation for this course of events was that the similarity would be helpful to the B-52 crews, who were inexperienced in flying in such high-threat environments.<ref>Gilster, p. 112.</ref> Air Force historian Earl Tilford offered a differing opinion: "Years of dropping bombs on undefended jungle and the routines of planning for nuclear war had fostered a mind-set within the SAC command that nearly led to disaster&nbsp;... Poor tactics and a good dose of overconfidence combined to make the first few nights of Linebacker nightmarish for the B-52 crews."<ref>Tilford, pp. 255–256.</ref> During the operation the USAF depended almost entirely on the [[Ryan Model 147#The last days of the Lightning Bugs 1969-1975|Ryan Model 147 Buffalo Hunter AQM-34L/M]] [[unmanned aerial vehicle]]s for [[bomb damage assessment]] due to bad weather.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA525674.pdf|title=Air Force UAVs: The Secret History|author=Ehrhard, Thomas|date=July 2010|website=Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC®)|publisher=Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies|access-date=20 July 2015|archive-date=18 May 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170518190154/http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA525674|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Re-evaluation===
[[File:B-52G landing at Andersen AFB Dec 1972.JPEG|thumb|left|A B-52G lands at [[Andersen Air Force Base|Andersen AFB]] after a mission on 15 December 1972.]]
It was at this point that President Nixon ordered that the effort be extended past its original three-day deadline. The first change that could be made by local Air Force commanders was divulged by a comparison of the differences between the radar jamming equipment of the B-52 models. The equipment aboard the G models was designed for use in the more sophisticated air defense environment of the Soviet Union, not against the more antiquated [[S-75 Dvina|SA-2]] and [[Fan Song]] radar systems used by the North Vietnamese.<ref>Tilford, p. 256.</ref> SAC headquarters stipulated that only the aircraft stationed at U-Tapao (equipped with more powerful and sophisticated ECM gear) be allowed over the North.<ref>Tilford, p. 257.</ref> On the fourth night (21 December) of the operation, 30 of the U-Tapao bombers struck the Hanoi storage area, the [[Văn Điển Railway Station|Văn Điển]] storage depot, and Quang Te Airfield. Two more of the D models were lost to [[Surface-to-air missile|Surface to Air Missiles]] (SAMs). On the following night, the target area shifted away from Hanoi to the port city of Haiphong and its petroleum storage areas. Once again, 30 aircraft participated in the strikes, but this time there were no losses among the bombers. An F-111 was shot down over the Kinh No Railroad complex.<ref name="Boyne, Linebacker II">Boyne, ''Linebacker II''.</ref>

[[File:Bach Mai 21 December 1972.jpg|thumb|[[Bach Mai Airfield]] bomb damage assessment 21 December 1972]]

On the 22nd, over 100 bombs from a B-52 hit the [[Bach Mai Hospital]] in the southern suburbs of Hanoi, obliterating the building and killing 28 doctors, nurses and pharmacists and wounding 22, despite most taking refuge in the hospital's basement.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last= |title=Bệnh viện Bạch Mai trong trận bom B52 năm 1972 |url=https://vnexpress.net/benh-vien-bach-mai-trong-tran-bom-b52-nam-1972-2931240.html |access-date=2022-03-11 |website=[[vnexpress.net]] |language=vi}}</ref> Almost the entire hospital was destroyed, including the operating rooms and pharmacy stock.<ref>{{Cite news |date=1972-12-24 |title=HOSPITAL DEATHS |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1972/12/24/archives/hospital-deaths-hanoi-aide-says-25-staff-members-are-killed-by.html |access-date=2022-03-11 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The US military claimed that the hospital "frequently housed  anti-aircraft positions."<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Gordon |first1=Neve |last2=Perugini |first2=Nicola |date=2019 |title='Hospital Shields' and the Limits of International Law |url=http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/30/2/2974.pdf |publisher=[[The European Journal of International Law]]}}</ref> According to the director of the hospital, Đỗ Doãn Đại, the US bombing served to break the morale of hospital staff and Hanoians.<ref name=":1" />

The civilian deaths were criticized by the North Vietnamese and U.S. peace activists. The hospital sat 1 kilometer from the runway of [[Bach Mai Airfield]] and a major fuel storage facility was only {{convert|200|yd|order=flip}} away.<ref>Morocco, p. 157.</ref> Two days before Christmas, SAC added SAM sites and airfields to the target list. Air Force F-111s were sent in before the bombers to strike the airfields and reduce the threat of enemy fighters. The F-111s proved so successful in these operations that their mission for the rest of the campaign was shifted to SAM site suppression.<ref name="Morocco, p. 154">Morocco, p. 154.</ref>

The bomber missions of the sixth night (23 December) again avoided Hanoi and hit SAM sites northeast of the city and the Lang Dang Railroad yards.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 107.</ref> There were no losses. On the following night, the run of American good luck (and avoidance of Hanoi) continued. Thirty bombers, supported by 69 tactical aircraft, struck the railyards at [[Thái Nguyên]] and [[Kép]] and no American aircraft were lost during the mission.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 115.</ref> Although the B-52s got most of the publicity during the campaign, the tactical aircraft were also hard at work. While the B-52s and F-111s attacked by night, an average of 69 tactical aircraft of the Air Force, Navy and Marines attacked by day (averaging nearly 100 sorties per day).<ref name="Morocco, p. 154"/> Losses for these aircraft were extremely light, with fewer than a dozen lost during the entire campaign.<ref name="Boyne, Linebacker II"/> It was not difficult for their crews to deduce why. The North Vietnamese air defense forces "simply waited for nightfall and the arrival of more lucrative targets."<ref name="Morocco, p. 154"/>

===Final phase===
The strikes of 24 December were followed by a 36-hour Christmas stand-down, during which Air Force planners went to work to revise their plans for the next phase of operations. Due to aircraft losses during the initial phase, they intended to launch an all-out attack on North Vietnam's air defenses when the operation resumed. This course was also necessary since, by Christmas, most of the strategic targets within North Vietnam were in shambles.<ref>Tilford, p. 259.</ref> SAC also belatedly turned over tactical mission planning to its subordinate [[Eighth Air Force]] headquarters on Guam, which promptly revised the tactics. Instead of using waves, all of the bombers would be in and out of the target area within 20 minutes and they would approach from different directions and at different altitudes. They would exit by varying routes and the steep PTTs were eliminated.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, pp. 121–122.</ref> Ten targets, in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas were to be struck by bombers approaching in seven streams, four of which were to come in off the [[Gulf of Tonkin]].<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 121.</ref>

On 26 December 120 bombers lifted off to strike Thái Nguyên, the Kinh No complex, the Duc Noi, Hanoi, and Haiphong Railroads and a vehicle storage area at Văn Điển. 78 of the bombers took off from Andersen AFB in one time block, the largest single combat launch in SAC history, while 42 others came in from Thailand.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 129.</ref> The bombers were supported by 113 tactical aircraft which provided [[Chaff (countermeasure)|chaff]] corridors, escort fighters, Wild Weasel SAM suppression and electronic countermeasures support.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 124.</ref> The North Vietnamese air defense system was overwhelmed by the number of aircraft it had to track in such a short time and by a dense blanket of chaff laid down by the fighter-bombers.<ref>Morocco, pp. 154–156.</ref> 250 SAMs had been fired from 18 until 24 December and the strain on the remaining North Vietnamese inventory showed, since only 68 were fired during the mission.<ref name="Zaloga23"/>{{efn|The claim made by both general and Air Force historians was that the North Vietnamese SAM inventory was eventually depleted during the campaign. The historian Herman Gilster disagreed with this assessment. "The number of SAMs sighted per B-52 sortie increased from 1.2 during the first phase of the campaign to 1.9 during the last phase. A more reasonable answer to the decline in attrition would be the change in U.S. tactics after the third night."<ref> Gilster, p. 112.</ref>}} One B-52 was shot down near Hanoi and another damaged aircraft made it back to U-Tapao, where it crashed just short of the runway. Only two members of the crew survived.<ref name="Tilford, p. 262">Tilford, p. 262.</ref>

On the following night, 60 bombers flew, with some attacking SAM sites while others struck Lang Dang, Duc Noi, the Trung Quang Railroad and Văn Điển. One B-52 was so heavily damaged that its crew ejected over Laos, where it was rescued. A second aircraft was not so lucky. It took a direct hit and went down while attacking the Trung Quang Railroad yards.<ref>McCarthy and Allison, p. 152.</ref> During the evening's operations two F-4s and an [[HH-53]] search and rescue helicopter were also shot down.<ref name="Boyne, Linebacker II"/> Day ten (28 December) called for strikes by 60 B-52s–15 Gs and 15 Ds from Andersen and 30 Ds from U-Tapao, The aircraft formed six waves attacking five targets. Four of the waves struck targets in the Hanoi area (including SAM Support Facility #58), while the fifth hit the Lang Dang Railroad yards southwest of [[Lạng Sơn]], a major choke-point on the supply route from the People's Republic of China. No aircraft were lost on the mission.<ref name="Tilford, p. 262"/> By the eleventh day (29 December), there were few strategic targets worthy of mention left within North Vietnam. There were two SAM storage areas at Phúc Yên and the Lang Dang yards that could be profitably attacked.<ref name = 'McCarthy163'/> A total of 60 aircraft again made the trip North but the mix was altered; U-Tapao again provided 30 D models but the Andersen force was varied, putting 12 G models and 18 Ds over the North. Total bombing was rounded out by sending 30 G models on [[Operation Arc Light|Arc Light]] missions in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam and in South Vietnam.<ref name = 'McCarthy163'>McCarthy and Allison, p. 163.</ref>